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9Preface
Preface
Dear Reader, 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union emphasises the 
“indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidar-
ity” and prohibits discrimination “based on any ground such as sex, race, 
 colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, 
political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, 
birth, disability, age or sexual orientation”.
Robust human rights in a diverse, tolerant and multicultural Europe are not 
only essential for the protection of minorities. They form the very essence of 
social cohesion and healthy democracy. Whether Europe opts for or against 
tolerance and diversity depends on the actual integration of heterogeneous 
groups. It is the extent of prejudices towards e.g. migrants, Muslims, homo-
sexuals, or unemployed that reflects the will of Europeans to mutual accept-
ance and recognition.
On top of the everyday discrimination documented by the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights, the growing success of populist and extrem-
ist right-wing movements attests to a yawning gulf between desire and reality. 
Especially in times of crisis, the extreme right scores with exclusionist slogans 
and allegedly simple “solutions”.
If we consider their electoral successes in countries like Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Hungary, we cannot ignore the question: “What is Eu-
rope’s present state as far as our fundamental democratic values are concerned?”
Do Europeans believe in the values of human rights, such as tolerance, intercul-
tural diversity and solidarity? How widespread are prejudices towards “others” 
who are supposedly “different“? And to which extent are we willing to accept 
social, ethnic, cultural and religious minorities as equals and grant them equal 
participation? What does this mean for politics and society?
With this investigation into the extent of prejudice, intolerance and anti-dem-
ocratic attitudes in eight European countries the “Project on Combating Right-
Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report10
Wing Extremism” of the Forum Berlin of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung hopes to 
advance society’s political discourse on anti-democratic tendencies in  Europe. 
We hope that this both informative and worrying European report on intoler-
ance, prejudice and discrimination will stimulate efforts to promote democracy 
and counteract right-wing extremism, racism and other prejudices.
Our heartfelt thanks go to the authors of the report, Dr. Beate Küpper, Prof. 
Dr. Andreas Zick and Andreas Hövermann, along with all others involved in 
its publication. You can find this report and other information on the work of 
the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for democracy and against right-wing extremism 
at http://www.fes-gegen-rechtsextremismus.de.
Nora Langenbacher 
Project on Combating Right-wing Extremism 
Forum Berlin, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
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Authors’ Foreword
Intolerance threatens the social cohesion of plural and democratic societies. 
It reflects the extent to which we respect or reject social, ethnic, cultural and 
religious minorities. It marks out those who are “strange”, “other” or “out-
siders”, who are not equal, less worthy. The most visible expression of intoler-
ance and discrimination is prejudice. Indicators of intolerance such as prejudice, 
anti-democratic attitudes and the prevalence of discrimination consequently 
represent sensitive measures of social cohesion.
Investigating intolerance, prejudice and discrimination is an important pro-
cess of self-reflection for society and crucial to the protection of groups and 
minorities. We should also remember that intolerance towards one group is 
usually associated with negativity towards others. The European Union ac-
knowledged this when it declared 1997 the European Year against Racism. In 
the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam the European Union called for joint efforts to 
combat prejudice and discrimination experienced by groups and individuals on 
the basis of their ethnic features, cultural background, religion, gender, sexual 
orientation, age or disability.
It is therefore all the more surprising that we still know so little about the 
general extent of prejudices against different groups in the countries of Eu-
rope. Until now, we have had no cross-cultural data set created using uniform 
methodology.
This report is the very first to supply comprehensive and comparable data about 
the extent of prejudice and discrimination against the main target groups in 
eight selected European countries. This representative data, based on the find-
ings of a research project on group-focused enmity in Europe (GFE Europe) 
initiated by the University of Bielefeld, allows us to analyse the differences be-
tween countries and discover what they have in common.
The objective of this publication is to make the findings and data available to 
the international research community in an accessible and manageable form, 
and above all to stimulate social and political discussion. Accordingly, the fo-
cus is on advancing the political discussion about prejudice and discrimination 
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rather than on the complexities of theory. If Europe wishes to know whether 
prejudices, stereotypes and discriminatory mentalities in individual member 
states are endangering or even corroding democracy then the findings of the 
present publication supply an alarming wake-up call. We hope that our data 
and analyses will invigorate the European discussion and supply empirical evi-
dence that has hitherto been sorely lacking.
We owe very special thanks to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for making it pos-
sible to publish this research report, which we hope will channel our scientific 
findings into the broader political debate in society. Most of all, we are grateful 
to Nora Langenbacher for her conceptual contribution and editorial rework-
ing of the study. 
Thanks are also due to Eva Fenn, media researcher and editor, for polishing 
the language and standardizing the style of the original German report. She 
has ensured that our academic texts are highly readable and accessible to a lay 
 audience, a priority we share with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Under some-
times difficult circumstances she put great energy into supporting and assisting 
us competently during every phase of production.
Meredith Dale translated the German text and edited the present English edi-
tion, assisted by his close colleague Melanie Newton. He is a very experienced 
translator with terrific knowledge and flair for social scientific texts. A big thank 
you to him for his excellent work. 
Our gratitude is also due to Carina Wolf for her great work processing the 
data and our student assistants Silke Grygier, Lisa Beckmann, Judith Raum 
and Marie-Luise Alders, who showed skill and intelligence in helping to pro-
duce this publication.
This report is based on survey data collected in the scope of a major inter-
national research project based at the University of Bielefeld (see p. 18/19). 
We would like to thank our entire team for their hard work and dedication in 
developing and implementing the study, and our sponsors for their financial 
support for the workshops and survey (see chapter 1). 
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Summary
We investigated the broad extent, major determinants and possible causes 
of group-focused enmity in eight European countries on the basis of a tel-
ephone survey of a representative sample of one thousand subjects per coun-
try. “Group-focused enmity” describes the syndrome of interlinked negative 
attitudes and prejudices towards groups identified as “other”, “different” or 
“abnormal” and assigned inferior social status. These take the form of anti-
immigrant attitudes, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism and 
homophobia as well as prejudices against other identified groups. Our central 
findings are:
 Group-focused enmity is widespread in Europe. It is weakest in the Nether-
lands, and strongest in Poland and Hungary. With respect to anti-immigrant 
attitudes, anti-Muslim attitudes and racism there are only minor differences 
between the countries, while differences in the extent of anti-Semitism, sex-
ism and homophobia are much more marked.
 About half of all European respondents believe there are too many immi-
grants in their country. Between 17 percent in the Netherlands and more 
than 70 percent in Poland believe that Jews seek to benefit from their fore-
bears’ suffering during the Nazi era. About one third of respondents believe 
there is a natural hierarchy of ethnicity. Half or more condemn Islam as “a 
religion of intolerance”. A majority in Europe also subscribe to sexist atti-
tudes rooted in traditional gender roles and demand that: “Women should 
take their role as wives and mothers more seriously.” With a figure of about 
one third, Dutch respondents are least likely to affirm sexist attitudes. The 
proportion opposing equal rights for homosexuals ranges between 17 per-
cent in the Netherlands and 88 percent in Poland; they believe it is not good 
“to allow marriages between two men or two women”.
 These at first glance very different prejudices are interconnected. Those 
who denigrate one group are very likely to target other groups too. Al-
though prejudices sometimes appear to be isolated they are in fact closely 
interconnected.
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 Three ideological orientations are especially associated with group-focused 
enmity: authoritarianism (an underlying attitude espousing law and order 
and discipline), Social Dominance Orientation (advocating social status hier-
archies) and the rejection of diversity (a general rejection of cultural, ethnic 
and religious diversity within a country).
 Group-focused enmity increases with age and decreases with education and 
income; attitudes differ little between men and women.
 General political attitudes are relevant only to a certain degree. Respond-
ents who describe themselves as tending to the right, who feel politically 
powerless and who wish for a strong leader and support the death penalty 
are on average more prejudiced. The intensity of political interest is of little 
relevance for the dissemination of prejudice.
 Group-focused enmity need not remain restricted to attitudes. It can also 
have consequences for action. We investigated this in relation to immi-
grants. Respondents who denigrate weak groups are more likely to oppose 
integration of immigrants, to refuse them equal political participation, to 
discriminate against them and to use violence against them.
 Alongside an authoritarian mentality that supports hierarchies the most im-
portant explanatory factors for group-focused enmity are a subjective feeling 
that immigrants represent a threat and a general feeling of social disorienta-
tion. Low income and the feeling of being disadvantaged also play a role.
 The most important factors mitigating against group-focused enmity are 
trust in others, the ability to forge firm friendships, contact with immigrants, 
and above all a positive basic attitude towards diversity. Religiosity on the 
other hand does not mitigate against group-focused enmity, and holding 
general values that emphasize security and universalism plays only a small 
role in explaining tolerant attitudes.
151. Multicultural Europe between Tolerance and Prejudice
1. Multicultural Europe between Tolerance 
and Prejudice: General Observations and 
Project Design
The countries and cultures of Europe have always been diverse and heteroge-
neous in their ethnic, religious and social composition. The opening of borders, 
globalization of markets and production, worldwide migration and new com-
munication technologies mean this trend will continue, even if populist and 
extremist forces on the right persist in their attempts to stir up antipathy and 
mobilize citizens against any acceptance of cultural heterogeneity.
As a continent of very many different countries, languages and cultures Europe 
is by its very nature diverse. It is a place where people from different cultural, 
ethnic and religious backgrounds, men and women with different sexual ori-
entations, individuals with and without physical and mental disabilities pursu-
ing widely differing lifestyles and inhabiting different economic milieus all live 
together. So diversity is both a fact and a project to be pursued for the future. 
The future of Europe depends not only on the acceptance of diversity but also 
on the quality of integration of heterogeneous groups, and that in turn is a 
question of recognizing their equality. Hitherto marginalized and subordinated 
groups are increasingly demanding equal treatment as well as involvement, par-
ticipation and support for their group with its specific identity and cultural char-
acteristics. Whether people from different social groups manage to live together 
peacefully as equals or find their coexistence charged with conflict will depend 
on the willingness of the hitherto dominant groups and majorities to treat oth-
ers as equals and integrate them, and on their general attitude to diversity.
Europe faces three fundamental questions that will exert a decisive influence 
on the equality of individuals in societies (as enshrined in declarations of hu-
man rights but rarely achieved in reality):
 Which groups are accepted as members of society?
 How equal is the participation of, for example, immigrants, religious minori-
ties, women, homosexuals and disabled people?
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 What degree of conformity and subordination is demanded and how are 
outsiders treated?
The first point is a question of tolerance. To what extent are heterogeneity 
and diversity desired or tolerated in Europe? The second question follows on 
from the first, pointing us towards the social order. It asks how strong the 
desire is to arrange social groups in hierarchies, or, conversely, how great the 
willingness is to treat these groups as equals and place them on a par with 
one another. The third question touches on the relationships between indi-
viduals and groups and concerns how strongly the individual must submit to 
the social order and to what extent outsiders and non-conformists can expect 
rigidity or tolerance.
The visible and invisible dislike, rejection and exclusion of social groups that we 
designate and identify as “different” are the yardstick to answer these three 
questions. This is where the power of prejudice comes into play. The extent of 
prejudices against migrants, Muslims, black people and Jews, and the treat-
ment of women, homosexuals, disabled, poor and unemployed people show us 
whether a society is for or against tolerance, diversity and integration. Impor-
tantly, prejudice against immigrants, Jews, black people, and increasingly also 
Muslims form central components of right-wing populist and extremist attitudes 
(Decker and Brähler 2006; Zick and Küpper 2009), and a sexist and homophobic 
undertone often resonates through right-wing populist and extremist propa-
ganda. Perpetrators of violence against homeless and disabled people commonly 
share right-wing extremist attitudes (at least subliminally), or even feel encour-
aged to commit such acts of violence by the concomitant ideologies.
After a long period during which Europe was reluctant to take the connec-
tions between widely differing forms of discrimination seriously and seek joint 
strategies for action against all facets of prejudice and discrimination, the EU 
finally used the European Year against Racism in 1997 to call for action against 
all forms of prejudice and discrimination. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam: 
the Council … may take appropriate action to combat discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation.
The struggle against what we term group-focused enmity has thus been a 
declared political goal of the EU for thirteen years now. In pursuing these ob-
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jectives some European countries have assumed a pioneering role while oth-
ers continue to drag their feet. This applies especially in relation to prejudice-
based discrimination in the labour market (Chopin and Gounari 2010 for the 
European Commission). Transforming the pertinent European directives into 
national legislation was no easy matter, and laws and regulations can only do 
so much to address bigoted personal opinions.
So it is little surprise that when it comes to access to education, health, hous-
ing or work, for example, people continue to suffer discrimination on the basis 
of their group membership. While certain countries have made great progress 
in their efforts to achieve equality, for example for women or homosexuals, 
elsewhere equal rights and opportunities still continue to be obstructed, with-
held or even refused to many groups, either through structural conditions, or 
in some cases even quite openly through laws and regulations.
In relation to hate crime we observe a similar situation. Despite their prom-
ises to the OSCE, many European countries still supply incomplete statistics 
on prejudice-driven acts of violence, or none at all (Human Rights First 2009). 
One reason for this is that hate crime is not (yet) separately specified in national 
legislation. Another possible cause is a lack of awareness, leading to a failure 
to record prejudice-based hate crimes as such.
And finally, we must also consider the aspect of general ignorance about 
prejudice. In the public sphere the prejudices that constitute group-focused 
enmity are widely classed as individual attitudes or mentalities and judged to 
be of little relevance for the quality of democratic culture. Here it is all too 
easy to overlook the way anti-democratic extremist and populist groups feed 
on prejudice; indeed, prejudice could be said to be the essence of right-wing 
extremism. If acceptance of plurality and tolerance of difference and diversity 
are essential pillars of democracy, then agitation designed to undermine them 
is a serious threat to the very foundations of the structure. Widespread preju-
dices that classify particular groups as inferior and exclude them from equal 
participation make a mockery of democracy.
Moreover, prejudices play havoc with efforts to promote diversity, equality 
and integration. This work is always an uphill struggle, and often experiences 
set-backs where hostility towards people on the basis of their group member-
ship comes to dominate. Political actors, opinion leaders and the media, as 
well as individual European citizens, need to ask themselves critically whether 
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they may in fact– possibly without even noticing – encourage, condone or 
prepare the ground for group-focused enmity. The hostility towards people of 
Islamic faith that is currently rampant in Europe provides clear evidence that 
even those who overtly reject prejudice can be involved here, willingly or un-
willingly. Those who occupy political offices and public roles are human too, 
and as such not immune to prejudice. As these observations demonstrate, it 
is high time to take a closer look at the severity and dissemination of preju-
dices in Europe.
The structure of the study
The present volume documents the European population’s attitudes and be-
liefs concerning tolerance, diversity and integration. In this respect it supplies 
a solid analysis of the state of affairs in Europe that is fit to serve as the basis 
for serious discussion. More than ten years after Europe set itself the ambitious 
goal of ending discrimination, this volume investigates the current extent of 
group-focused enmity employing scientific criteria and methods. Using survey 
data from eight European countries we document the magnitude of prejudice 
towards migrants, black people, Jews, Muslims, women and homosexuals. As 
well as their quantitative relevance, these groups are also decisive in defining 
the discourse. The choice of groups was constrained by the limits of the sur-
vey and is by no means exhaustive: Europe suffers from many other prejudices 
that have come to permeate everyday life. We were, for example, unable to 
consider prejudices against homeless, poor, overweight or disabled people, to 
name but a few of the marginalized groups that are singled out and treated 
as inferior.
The analysis is based on survey data collected in telephone interviews of a rep-
resentative sample of 1,000 persons aged 16 and above per country conducted 
in autumn 2008 in the scope of the Group-based Enmity in Europe study. The 
countries involved were France, Germany, Great Britain,1 Hungary, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal. The countries were selected to reflect the 
different geographical regions of the EU, taking old and new member states 
into account. The number of countries included was restricted by the avail-
able funding. The study was designed and conducted in collaboration with an 
1 The survey was conducted in England, Wales and Scotland, but not Northern Ireland.
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international interdisciplinary team of renowned experts in prejudice and sur-
vey research and funded by private private foundations.2 
We begin by providing a brief overview of the groups targeted by the surveyed 
prejudices, describing the groups and determining their size (chapter 1.1). We 
believe it is important to document how the statements about these groups – 
which many respondents agreed with – are not only negative but also at odds 
with the objective facts. As we show in our findings, the level of prejudice 
against a particular group has little to do with its actual numerical presence. 
But before we come to the results we outline what we understand by prejudice, 
how it is expressed and what consequences it has. Finally, at the end of the 
volume, we consider which especially important influencing factors promote 
or prevent discriminatory attitudes (chapter 9). 
1.1 Outsiders in Europe – the Targets of Prejudice
The present study concentrates on European attitudes towards migrants, black 
people, Jews, Muslims, women and homosexuals. It is against these and other 
groups that group-focused enmity is directed and it is they who are most often 
the victims of deliberate discrimination and structural disadvantage. Moreover, 
these groups are specifically targeted by right-wing populist propaganda and 
extremist violence, with right-wing politicians often claiming that “we” are be-
ing “swamped” or arguing that the cultures are incompatible. In the following 
we provide some objective facts about the targeted groups, touching on their 
experience of discrimination in order to demonstrate the harm prejudice causes.
2 Grants were dedicated to Andreas Zick and Beate Küpper, who also managed the project. 
The team included: France: Dr. Nonna Mayer, CERI, Sciences Po Paris and Dr. Guillaume 
Roux, University of Grenoble; Germany: Prof. Ulrich Wagner, University of Marburg and 
Carina Wolf, University of Bielefeld; Great Britain: Prof. Miles Hewstone and Dr. Katha-
rina Schmid, University of Oxford; Hungary: Prof. Antal Örkény and Luca Váradi, Eötvös 
Loránd University of Budapest; Italy: Prof. Alberto Voci, University of Padua; the Neth-
erlands: Dr. Bertjan Doosje, Prof. Roel Meertens and Anja Zimmermann, University of 
Amsterdam; Poland: Prof. Pavel Boski and Marta Penczek, Polish Academy of Sciences, 
University of Warsaw; Portugal: Prof. Jorge Vala, Dr. Alice Ramos and Cicero Pereira, Uni-
versity of Lisbon. The project was supported financially by the Compagnia di San Paolo, 
the Freudenberg Stiftung, the Groeben Stiftung, the VolkswagenStiftung, and two other 
private foundations. We would like to express our particular gratitude to Christian Petry, 
Prof. Piero Gastaldo and Dr. Wilhelm Krull, who opened unexpected doors for us, as well 
as to the Amadeu Antonio Foundation for their constant support. The project was also 
supported by the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence at the 
University of Bielefeld, which provided resources for staff and equipment.
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As the continent with the greatest inward migration, Europe should be es-
pecially interested in prejudice against immigrants. Every year about two mil-
lion people migrate to Europe, with almost the same number leaving again. 
Migration within Europe is even greater still. The proportion of immigrants in 
the total population varies in the countries under consideration here from 1.3 
percent in Poland to 12.2 percent in Great Britain (Table 1).
Immigrants to Europe originate from very different countries, by no means 
forming a homogeneous group. In Great Britain many immigrants come from 
the former colonies of India, Pakistan and the Caribbean, while more recently 
many labour migrants have arrived from Poland. In Germany immigrants from 
Turkey who arrived as temporary labour migrants (“guest workers”) but stayed 
form the largest group. Germany also has many ethnic German immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe who enjoy automatic Ger-
man citizenship. The third major group in Germany are labour migrants from 
southern European countries that are now in the EU, along with their descend-
ants. Most immigrants in France have North African roots; many originate from 
the former colony of Algeria and possess French citizenship. The Netherlands 
is home to many immigrants from the former Dutch colonies of Indonesia and 
Surinam, as well as many people with Moroccan and Tunisian roots. In Italy 
the proportion of immigrants is considerably smaller, the main groups being 
undocumented migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Roma from Romania 
seeking work. Migration from the Balkan states increased during the Yugo-
slavian wars. As a former colonial power Portugal also records considerable 
immigration from Africa, and has recently also attracted labour migrants from 
Ukraine. The official statistics show very little immigration in Poland, but many 
temporary labour migrants come from neighbouring eastern European coun-
tries, especially to work in agriculture. Most immigrants in Hungary originate 
from formerly Hungarian regions of neighbouring Romania, Serbia, Slovakia 
and Ukraine. These immigrants are perceived not as foreigners but as people 
with Hungarian roots. In that sense they are comparable to ethnic Germans 
from the former Soviet Union whose German citizenship means they do not 
appear as foreigners in official German statistics, even though empirical stud-
ies show that the population at large often sees them as foreign (Zick et al. 
2001). The same often also applies to immigrants from former colonies, who 
are frequently treated as foreigners even though they are legally citizens.
Thus the extent to which people are perceived as foreigners or outsiders does 
not necessarily depend on their birth, citizenship or origins. A person may pos-
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sess a country’s citizenship and have lived there for decades yet still be regarded 
by the majority of the population as a migrant, foreigner or outsider. This may 
even apply if they were born there and have lived there all their lives. This is 
above all the case when they are members of a group identified as foreign, a 
group that is categorized as “other” in ethnic, cultural or religious terms and 
negatively stereotyped.
Immigrants who belong to a non-Christian religion are quickly labelled as out-
siders in the overwhelmingly Christian continent of Europe. In the surveyed 
countries there are comparatively few adherents of non-Christian religions, 
but here we are dealing with estimates rather than hard data. France has the 
highest proportion of Muslims in the population, with approx. 10 percent. In 
Germany and the Netherlands Muslims represent between 6 and 7 percent of 
the population, in Great Britain 4 percent. Even fewer Muslims live in Hungary, 
Poland and Portugal; in all three the proportion is less than 1 percent (Table 
1). It is estimated that altogether 1.12 million Jews live in the European Union 
(Della Pergola 2010). With about half a million France has by far the largest 
Jewish population. In all other surveyed countries the proportion of Jews is less 
than 1 percent; it is particularly small in Poland and Portugal.
Table 1: Migrants and Muslims in Europe (percent of population) 
Muslimsa Migrantsb Main countries of origin
France  10.0 10.4 North Africa, esp. Algeria
Germany   7.0 12.3 Turkey, former Soviet Union,  
eastern Europe
Great Britain   4.0   9.1 South East Asia, Pakistan,  
Caribbean islands, Poland
Hungary 0.03   3.1 Romania, especially former  
Hungarian territories
Italy   2.1   4.3 Balkan states incl. Romania, Africa
Netherlands   6.0 10.1 Indonesia, Surinam, Morocco, 
Turkey
Poland 0.07   1.8 Eastern Europe, esp. Ukraine 
Portugal 0.14   7.3 Africa, Ukraine
a Kettani (2010), percentages based on total population of country regardless of citizenship. Figures 
are somewhat higher than those calculated on the basis of national citizenship.
b Foreign-born residents as percentage of total population (Muenz 2006; OECD data).
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We also consider homosexuals as targets of group-focused enmity. Although 
churches and the state conduct a lively moral and legal discourse about ho-
mosexuality, there are as yet no reliable figures for their proportion of the 
population. This is generally estimated to be approx. 5 percent (for men and 
women alike), although far from all live their homosexuality openly. In some 
studies, a considerable number of people who would not describe themselves 
as homosexual report having felt attracted to a person of their own gender 
at some time.
Gender is of course one of the central categories on which the prejudices and 
stereotypes of everyday life are based. The lack of equality between men and 
women in all spheres of life is a persistent deficit, for women continue to suf-
fer massive structural disadvantage. Although women are affected by preju-
dice and discrimination, unlike the other listed groups they are not a minor-
ity. In fact, in all of the countries considered here women tend to represent a 
slight majority.
1.2. The Experience of Discrimination
In 2008 the European Commission published a comprehensive special report 
on discrimination, using Eurobarometer data to determine how many people 
see themselves as part of a minority and examine how prevalent the experi-
ence of discrimination is.3 The following figures taken from the Special Eu-
robarometer 296: Discrimination in the EU 2008 outline the dimensions of 
discrimination experienced by the groups targeted by the prejudices surveyed 
for this study. Thus the findings reported below are also based on surveys and 
therefore reflect subjective perceptions, assessments and reported experiences 
of both the affected minority and the c orresponding majority.
Contact with outgroups: According to the Eurobarometer survey, 61 percent 
of Europeans say they have friends or acquaintances who are “of a different 
religion or have different beliefs to them”. More than half say they know some-
one with a disability or a person of a different ethnic origin (55 percent in each 
3 The European Commission’s Eurobarometer opinion survey has been conducted at reg-
ular intervals in all EU member states since 1973. The topics covered include environ-
mental and climate protection, health, culture, poverty and social exclusion, human 
rights and equality, and integration of minorities. (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
index_en.htm).
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On the role of subjective perception
People’s subjective views of the world, including their understand-
ing and interpretation of discrimination, are of course not necessarily 
identical with the objectively measurable facts. There are occasions 
where institutions and individuals insist that particular reported ex-
periences of prejudice and discrimination lack any objective basis. 
That is a mistaken perception. Firstly, when analysing the state of a 
democratic society the subjective impressions and perceptions of its 
citizens – the “soft data” – are not only revealing but absolutely in-
dispensable. Democracies require a broad consensus on values and 
norms, where violations cannot be reduced to objective facts alone. 
Social attitudes and convictions, collective emotions and experiences 
of discrimination are all indicative of the climate and the strength 
of cohesive forces, and signalize where conflicts and problems exist 
or might emerge. Individual interpretations, the respective excerpt 
of social reality, fundamental values and many other aspects always 
feed into people’s subjective perspectives on society. Secondly, with 
reference to discrimination, we must note that subjectively reported 
or perceived discrimination need not necessarily coincide with objec-
tively measurable discrimination. That said, the subjective aspect can-
not be completely divorced from the objective facts either. Both facets 
are relevant. For example, being personally affected can lead to an 
overestimation of the actual extent of discrimination. Or conversely, 
inattentiveness, lack of interest and habituation can lead a person to 
overlook real existing discrimination or fail to recognize it as such. If 
it is “normal” that children from migrant communities do less well at 
school, many people will not even consider the possibility that system-
atic individual or structural discrimination might play a role. Where 
particular forms of discrimination, such as sexism and homophobia, 
are so deeply rooted in our society that they are reflected in legisla-
tion – for example restricting the privilege of marriage to heterosexual 
relationships – many people may fail to recognize this as discrimina-
tion, treating it instead as part of the culture.
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case), while one third have a friend or acquaintance who is homosexual (34 
percent). Younger and better-educated respondents are more likely to report 
contact with people of a different ethnic origin, as are those who live in urban 
areas or themselves belong to an ethnic minority. A large majority of those 
surveyed – 87 percent – say they belong to no minority group, markedly more 
than we would actually expect on the basis of the statistically reported pro-
portions of ethnic and religious minorities, homosexuals and disabled people.
Perceived discrimination: Many Europeans believe that minorities in Europe 
suffer discrimination: 62 percent of respondents believe that discrimination 
on the basis of ethnic origin is widespread, 51 percent recognize sexual orien-
tation as grounds for discrimination and 42 percent suspect widespread dis-
crimination on the basis of faith or religion. 45 percent say they believe disa-
bled people suffer discrimination and 36 percent believe gender is a cause of 
discrimination. Almost one third of respondents – 29 percent – said they had 
witnessed discrimination against another person during the previous twelve 
months, largely on the basis of ethnicity. Especially many of the Dutch and 
German respondents shared this experience, followed by British and Hungar-
ians. Respondents in Portugal and Poland, on the other hand, relatively rarely 
reported having witnessed discrimination against other people. A close con-
nection was found between observed discrimination and the respondent’s own 
experience of discrimination.
Experience of discrimination: Overall 15 percent of the European respondents 
reported having suffered discrimination or harassment during the previous 
twelve months because of their gender, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, 
religion or age. Conspicuously many in Austria shared this experience, followed 
by Italy and Hungary. The proportion in Great Britain and France was above 
the European mean, too. In Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Poland 
the proportion who had experienced discrimination was below the European 
average. People born outside the Europe most frequently reported ethnic dis-
crimination (23 percent), followed by those from non-EU European countries 
and those not living in the country they were born in.
Anti-discrimination: 48 percent of Europeans believe that too little is done to 
tackle discrimination in their country. Those who believe discrimination to be 
widespread express this opinion especially frequently. Only 11 percent believe 
enough is being done. One section of the European population is plainly sen-
sitized to discrimination and consequently calls for stronger action, whereas 
251. Multicultural Europe between Tolerance and Prejudice
another section fails to perceive discrimination and therefore also believes cur-
rent measures to be adequate. Sensitivity to discrimination depends strongly 
on whether people have themselves experienced or observed discrimination 
against people they know. It is stronger among the young, the better-educated 
and those who live in urban areas. There are also strong wdifferences in sen-
sitivity between the different European countries.
One important group that denies the existence of discrimination and sabotages 
action to rectify it are followers of right-wing populism and extremism, who 
make use of group-focused enmity to justify discrimination against the afore-
mentioned groups. Next, we will briefly examine how extremism and populism 
are connected with prejudice.
1.3. Treating Others as Inferior as a Core Element of 
Right-wing Populist and Extremist Ideologies
While there are many definitions of right-wing extremism and populism, 
comprising distinct but partly overlapping elements, there is broad consen-
sus that treating outgroups as inferior represents an important component of 
right-wing populist and extremist attitudes.4 According to Wilhelm Heitmeyer 
(1987), extreme right-wing orientations are based on an ideology of inequal-
ity in conjunction with an acceptance of violence that sets them apart from 
right-wing populism. The ideology of inequality, he writes, expresses itself in 
the treatment of others as inferior, in extreme nationalism, in racist catego-
ries, in social Darwinism, in totalitarian norms and in an emphasis on ingroup 
homogeneity. The conviction that violence is a legitimate means for regulating 
conflicts leads to an acceptance of its use (see also Zick and Küpper 2009). 
On the basis of quantitative and qualitative data gathered in eight European 
countries the SIREN Project identifies the following four factors as core ele-
ments of right-wing populist attitudes: outgroup negativity, ingroup favour-
itism, authoritarianism and rejection of the institutions of representative de-
mocracy (Hentges et al. 2003; de Weerdt et al. 2004). According to Wilhelm 
4 We restrict ourselves here to definitions that treat right-wing extremism and populism 
as attitude complexes. In other contexts, especially political science, both terms appear 
as designations for movements, groups, parties, individuals and political currents. In that 
usage too, treatment of outgroups as inferior is generally an important element.
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Heitmeyer, right-wing populism is essentially constituted by anti-immigrant 
attitudes, anti-Semitism and an aggressive authoritarianism with a heavy em-
phasis on law and order (2002, see also Klein, Küpper and Zick 2009). Oliver 
Decker and Elmar Brähler (2006) define right-wing extremism as a pattern of 
attitudes whose unifying element is the idea that not all groups should enjoy 
equal status. This is expressed in the dimensions of anti-immigrant attitudes, 
anti-Semitism, social Darwinism, support for right-wing dictatorship, national 
chauvinism and trivialization of Nazi crimes.5
Building on these definitions, we propose that treatment of groups as inferior 
represents a central dimension of right-wing populist and extremist attitude 
complexes. In terms of hostility to outsiders that means above all anti-Semitism 
and old-fashioned racism. Current trends in many European countries suggest 
that anti-Muslim attitudes have also become a central component of right-
wing populist and extremist ideas. We also find prejudice against women and 
homosexuals in right-wing extremist propaganda, and to some extent also in 
populist materials. This thus also forms one of the components of right-wing 
extremism, although it is not (yet) one of its core aspects. 
The kind of prejudices instrumentalized and propagated by extremist groups 
in the different countries of Europe depend on the history of the respective 
group, prevalent ideologies of unequal status, and the culture and history in 
which they develop. But the groups against which right-wing extremists agi-
tate are often similar across the different countries: immigrants, black people, 
Jews and Muslims, women and homosexuals are the central target groups in 
all the countries we have studied. In other words, the extremist and populist 
movements are united in their prejudices and in the group-focused enmity 
these constitute. Intolerance of others, which includes insiders accused of 
violating norms as well as outsiders, is an enormously important propaganda 
instrument, because it attracts people who share these sentiments and is a 
powerful instrument for reinforcing cohesion. Because it permeates everyday 
life, the power of prejudice in Europe is much greater than has generally been 
assumed. In the next chapter we outline more precisely what we understand 
by prejudice and why it is so powerful and dangerous.
5 This definition is also the one used in the studies of right-wing extremism in Germany 
published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, most recently Die Mitte in der Krise: Rechts-
extreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010 (Decker et al. 2010).
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2. Prejudice and Group-focused Enmity
Given their centrality to this study, it would now be pertinent to provide an 
overview of our fundamental understanding of prejudice and present the con-
cept of group-focused enmity (GFE) on which our work is based. First we de-
scribe how we define prejudice, which forms of expression it may assume, 
which social functions it fulfils and what consequences it has. Our perspective 
is rooted in social psychology, in an understanding of prejudice as a set of so-
cial attitudes that arises through the interaction of individual and environmen-
tal causal factors. Individuals hold prejudices because their environment leads 
them to. Although we focus mainly on individuals and their attitudes, percep-
tions, feelings and interpretations, these are also reflected in social discourse 
because that is where prejudices are rooted, where they emanate from. The 
concept of prejudice we outline below also provides a basis for understanding 
the current political discussions. After defining prejudice itself we present the 
concept of group-focused enmity, which places the various social prejudices in 
an overall context. The concept was introduced by Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2002) 
and has since been elaborated and empirically verified by other scholars (Zick 
et al. 2008).6
2.1 A Fundamental Understanding of Prejudice
Classical prejudice research understands prejudices as negative attitudes to-
wards groups and individuals based solely on their group membership (Allport 
1954). Following this perspective, Aboud defines prejudice as a “unified, sta-
ble, and consistent tendency to respond in a negative way toward members of 
a particular ethnic group” (1988, 6), which we would extend to any group. In 
other words, individuals are looked down upon not on the basis of their per-
sonal characteristics but through nothing other than their categorization as a 
6 The Group-focused Enmity in Germany project has been running for ten years (2002–
2011) and surveys German opinion about identified groups in an annual representa-
tive telephone survey. A parallel panel survey is also being conducted in which the same 
 respondents are interviewed at two-year intervals. The study is supported by regional 
analyses in specific social areas and an interdisciplinary postgraduate programme. The 
results are published in the annual Suhrkamp series Deutsche Zustände (in German; ed. 
Wilhelm Heitmeyer); see also www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg.
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member of an outgroup. It is utterly irrelevant whether they see themselves as 
a member of this group or whether their group membership can be determined 
objectively. What matters is solely the categorization by the person holding or 
expressing the prejudice. Take the example of the categorization of a person 
as a “foreigner”. For xenophobic prejudices to exist against this person it is 
generally irrelevant whether he or she in fact possesses the country’s citizen-
ship, was born there, or has ever lived anywhere else.
In prejudice research there is broad consensus that prejudices arise as gener-
alized negative attitudes towards groups and individuals and are based solely 
on the fact that these groups are outgroups or these persons belong to an 
outgroup (Allport 1954; Zick 1997). 
Racism, sexism, anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism and many other prej-
udices are thus not personal traits, but social attitudes that must be under-
stood through the context of the person who holds them. As social attitudes, 
prejudices have a cognitive, an affective and possibly also a behaviour-related 
dimension. As attitudes they are learnable – and unlearnable – even if this is 
often a long and difficult process in cases where attitudes are deep-seated.
2.2 Three Steps to Prejudice
A prejudice is created through a three-stage process involving: 1) categoriza-
tion, 2) stereotyping and 3) judgement (affective priming).
The first step is categorization. This is a fundamental cognitive process that oc-
curs almost automatically and helps individuals to understand and make sense 
of the complex information they receive from their environment. We categorize 
our material surroundings, plants, animals and other people too. We differen-
tiate people by whether they belong to our own ingroup or to an outgroup, 
regardless of what specific features we use to define in- and outgroup. The 
features by which we categorize people are essentially those which are cur-
rently available to us, in other words those to which our attention is directed 
or of which we are currently particularly aware. Depending on the situation, 
for example, we might categorize people by gender or else apply age as the 
relevant category; in another context we might categorize them into native and 
immigrant. The media play a decisive role, directing our attention to specific 
features – for example Muslim/non-Muslim.
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Whether a person applies categorizing labels such as “foreigner”, “Muslim” 
or “Jew”, “woman”, “homosexual” or “disabled” depends largely on their 
environment, on the debates conducted in their immediate lifeworld and in 
the public sphere. In political discourse, too, we can observe how categories 
are continuously discussed and assessed. But categories and their application 
are not in themselves prejudices; first they must pass through two further pro-
cesses. Prejudices are always “group-based” and “group-focused”. They ex-
press the position of individuals as members of categories vis-à-vis persons or 
groups who belong to another category.
In the second step we attribute particular characteristics to people on the basis 
of their group membership, imagining them so to speak as particular “types”. 
These stereotypes can be understood as little pictures we make in our heads 
(Lippmann 1922, cited in Aronson, Wilson and Akert 2004, 485). Stereotyp-
ing involves generalizing about a group of people, attributing identical char-
acteristics to all of them even though they may in reality be very different. The 
stereotypes that exist within cultures are remarkably similar, and very resistant 
to change. In stereotyping we observe an outgroup homogeneity effect and 
an ingroup heterogeneity effect: members of outgroups all appear the same 
while we perceive members of our own group to be quite distinct from one 
another. But the step of stereotyping does not occur automatically. We also 
have the option of stopping to think and consciously reconsidering or revising 
our stereotypes (Devine 1989). Nor are stereotypes necessarily prejudices in 
the sense of generalized negative attitudes implying inferiority. Stereotyping of 
others also entails self-stereotyping. In defining how members of an outgroup 
are different we simultaneously attribute to ourselves stereotyped characteris-
tics of the ingroup (Zick 2005).
Not until the third step of prejudice formation are the people we have catego-
rized into groups and stereotyped finally evaluated positively or negatively. As 
a rule, members of society tend to assess members of their ingroup positively 
and members of identified outgroups negatively. This is driven by a desire to 
create a positive social identity and preserve or enhance self-esteem (Tajfel and 
Turner 1979). This ingroup favouritism is not just an abstract positive evalu-
ation, but expresses itself in very real partiality and patronage, even towards 
completely unknown members of the ingroup.
Identifying and denigrating an outgroup is a simple means of gaining a positive 
social identity and can also strengthen cohesion within the ingroup. One classic 
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example of this is where football fans mock the other team and celebrate their 
own. In the political context extreme nationalism and chauvinism are expres-
sions of the nexus of ingroup overidentification and outgroup inferiority, here 
directed against the citizens of another nation. All prejudices share an implicit 
assumption that all members of the outgroup are the same, and that they are 
different from and worse than the ingroup.
There are of course also positive prejudices towards groups, and theoreti-
cally these also confer an unequal status on those towards whom they are 
directed. But because they cause no disadvantage to those affected, they are 
less problematic and of less urgency when setting research priorities. More 
problematic are prejudices that at first glance appear positive but actually 
have negative consequences for those they address. Examples of such super-
ficially positive prejudices are the idea that women are especially emotional 
and men more rational. Although both may be unproblematic in the private 
interpersonal sphere, they serve to legitimize social discrimination, for exam-
ple in the appointment of senior managers. Such benevolent prejudices are 
a subset of the class of modern or subtle prejudices, which are discussed in 
the next section. 
2.3 Overt and Covert Prejudices
Prejudices may be expressed openly and directly or in subtle, indirect and hid-
den ways. One important example of the latter is the rejection or refusal of 
sympathy for a particular outgroup, or the exaggeration of alleged cultural 
differences (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). Covert prejudices consist of a 
series of arguments that on closer examination turn out to be similar regard-
less of which target group they are directed against. The negative character-
istics of overt and covert prejudices are always the same: stupidity, laziness 
and indolence, uncleanliness, physical weakness and psychological instability, 
criminality, deviousness and slyness. Prejudices often involve double standards, 
where something that is criticized in the outgroup is ignored or dismissed as 
unimportant in the ingroup. One example of this would be where Muslims are 
criticized for favouring gender inequality while support for traditional gender 
roles in the majority population is ignored. Furthermore, all prejudices share 
the aspect of holding all members of a group responsible for the deeds of an 
individual, for example blaming all Muslims for terrorist attacks conducted by 
radical minorities or individuals.
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Traditional prejudices are overt prejudices (open prejudices, old-fashioned rac-
ism), and as a rule express a clearly negative generalized attitude. Often the 
targets of these prejudices are accused of threatening the ingroup, for example 
stealing its members’ jobs. They are also expressed through open rejection of 
personal contact with members of an outgroup. Overt prejudices often involve 
attributions of blame, where groups are told that their own behaviour is re-
sponsible for prejudices or even persecution. Outgroups are often also instru-
mentalized as scapegoats for political, economic or social problems.
In recent decades in Europe, however, strong social norms of tolerance and 
anti-racism have become established, and increasingly inhibit open expres-
sion of prejudice. But the extent to which these are active and effectual in 
everyday life varies from country to country and milieu to milieu. Marked dif-
ferences can be observed between target groups: Something that may not be 
said aloud about one group may (still) be perceived as socially acceptable in 
relation to another.
Yet even where social norms of tolerance are widely shared, negative emo-
tions towards particular groups often remain extant. The negative labelling 
of particular groups is often so deeply rooted in cultural memory and in-
dividual socialization that negative emotions persist. Thus even individuals 
who consciously reject anti-Semitism may still possess latent reservations, 
having for example been shaped by anti-Semitic attitudes in their childhood 
environment.
Modern prejudices that undermine or subvert a public norm of tolerance 
emerge especially where traditional prejudices are inhibited or condemned 
(Zick 1997). They comprise more subtle or hidden forms of prejudice that are 
less easily identifiable and/or communicated circuitously. Modern prejudices 
express stereotypes in a more polite manner, for example through statements 
that a particular group is less high-achieving or holds completely different and 
incompatible values with respect to education or gender equality. Covert prej-
udices are also expressed through denial or refusal of positive emotions such 
as affection or sympathy for or admiration of an outgroup. There is no open 
hostility here but no affection either, making it difficult for members of this 
outgroup to feel personally liked as individuals. Modern prejudices can also ap-
pear in the guise of an overemphasis on individual equality. Sometimes equality 
is used as an argument to deny demands for measures to improve the oppor-
tunities of particular groups, for example when specific quotas for women to 
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overcome structural inequality of opportunity and discrimination are rejected 
on the grounds that individual achievement is what counts – forgetting that 
the decisive structures are made by men, designed to meet the needs of men 
and dominated by men.
Prejudices can be expressed consciously and in a controlled way, but they may 
also exert influence unconsciously and almost automatically without the ac-
tors being aware of the process. In this case prejudices are expressed without 
thought in the form of blithely repeated “common knowledge” and “tradi-
tional” opinions. These include insulting designations for particular groups 
such as black people or women. The point is to realize that even these un-
conscious and thoughtless prejudices have negative consequences for their 
targets. The same applies to prejudices communicated more or less directly in 
media images and reports, such as pictures of violent Muslim youth or brutal 
Israeli soldiers.
2.4 Functions of Prejudices
Prejudices are especially persistent when they fulfil social-psychological func-
tions, meaning they have social and individual utility for groups and individuals. 
These functions are social because prejudices are relevant less for individuals 
than for the integration of individuals in groups, nations and cultures (Zick, 
Küpper and Heitmeyer 2010). There are five main social functions of prejudice.
1. Prejudices bond. The most important function of prejudice (and of extrem-
ist attitudes and ideologies) is probably bonding, where differentiation from 
the other creates social identity and a sense of belonging within the ingroup. 
This is why political propaganda so often plays the prejudice and racism cards 
(Mendelberg 2001), because devaluing minorities heightens the importance of 
the ingroup. A leader can present himself as a saviour by depicting the national 
or ethnic ingroup as endangered. Other problems such as unemployment or 
unfair distribution of resources fade from view or worse still are blamed on 
the “outsiders”.
2. Prejudices serve to preserve and enhance self-esteem. This function is 
directly connected with the first. The more inferior the other in compari-
son to the ingroup the more positive the self-esteem gained through group 
identification.
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3. Prejudices offer control and legitimize hierarchies. Prejudices often con-
tain justifications for an existing social order. By explaining why certain groups 
possess greater wealth and power than others they defend a hierarchical sta-
tus quo or even help to establish it in the first place. This is seen particularly 
clearly in long-established racist ideas or sexist views, which refer to special 
characteristics or biological differences in order to justify the inferior position 
of black people and women. Prejudices are thus also legitimizing myths for 
creating and maintaining group-based hierarchies (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). 
As traded myths they are widely disseminated and socially shared. This may 
even lead subordinate groups to share prejudices against their own group, for 
the reasons stated above: Prejudices strengthen the feeling of belonging to-
gether with the dominant group and explain – albeit at the price of reduced 
self-esteem – why the subordinate group occupies its subordinate position. In 
other words, prejudices supply knowledge, which brings us to our next point. 
4. Prejudices supply “knowledge” and “orientation”. Prejudices provide a 
handy frame of reference for understanding the world. They are especially po-
tent where complex social realities have become incomprehensible. The cliché 
explains. This is why prejudices appear especially in situations of crisis, such as 
economic recession, natural disaster or famine, where the need for explana-
tions is especially strong. Where little real factual knowledge about a group is 
available, deeply rooted stereotypes, old wives’ tales and anecdotes serve as 
a substitute. This stereotype-based “knowledge” in turn guides perceptions 
of the group in real situations. Information about a group, for example immi-
grants, is often received and selected to fit existing stereotypes. This can also 
occur in media reports, whose producers themselves filter the information they 
select and present through the prism of stereotypes.
5. Prejudices show who can be trusted and who cannot. The “knowledge” 
imparted by prejudices also tells its recipients which individuals and groups can 
be trusted and which cannot. Social prejudice thus fulfils a confidence-building 
function and at the same time sows mistrust.
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2.5 Individual and Societal Consequences of 
 Group-focused Enmity
Prejudice on the grounds of a person’s attributed membership of a group de-
fined as “foreign”, “strange” or “other” is not simply one possible personal 
opinion among many. Prejudices have far-reaching negative consequences for 
those targeted and for the social climate as a whole. 
So far we have examined prejudices as attitudes. They may have a behavioural 
component, but as attitudes they need not necessarily provoke actions or re-
actions. As complex ideologies prejudices can remain in the realm of ideology 
without any impact at the level of objective relations. Nonetheless, attitudes 
are still relevant for real-world activities in several respects.
From attitude research we know that attitudes can lead to acts. The same ap-
plies to prejudices. Although prejudices do not lead automatically and directly 
to discrimination, they can supply the basis and above all the justification for 
discrimination and even violence. The more strongly a person advocates an act, 
the more likely it is that they will carry it out. If the circumstances are favourable 
they will perhaps act on their attitudes. As we know from the field of hate crime, 
in the extreme case prejudice can lead to violence. Then the targets of prejudice 
become victims of violence solely because they are identified as members of a 
particular group, for example because of their skin colour, homosexual orienta-
tion, disability or homelessness. This form of violence is also referred to as hate 
crime and is always accompanied by prejudices. Domestic violence can also in-
volve prejudices, for example when a woman has exercised liberties to which 
– as a woman – she is not entitled according to conventional opinion. A less 
drastic but still relevant example is the way middle-class children are favoured 
by teachers who treat them from the very start as cleverer and more ambitious.
Types of discrimination
Under the term discrimination we understand negative, unjustified or exclu-
sionary behaviour towards members of a target group solely because they are 
identified as members of this group (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986, 3).
Discrimination is found in three forms: Firstly there are acts of direct discrimi-
nation. This would include decisions concerning job appointments and hous-
ing, where members of one group (for example the national ingroup) are 
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favoured and members of an outgroup (for example immigrants) disadvan-
taged on the basis of their group membership. Direct discrimination is also 
expressed through social distance, for example when parents forbid their child 
from marrying a member of an outgroup or do not wish to have a member 
of that group as their neighbour. It also applies when parents avoid sending 
their children to a school attended by significant numbers of migrants’ chil-
dren. Especially when it comes to choice of school, prejudices often serve 
very specifically to justify inequality of educational opportunities by pointing 
to supposedly insuperable cultural or religious differences or a lack of motiva-
tion or achievement on the part of children from migrant communities. But 
discrimination can also be expressed in immediate physical terms. This is the 
case, for instance, when people distance themselves physically from stigma-
tized groups in public space.
Secondly, there is structural discrimination by institutions, organizations and 
businesses, where the rules, regulations, laws and procedures favour certain 
groups and disadvantage others. For example, schools that demand parental 
participation and support with homework automatically disadvantage those 
pupils whose parents are unable to provide this, whether because they have 
poor command of the language or because their own education is inadequate. 
Where teachers place great importance on correct spelling in all subjects, pupils 
whose mother tongue is not the teaching language face difficulties that oth-
ers do not. Companies that schedule important training events in the evenings 
inevitably hinder the careers of those who have to care for small children, who 
tend to be overwhelmingly women. Structural discrimination, too, is ultimately 
shaped by people and implemented by individuals. It is reflected in individual 
support for discriminatory structures, for example voting for parties that mo-
bilize against immigrants or supporting special policing measures targeting 
individuals on the basis of their specific group membership.
Thirdly, discrimination can also take the form of harassment. This involves 
denigrating individuals on the basis of their group membership or creating an 
environment in which people are humiliated, intimidated or insulted on the 
basis of particular group characteristics.
Prejudice as legitimization of inequality
Prejudices encourage or facilitate action by justifying acts (Sidanius and Pratto 
1999). They supply explanations for existing inequalities by pointing to a 
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“natural order”, supposed biological differences or “typical” characteristics 
that predispose particular groups for places at the top or bottom of the so-
cial ladder. 
Prejudices also create social norms. They have the power to define what is 
proper and customary – what is “normal”. In the political context prejudices 
(for example those of politicians and other decision-makers) can even influence 
the rules, regulations and legislation that encourage or discourage individual 
discriminatory behaviour. Prejudices shared in peer groups such as families, 
clubs and societies, political parties or groups of friends influence a person’s 
attitude and their willingness act on it by offering legitimization. Violent right-
wing groups justify their acts through prejudices. As long as these are shared 
more broadly in society, the extremist group is able to say it is only putting into 
practice what everybody thinks anyway (Wahl 2003).
Consequences for the targets of prejudice
Prejudices also have consequences for their targets. Experiencing prejudice 
has negative effects on the target’s physical and emotional well-being as well 
as on their achievements and success in life. Research has found that experi-
encing prejudice and discrimination destroys self-respect and can lead to self-
stigmatization. For example, as David R. Williams and Ruth Williams-Morris 
show, black school students in the United States have a worse opinion of their 
own marks than white students with the same level of achievement (2000). 
Moreover, ongoing experience of prejudice is experienced as threat. In order 
to escape this threat and avoid a permanent fight against prejudice, the tar-
gets of prejudice sometimes alter their behaviour to conform to the popular 
stereotype. In this way prejudices can ultimately become self-fulfilling (see also 
Zick and Küpper 2010).
So prejudices are used to justify existing discrimination through ideas of un-
equal status and contribute to the establishment and maintenance of discrimi-
natory structures and thought patterns. Prejudices shape people’s understand-
ing of their world and create reality. Prejudices are thus ultimately reflected 
in the distribution of power, influence and money, in access to education and 
housing, in health, and much more besides. To be able to do so, they require 
the additional quality that is described by the syndrome of group-focused 
enmity.
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2.6 Group-focused Enmity
The concept of group-focused enmity places group-specific prejudices in an 
overall context of anti-democratic mentalities. We speak of enmity to denote 
the hostility that constitutes the essence of any prejudice and is the common 
factor underlying all individual prejudices. We use the term group-focused 
to take into account the aforementioned observation that prejudice is about 
groups differentiating themselves from one another rather than about personal 
ill-will or misanthropy.
We understand a spectrum of prejudices, including anti-immigrant attitudes, 
racism, anti-Semitism and sexism, as elements of a syndrome of group-focused 
enmity. We speak of a syndrome of group-focused enmity in order to make 
it clear that prejudices directed towards different target groups are linked to 
one another and share the common core of an ideology of unequal status.7 
Individuals who share this ideology look down upon outgroups regardless of 
these groups’ specific identity.
The crucial reason to treat group-focused enmity as a syndrome is that as a 
rule one prejudice is generally associated with others. Back in the 1950s the 
founder of modern prejudice research, Gordon Allport, stated (1954, 68):
One of the facts of which we are most certain is that people who reject 
one out-group will tend to reject other out-groups. If a person is anti-
Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group.
7 Group-focused enmity is related to the concepts of racism and ethnocentrism, but not 
identical with them (see for example Sumner 1906). Following the approach of prej-
udice research, we use the term racism in a narrow sense to denote prejudice against 
black people (or more generally prejudice based on physical ethnic traits). We believe it 
makes sense to distinguish conceptually between ethnocentrism and prejudices against 
groups. The extent to which an ethnic ingroup’s inflated perception of its own worth is 
associated with – or independent of – negative perceptions of the worth of other eth-
nic groups is an empirical matter (Bizumic et al. 2009).
Group-focused enmity describes a generalized devaluation of 
outgroups. At its core is an ideology of unequal status.
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We follow Allport in assuming that prejudices against different target groups 
are connected to one another, but go a step further. According to Wilhelm 
Heitmeyer (2002), different prejudices share a common core, which he identi-
fies as an ideology of unequal status. The German survey project on group-
focused enmity has been able to confirm this empirically (Zick et al. 2008). 
Here we adopt the construct of Social Dominance Orientation as an indicator 
of an ideology of unequal status (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, see chapter 5.3 in 
this volume). Later in this report we are able to show that persons who gen-
erally condone group hierarchies tend to hold negative attitudes towards cer-
tain specific groups. In their concept of the authoritarian personality, Adorno 
and colleagues (1950) demonstrate that authoritarianism is associated with 
prejudices against many different groups (see chapter 5.3 in this volume, also 
Decker and Brähler 2010). Here, too, we have been able to confirm that the 
conceptually and empirically closely related phenomenon of authoritarianism 
codetermines the core of group-focused enmity along with Social Dominance 
Orientation (Küpper and Zick 2005). 
2.7 The Elements of Group-focused Enmity Investigated 
in the European Project
Group-focused enmity is a fundamentally open concept into which further 
prejudices can be integrated as required by cultural and socio-political devel-
opments (a case in point being prejudices against Roma). The group-focused 
enmity in Europe research project on which this study is based investigated 
the following prejudices as elements of a syndrome of group-focused enmity: 
anti-immigrant attitudes, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism 
and homophobia (Figure 1). 
The choice of elements of group-focused enmity to investigate in the European 
project was governed by empirical and methodological aspects and by the 
restricted length of the interviews rather than theoretical considerations (see 
chapter 3). We were nonetheless still able to survey and observe a socially and 
politically relevant syndrome of group-focused enmity directed towards some 
of the groups worst affected by intolerance and exclusion. In the following we 
outline our understanding of the individual prejudices studied.
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Figure 1: The syndrome of group-focused enmity in the European study
2.7.1 Anti-Immigrant Attitudes
Anti-immigrant attitudes are a central element of the GFE syndrome. They are 
directed against persons who are actually or supposedly “foreign” or “immi-
grants”. The targets of this prejudice need not in fact be foreign at all; it is 
enough to be perceived as such. Immigrants from other countries are often 
identified as foreigners, but by no means all countries of origin are equally as-
sociated with negative prejudices. In western Europe negative prejudices are 
currently directed above all against people from other cultures – usually mean-
ing dark-haired people from Muslim countries – whereas towards Swedes, 
for example, rather positive prejudices are widespread. This example clearly 
illustrates the three characteristics of prejudice: Firstly, the categorization of 
persons as “foreign” is flexible (indeed, it could mean a neighbour). Secondly, 
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prejudices are context-dependent, with the targets of anti-immigrant attitudes 
differing in different places and historical eras. And thirdly, we see here how 
anti-immigrant attitudes are closely interlinked with other elements, namely, 
racism and anti-Muslim attitudes.
2.7.2 Racism
We define racism as prejudice against groups or their members on the basis of 
biological or “natural” features. People are identified as black, white, Latino 
or Asian by external ethnic features and assigned particular characteristics and 
abilities on the basis of those features. In the Western world where “whites” 
are the majority “white” is generally regarded as positive and people with 
other physical ethnic markers are regarded as inferior. Even in regions with 
non-white majorities people are categorized and qualified by ethnic mark-
ers, often according to the darkness or lightness of their skin. But the instru-
mentalization of natural, biological and genetic differences is not restricted to 
racism; it also shapes sexism, anti-Semitism and the biologization of culture 
(where cultural differences are explained in evolutionary or biological terms). 
In Europe a culturally and religiously tinged hostility towards Muslims also ap-
pears to be assuming traits of biological racism. But we would prefer not to 
define all forms of prejudice as racism. We consider racism as one element 
of group-focused enmity, measuring it in the form of “blatant, direct racism” 
based on ethnic features. 
2.7.3 Anti-Semitism
Anti-Semitism brings together religious, supposedly biological and cultural fea-
tures to categorize people negatively as Jews. We define anti-Semitism as social 
prejudice directed against Jews simply because they are Jewish. Its particular 
power seems to be that it can be very flexibly argued and instrumentalized 
to justify discrimination. Anti-Semitism takes many different forms: political 
(“Jewish world conspiracy”), secular (usury), religious (“responsible for the 
death of Jesus”) and racist (“Jewish character”). Although the definition of 
anti-Semitism as social prejudice is common currency in American anti-Sem-
itism research (Zick 2010b), other authors, especially Europeans, argue for a 
broader, more sweeping definition that extends beyond Jewishness to en-
compass anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism and anti-modernism. In our view 
the narrower definition of anti-Semitism as social prejudice is helpful when 
analysing the expression, dynamics and function of anti-Semitism in practice 
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and in relation to research findings on other prejudices. The extent to which 
anti-Semitism is associated with other ideologies is an empirical matter. What 
is central is that it identifies a group, the Jews, and cements its inequality. Anti-
Semitism is thus prejudice against Jews because they are Jews.
2.7.4 Anti-Muslim Attitudes
Anti-Muslim attitudes are directed against people believed to be of Muslim 
faith or generally against Islam as a religion, regardless of whether those af-
fected are actually religious and which branch of Islam they belong to. In many 
European countries with large Muslim immigrant populations there appears to 
be a trend to equate “immigrant” with “Muslim” and perceive all Muslims as 
immigrants regardless of their citizenship or place of birth. Like Jews, Muslims 
are frequently regarded as “foreign” rather than as an integral component of 
the majority society. 
2.7.5 Sexism
Sexism is based on the idea of inequality between men and women. The dif-
ferent characteristics, capabilities and preferences assigned to men and women 
on the basis of supposedly biological facts are used to explain and justify why 
women tend to have less power, influence, wealth and opportunity than men. 
Traditional sexism, which expresses itself in clearly negative stereotypes, is to-
day frowned upon in many European countries. But wherever the normative 
thresholds are reduced – in bars, football stadiums, etc – it quickly surfaces in 
comments and jokes. The modern facets of sexism are more “respectable”. For 
example, evolutionary explanations for gender differences enjoy great popular-
ity in public discourse. Here traditional prejudices reappear in scientific guise, 
explaining observed gender-typical behaviour as the outcome of biological fac-
tors. Cultural explanations that acknowledge learned patterns of behaviour or 
socialization conditioned by external structures are under-represented. Instead 
the subordinate status of women (as manifested in income differentials and 
promotion to top jobs) is presented as a natural state of affairs.
2.7.6 Homophobia
Homophobia means prejudice against people who are sexually attracted to 
others of their own gender. Expressions of homophobia include charges of im-
morality and refusing homosexuals equal rights (for example the right to marry 
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or to adopt children). We are aware that this does not cover prejudices against 
transgender people and person with other sexual orientations.
The term homophobia is contested because it describes as “phobia” a phe-
nomenon that does not necessarily bear the features of neurotic fear, and thus 
reduces prejudice to illness. We are of the opinion that phobic fear is not the 
driving force of prejudice. Other terms appear more suitable, but for the sake 
of comparability we defer to the established terminology in the field.
Now that we have presented the basic ideas and concepts we would like to 
turn to the methodology of the empirical study we conducted to investigate 
group-focused enmity in Europe.
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3. Methods
This report is based on a survey conducted for the Group-focused Enmity in 
Europe research project. The GFE Europe survey was conducted in eight Euro-
pean countries in autumn and winter 2008/09 by international experts led by 
the Bielefeld Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, 
which initiated the research. In each country a representative sample of the 
population aged 16 and above was interviewed by telephone.8 In order to 
maximize comparability the same methods, sampling techniques and survey 
schedules were applied in each country.
The study covers France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, Poland and Portugal, thus including both old and new EU member 
states. The eight countries differ to greater and lesser degrees in their integra-
tion policies, migration history, immigrant populations and general affluence. 
It would be extremely productive to repeat the study in order to monitor trends 
of intolerance and to expand it to cover more countries. 
3.1 Questionnaire Design and Pretests
For the telephone interviews we developed a questionnaire that reliably and 
validly records prejudices against various target groups as well as measuring 
causal and influencing factors for group-focused enmity. The latter include 
ideologies, political attitudes, opinions about the respondent’s own economic, 
political and social situation, and factors that mitigate against prejudice such 
as empathy, intercultural contacts or the desire to avoid making negative value 
judgements about groups. The challenge when designing the questionnaire 
was to cover a selection of the most important constructs taking into account 
various scientific perspectives. On the basis of preparatory theoretical work, 
constructs were drafted for discussion and revision by international groups 
of experts. We sought to cover the depth and breadth of the constructs in a 
balanced manner and to paint a complex picture of the prejudices and vari-
ous possible influencing factors that does justice to the different theoretical 
8 The survey was conducted for us by TNS Infratest and partner institutes in the respec-
tive countries.
3. Methods
Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report44
approaches without overtaxing the attention span and patience of the inter-
viewees. We also selected the constructs with an eye to their possible con-
tribution to wider prejudice and discrimination research, practical application 
and political intervention.
In cross-cultural comparisons it is always important to consider whether con-
structs and statements need to be equivalent and comparable across all the 
countries or whether cultural and national singularities are more important 
(for more on cross-cultural research see Zick 2010a). For the present study we 
gave priority to the former. In eight workshops an international interdiscipli-
nary team selected the constructs, discussed which items (statements) should 
go with them and drafted a model questionnaire in English.
The constructs and associated statements were selected on the basis of the 
following criteria: 
	A solid, innovative and interdisciplinary theoretical foundation.
	Tried and tested scales and items.
	Intercultural comprehension and relevance.
The model questionnaire was then translated into each working language by 
two members of the respective team working independently of one another, 
after which the translations were compared, discussed and revised. The pro-
cess of drafting the questionnaire was extremely time-consuming, but crucial 
for ensuring the quality of the survey.
In autumn 2006 we subjected the interview materials to a pretest in which 150 
people in each of the eight participating countries took part.9 The objective of 
the pretest was to arrive at a suitable questionnaire for the main survey. The 
questionnaire as a whole and individual items were tested for quality, com-
prehensibility, acceptance and statistical reliability. The pretest was conducted 
in the form of interviews lasting on average forty-five minutes and contained 
more items than we ultimately intended to use in the main survey.
9 Sweden was pretested too, but had to be excluded from the final survey due to fund-
ing limitations
453. Methods
The results of the pretest led to a number of revisions of the questionnaire, 
with certain items being replaced or retranslated. The revised questionnaire 
was itself pretested and reduced in length. The final questionnaire contained 
120 items, most of which had been tested twice in each country.
The survey data proper was collected in autumn 2008 by means of standardized 
telephone interviews as a CATI survey (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews, 
see glossary). The main survey interviews lasted on average thirty-five minutes. 
Participation was voluntary and the data was saved in anonymized form.
3.2 Measuring Group-focused Enmity 
The final questionnaire contained items for measuring prejudices against immi-
grants, Jews, black people, Muslims, women and homosexuals.10 In the inter-
views participants were asked about their attitudes, emotions and experience 
concerning these groups and about their ideological convictions and general 
values. In all cases we also collected demographic data on economic status, age, 
gender and education as well as a self-assessment of the respondent’s financial 
situation. In this publication we report on a selection of the surveyed indicators.
The prejudices and negative attitudes towards the groups targeted by group-
focused enmity were as a rule recorded using items already tested in earlier 
studies. However, many items that had previously been used successfully in 
national studies proved unsuitable for cross-cultural comparison: some did not 
make sense across all countries, others were widely misunderstood in certain 
countries or provoked anger.11 For constructs where pre-existing survey items 
were unavailable we had to design items from scratch specially for this survey.
For certain selected prejudices we chose a more differentiated approach to 
cover several different aspects. As well as negative attitudes towards the 
10 We also surveyed items measuring prejudices towards disabled and homeless people. 
Unfortunately in these cases we were unable to achieve cross-cultural comparability and 
were therefore forced to omit those prejudices from this report. 
11 For example many participants in the Hungarian pretest failed to understand statements 
about Muslims that reflect widespread opinion in western Europe, because there is very 
little discussion of Muslim immigration in Hungary. Certain statements probing anti-Se-
mitic prejudice provoked such resistance in France and the Netherlands (including inter-
view terminations) that we were forced to omit them from the main study.
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groups of interest we also surveyed certain positive attitudes. Because we are 
interested in negative prejudices most of the statements in this survey were 
negatively formulated. This creates a risk of response bias which can be coun-
teracted by including individual positively formulated statements that encour-
age participants to listen closely and form an opinion on each statement, rather 
than simply automatically agreeing or disagreeing with all the statements on 
the basis of a pattern. Moreover, respondents might have found a very nega-
tive questionnaire to be annoying or troubling. Quite apart from that aspect, 
surveying positive attitudes is just as interesting for any investigation of the 
constructs, whereby we observe that a negative item and its positive counter-
part may sometimes represent two different dimensions of a construct rather 
than one and the same. All in all, it appeared to make sense to include at least 
one positive item for each construct in the questionnaire.
At the beginning we discussed including other dimensions of prejudice in the 
questionnaire, with items examining prejudices against Roma, overweight peo-
ple and people with AIDS. The constraints of interview length meant that we 
had to leave these out, along with a range of statements elucidating additional 
potential explanatory factors. 
At the time the survey was conducted France was involved in a heated contro-
versy about opinion surveys in general, with an allegation that surveys them-
selves create attitudes and prejudice by using categories such as “native French” 
and “immigrant”. There were grounds to fear that French public opinion would 
take an especially critical view of opinion surveys on the question of prejudice at 
that point in time. For this reason we reformulated certain items in the French 
questionnaire to measure positive attitudes and omitted others altogether.
3.3 Scales
We measured agreement or disagreement with each single indicator of preju-
dice (item). Generally, unless stated otherwise, respondents were asked to 
choose from four response categories (“strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, strongly disagree”). These responses were then assigned 
numerical values, with a high score corresponding to a highly negative state-
ment. Positively formulated statements were reverse coded so that rejection 
of the positive statement produced a higher numerical value. The individual 
statements that serve as indicators for the prejudices were statistically verified 
and then combined to create a mean scale for each prejudice with a value 
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between 1 and 4. Each mean scale is based on at least two items of the cor-
responding construct. As a rule, scales supply more reliable information than 
individual indicators because they compensate for the influence of random 
error and individual misunderstandings.
Equivalence checking was conducted to ensure that the meaning of individual 
prejudices was identical in all the countries and that all respondents shared the 
same understanding of the different language versions of the statements.12 
This cross-cultural comparability was confirmed for all prejudice types with 
the exception of prejudice against homeless and disabled people, which were 
therefore excluded from further analysis. Following the frequency analyses 
we analysed the extent to which the different prejudice types correlate with 
one another, first for the eight European countries together and then for each 
country individually. We generally used the combined scales, applying indi-
vidual items where statistically necessary.
To create the scales we took two, three or four statements that served as in-
dicators for a particular prejudice and whose reliability and comparability had 
been confirmed, and combined them into a mean scale by assigning numeri-
cal values to the response categories, adding them up and then dividing by 
the number of statements.13
12 All scales were tested using confirmatory factor analysis and multiple-group compari-
son, meaning that the relationships between the individual statements designed to re-
cord a particular prejudice were tested simultaneously.
13 The items were coded so that higher values for agreement corresponded with stronger 
prejudice. The following items were reverse coded: anti-immigrant attitudes, item 4; 
anti-Semitism, item 10; anti-Muslim attitudes, item 22; homophobia, items 28 and 29 
(see chapter 4 for items and numbering).
Critical notes on method
Representative surveys provide us with useful and important information for 
scientific analysis and social and political intervention. But the method has its 
limits. Quantitative surveys can tell us about frequencies and means and pro-
vide data about relationships between variables, but they grant us no insights 
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 into the thoughts, feelings and experiences of individuals. They provide us 
with an overview of the average extent of particular prejudices and attitudes, 
from which each individual deviates.
Furthermore, surveys record only those attitudes and prejudices that the in-
terviewee reports to the interviewer. These expressed prejudices tell us little 
about the interviewee’s personality or underlying motives, and we do not fo-
cus on personalities, since we understand prejudices not as character traits, 
but as negative social attitudes towards particular groups. If, for example, a 
person agrees with an anti-Semitic or racist statement, we do not jump to the 
conclusion that the person is anti-Semitic or racist as a person, in the sense of 
that being a stable and unchanging personal trait. Such negative attitudes are 
subject to change. Individuals are capable of reflecting on prejudices, learn-
ing that prejudices encourage discrimination and inequality, recognizing that 
they themselves could potentially be affected by prejudices and their negative 
consequences, developing empathy for the addressees of prejudice, accepting 
new information about a marginalized group, or enhancing their own self-
esteem without negativity towards others.
Alongside their actual attitudes and prejudices, many other factors may in-
fluence a person’s responses. In a personal interview, responses concerning 
negative attitudes towards weak groups are swayed by social norms. Distorted 
responses may result where respondents tend to give answers conforming to 
the norms of their society. Thus a respondent in an interview situation is very 
likely to express less prejudice than in a private setting, especially where the 
social environment strongly disapproves of prejudices against minorities. There 
may also be reasons outside the immediate interview situation why a partici-
pant might be in an especially negative or positive mood, distracted or unmo-
tivated. Finally there is also the possibility that respondents will understand a 
statement differently from how it was originally meant. All these factors can 
influence responses.
The approach of prejudice research is to interview as many individuals as pos-
sible to minimize the impact of individual anomalies on the overall results. 
Basing analysis on scales rather than individual items and using mean scales 
comprising several items measuring the same construct also help to neutralize 
the effect of individual misunderstandings.
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3.4 Samples
In each country a sample of 1,000 individuals aged 16 or above was selected 
for landline telephone interviews. The samples were selected to be representa-
tive of the respective national population. Households were contacted in ad-
vance to select the interviewee using either the last/next birthday method or 
the Kish grid. Deviations from population demographics were dealt with by 
weighting. All told, we are able to report data taken from 8,026 European in-
terviewees representing approx. 270 million Europeans aged 16 or above. The 
samples include only persons holding the citizenship of the surveyed country.
Table 2 shows the demographic composition of the samples. In line with the 
official population statistics slightly more women than men participated in the 
survey in all the countries. The mean age was just under 47, with the young-
est sample in Poland (44) and the oldest in Germany (48). Taking the sample 
as a whole, 16 percent of respondents had at least one parent or grandparent 
who was an immigrant, but the countries differed considerably in this respect. 
In France almost one third of interviewees belonged to a migrant community 
in some sense, in Italy fewer than 3 percent.
Table 2: Samples
Country N Men
(percent)
Women
(percent)
Age
(mean)
Parents and 
grandparents  
not immigrants
(in percent)
France 1 007 48.0 52.0 46.5 68.1
Germany 1 000 48.3 51.7 48.4 84.3
Great Britain 1 000 48.3 51.7 46.8 79.4
Hungary 1 000 44.5 55.5 46.4 90.4
Italy 1 001 48.1 51.9 47.6 97.4
Netherlands 1 011 49.0 51.0 46.3 91.3
Poland 1 000 47.7 52.3 44.2 91.8
Portugal 1 007 47.8 52.2 46.6 92.6
Total 8 026 47.7 52.3 46.6 86.9
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3.5 Countries
The countries investigated were France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal. They differ in their integration policies, 
migration histories, immigrant populations, standard of living and level of so-
cial inequality, as well as in their discourses on tolerance and equality and their 
implementation and enforcement of EU directives and national laws against 
discrimination. These differences are potentially relevant for the country-spe-
cific prevalence of prejudices.
In the survey year (2008) GDP was below the European average in Portugal, 
Poland and Hungary and above it in the other countries. The worst of the 
economic crisis was still to come, but the foreshocks were already being felt. 
France, Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands recorded weak growth, while 
Portugal experienced no growth at all and Italy and Great Britain saw an eco-
nomic contraction. Only in Poland was the growth rate conspicuously high 
at 5.1 percent. Social inequality of income distribution measured by the Gini 
coefficient was greatest in Portugal and Great Britain, smallest in Hungary.14 
The unemployment rate was between 7 and 8 percent in France, Germany, 
Hungary, Poland and Portugal, and slightly below that figure in Italy. The Neth-
erlands had the lowest unemployment rate at 3 percent. 
The hard economic data is reflected to some extent in respondents’ subjective 
assessments of the economic situation in their country, but with important 
deviations. In almost all countries a majority assessed the economic situation 
to be negative. Indeed, in Hungary, Italy and Portugal more than 90 percent 
of respondents said that the economic situation in their country was quite or 
very bad, in Great Britain just under 90 percent. In Germany and Poland the 
figures were lower, but still 61 percent and 56 percent respectively. Only in the 
Netherlands was the mood of a majority positive in this respect.
14 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality. A value of 0 indicates that all people in a 
country have exactly the same income, while a value of 100 means that one person re-
ceives all the income. So the greater the inequality in a country the closer the Gini coef-
ficient will be to 100. 
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Table 3: Selected indicators of standard of living and social equality, 2008 
GDP
(per capita)
Economic  
growth
(percent)
Gini 
coefficient
Unemploy-
ment
(percent)
Negative eco-
nomic outlook  
(percent)
France 107 0.2 .28 7.6 84.1
Germany 116 1.0 .30 7.2 60.5
Great Britain 115 -0.1 .34 5.3 89.2
Hungary 64 0.8 .25 7.7 90.6
Italy 104 -1.3 .31 6.8 91.6
Netherlands 134 1.9 .28 2.8 40.0
Poland 56 5.1 .32 7.2 55.6
Portugal 78 0.0 .36 7.6 92.4
Notes and sources
Per capita GDP: At purchasing power parity, EU-27 = 100, 2008 (Institut für Wachstumsstudien,  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=de &pcode=tsieb010&plugin=1).
Economic growth: Real GDP, 2008 (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init= 1&plugin= 
1&language=de&pcode=tsieb020).
Gini coefficient: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=de& 
pcode=tessi190&plugin=1.
Unemployment: Seasonally adjusted rate, May 2008 (Eurostat Presse release 97/2009: http://www.eds-destatis.
de/de/press/pressrel09.php?m =press).
Negative economic outlook: Percentage who assessed the economic situation in their country as quite or very bad 
and believed that their own financial situation was likely to deteriorate (GFE-Europe Survey 2008 and chapter 9.4).
In autumn and winter of 2008 representative samples of 1,000 per-
sons aged 16 and above were interviewed by telephone in each of 
eight European countries: France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal. These countries differ 
in many respects: standard of living and social inequality, migra-
tion history and size of immigrant population, and current debates 
on immigration and protection of minorities. The standardized 
questionnaire contained pretested questions optimized for cross-
cultural comparison. Several statements were used to record each 
individual prejudice as an element of group-focused enmity, with 
interviewees indicating their agreement or disagreement on a four-
point scale. The statements for each prejudice were tested for their 
cross-cultural reliability and then combined to create a mean scale.
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4  The Extent of Group-focused Enmity  
in Europe
In this chapter we report on the extent of group-focused enmity, in the form 
of anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sex-
ism and homophobia in the eight countries. For each of these dimensions of 
prejudice we first present a table showing what proportion of respondents in 
each country agreed with the associated prejudice statements (items). For each 
country we aggregate the figures for those who “somewhat agree” with a 
statement with those who agree “strongly agree”.15
In a second step we analyse the statistical differences in the extent of individual 
prejudices between the countries using the mean values for each prejudice 
(averaged scales made up of two to four items). Mean values for the countries 
are illustrated in bar graphs.
Notes on interpreting tables and figures
1. In the tables, a difference in the value for a single item between two coun-
tries is not necessarily statistically significant. We tested the significance of 
differences in the extent of anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, racism, 
anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism and homophobia between the eight countries 
at a later stage by conducting univariate variance analyses on the mean 
scales (formed from several individual indicators of a particular prejudice).16 
In other words, we statistically tested the probability that the means repre-
sent real (rather than random) differences between the countries. The fig-
ures (graphs) show the mean scale values. 
15 The full frequency tables with all four response categories can be found in the appendix.
16 Here there may be slight differences to values given elsewhere, where initially multivariate 
variance analyses were calculated. The sample sizes and thus also the corrected means 
may vary slightly because of individual missing values.
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2. Likewise, in the graphs showing means, visual differences are not auto-
matically statistically significant. Only the subsequent post-hoc tests show 
whether the difference between two countries is statistically significant.17 
This information is stated beneath the graphs. Differences with error prob-
ability less than 5 percent are statistically significant. For example, “NL, 
GB < D, I” means that the extent of a prejudice in Germany and Italy is sig-
nificantly greater than in the Netherlands and Great Britain, but that there 
are no statistically significant differences between the Netherlands and Great 
Britain or between Italy and Germany. “NL, GB, D < D, I”, on the other 
hand, would mean that respondents in the Netherlands and Great Britain 
score significantly lower than in Italy, while the level of agreement among 
German respondents does not differ from any of the other three countries. 
3. We find it especially important to point out that this data does not permit com-
parison of the relative extent of anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, rac-
ism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism or homophobia within a particular country. 
The individual prejudices were measured using specific indicators whose state-
ments differed in their subject matter, choice of wording, bluntness and force. 
In other words, we can say whether anti-Semitism is greater in Italy or Portugal 
but not whether anti-Semitism or anti-Muslim prejudice is worse within Italy, 
because the two prejudices were measured Anti-Immigrant Attitudes
We used four statements to measure anti-immigrant attitudes, some of 
which had previously been used in other studies (Table 4, items 1 to 4). The 
statements cover the general impression that there are too many immigrants 
in the country, the feeling of being a stranger in one’s own country and the 
perception of possible competition for jobs. We also collected data on one 
positive attitude towards immigrants, in the form of the idea that immi-
grants enrich the culture. This item was reverse coded so that higher values 
represent rejection of the statement. Two further statements expanded our 
observation of anti-immigrant attitudes, but for reasons of capacity (length 
of questionnaire) were presented to only a randomly selected half of each 
interview sample and are therefore excluded from the mean scale.
17 Post-hoc tests were conducted retrospectively on individual pairs of countries to test 
whether the extent of a prejudice in one country differs significantly from its extent in 
the other. Here we chose to use the statistical method after Duncan.
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4.1 Anti-Immigrant Attitudes
We used four statements to measure anti-immigrant attitudes, some of which 
had previously been used in other studies (Table 4, items 1 to 4). The state-
ments cover the general impression that there are too many immigrants in the 
country, the feeling of being a stranger in one’s own country and the percep-
tion of possible competition for jobs. We also collected data on one positive 
attitude towards immigrants, in the form of the idea that immigrants enrich 
the culture. This item was reverse coded so that higher values represent rejec-
tion of the statement. Two further statements expanded our observation of 
anti-immigrant attitudes, but for reasons of capacity (length of questionnaire) 
were presented to only a randomly selected half of each interview sample and 
are therefore excluded from the mean scale.
Table 4 shows very clearly that about half of all European respondents agree 
that there are too many immigrants in their country. This pan-European trend 
applies to almost all the individual countries, with deviations of about 10 per-
Table 4: Anti-immigrant statements (agreement in percent)
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
1 There are too many immi-
grants in [country]. 
50.0 62.2 40.3 46.0 62.5 59.6 27.1 58.7
2 Because of the number of  
immigrants, I sometimes feel 
like a stranger in [country].
37.6 45.8 31.0 37.7 27.0 19.1 19.4 44.6
3 When jobs are scarce,  
[country natives] should  
have more rights to a job 
than immigrants.
42.4 50.3 29.5 24.7 55.9 58.2 74.1 71.2
4 Immigrants enrich our culture. 75.0 71.2 70.8 74.9 61.0 73.7 64.2 57.0
Additional items in random half of each sample
5 Immigrants are a strain on our 
welfare system.
40.8 60.2 54.7 20.3 31.7 42.5 45.8 77.2
6 We need immigrants to keep 
the economy going.
60.7 59.5 66.1 64.5 70.7 68.1 42.4 24.2
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cent in either direction. Only Poland stands out with a value of 27 percent, 
meaning that comparatively fewer people there believe there is a problem of 
“too many” immigrants.
Similarly, about half of all European respondents believe that jobs should be 
given to locals first when work is scarce. Here we found much larger differences 
in the responses between the countries. In the eastern European countries of 
Poland and Hungary about three quarters of respondents wanted preference 
to be given to non-immigrant workers, whereas in France and the Netherlands 
the figure is about one quarter. About one third of all European respondents 
shared the sentiment of feeling like a stranger in their own country. At the 
national level this feeling is most widespread in Great Britain (46 percent) and 
Hungary (45 percent), and least prevalent in Portugal and Poland with about 
19 percent of respondents in each case.
A counterweight to these negative attitudes is that almost 70 percent of 
all European respondents saw immigrants as an enrichment for their own 
culture. The figures are highest in Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal, 
where about three quarters confirm the enriching role of immigration. Even 
where they are lowest, in Hungary, Italy and Poland, more than half of re-
spondents agreed with the statement. A certain ambivalence is typical of 
prejudice, and acknowledgement of the cultural enrichment factor appears 
not to be incompatible with the clear claims to dominance expressed in the 
other statements.
This is underlined by the two statements surveyed in a randomly selected half 
of the sample (items 5 and 6 in Table 4). A majority in Europe sees immigrants 
as a burden on the welfare state. Hungary stands out with an especially high 
value of 77 percent, while “only” 32 percent of Italian and 20 percent of Dutch 
respondents agreed with this statement. In Italy, Portugal, France, the Nether-
lands, Germany and Great Britain a majority acknowledge the positive effects 
of immigration for the economy. In Poland 42 percent see a necessity to accept 
immigrants for economic reasons, in Hungary 24 percent.
We went on to use the mean scales to test whether anti-immigrant attitudes 
actually differ significantly between countries. Figure 2 summarizes the often 
slight differences outlined above to provide a concise impression of the extent 
of anti-immigrant attitudes in the eight countries.
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Figure 2: Anti-immigrant attitudes in European comparison (mean scale) 
Answer scale: 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”.
Difference between countries: F (7, 7508) = 51.00, p < .001.
Post-hoc comparisons: F, NL < D, PT, I < PT, I, PL < I, PL, GB < HU. 
As already suggested by the frequency analyses, Hungary has the significantly 
highest anti-immigrant attitude values, followed closely by Italy, Poland and 
Great Britain. Germany and Portugal come next, with France and the Nether-
lands recording the significantly lowest values. We must emphasize, however, 
that in absolute terms the differences in the extent of anti-immigrant attitudes 
between the countries are small.
4.2 Anti-Semitism
We used four statements to measure anti-Semitism, some of which had like-
wise previously appeared in other studies (Table 5, items 7 to 10). The state-
ments represent traditional and secondary anti-Semitism, covering the anti-
Jewish conspiracy theory that Jews have too much influence in the country 
in question and the reversal of victims and perpetrators contained in the ac-
cusation that Jews try to take advantage of past persecution. Here there is 
an undertone of the ancient anti-Semitic stereotype of the “money-grabbing 
Jew”. Another statement suggests that Jews only care for their own (implying 
illoyality to the nation). Here again we also included a positive attitude sug-
gesting that Jews represent a cultural enrichment; this item was reverse coded 
so that higher values represent rejection of the statement. Our survey also in-
1
2
3
4
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cluded two statements designed to capture anti-Semitism communicated via 
issues connected with Israel, but these were excluded from the anti-Semitism 
mean scale.
The responses to the anti-Semitic prejudice statements (Table 5) varied consider-
ably between countries. Almost half of Polish and 69 percent of Hungarian re-
spondents believe that Jews in their countries have too much influence, whereas 
at the other end of the scale only 14 percent in Great Britain and 6 percent in 
the Netherlands are of this opinion. The same is found for statements 8 and 9, 
which attribute avarice and egotism to Jews. Here again we find the strongest 
agreement in Poland and Hungary – although more than half of Portuguese re-
spondents also agree with these statements – and the least agreement in the 
Netherlands and Great Britain where about one fifth judge Jews to be profit-
seeking and self-interested. In all surveyed countries, however, a majority agrees 
with the statement that Jews are an enrichment for their culture.
Table 5: Anti-Semitic statements (agreement in percent)
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
7 Jews have too much influence 
in [country].
19.7 13.9 27.7 5.6 21.2 19.9 49.9 69.2
8 Jews try to take advantage of 
having been victims during 
the Nazi era.
48.9 21.8 32.3 17.2 40.2 52.2 72.2 68.1
9 Jews in general do not care 
about anything or anyone but 
their own kind.
29.4 22.5 25.8 20.4 26.9 54.2 56.9 50.9
10 Jews enrich our culture. 68.9 71.5 60.6 71.8 49.7 51.9 51.2 57.3
Additional statements
11 Considering Israel’s policy I can 
understand why people do not 
like Jews.
35.6 35.9 - 41.1 25.1 48.8 55.2 45.6
12 Israel is conducting a war of 
extermination against the 
Palestinians.
47.7 42.4 - 38.7 37.6 48.8 63.3 41.0
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The two additional statements on the current policies of Israel (Table 5, items 11 
and 12) provide the following picture: About half the respondents in Portugal, 
Poland and Hungary see anti-Semitic sentiments as based on Israel’s political ac-
tivities, while around 40 percent of respondents in most participating countries af-
firm the drastic assessment that the Israeli state is conducting a war of extermina-
tion against the Palestinians. In Poland 63 percent of respondents share that view.
Analysis of the mean scale formed from the first four items statistically confirms 
the impression gathered so far (Figure 3). The significantly strongest agreement 
with anti-Semitic prejudices is found in Poland and Hungary. In Portugal, fol-
lowed closely by Germany, anti-Semitism is significantly more prominent than 
in the other western European countries. In Italy and France anti-Semitic at-
titudes as a whole are less widespread than the European average, while the 
extent of anti-Semitism is least in Great Britain and the Netherlands.
Figure 3: Anti-Semitism in European comparison (mean scale)
Answer scale: 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”.
Difference between countries: F (7, 7233) = 204.07, p < .001.
Post-hoc comparisons: NL, GB < I, F < D < PT < PL, HU. 
4.3 Racism
The two statements measuring racism relate to distinctions made between 
people with light or dark skin, expressed in the perception of “natural” dif-
ferences between races and rejection of mixed-race marriage (Table 6, items 
1
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13 and 14). These two statements form the racism mean scale. Three addi-
tional statements used in a random half of the samples went on to measure 
a generalized racism that treats certain cultures and “races” as superior to 
others.
About one third of all European respondents believe there to be a natural hi-
erarchy of white and black, with the national figures ranging from about 40 
percent in Portugal, Poland and Hungary to just under 19 percent in Italy. The 
proportion of respondents who oppose marriage between black and white lies 
between 5 and 30 percent in the various countries: less than one in ten in the 
Netherlands and Italy, one in ten in Great Britain, one in seven in Germany and 
France, 18 percent in Portugal, 24 percent in Poland and 30 percent in Hungary.
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Table 6: Racist statements (agreement in percent)
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
13 There is a natural hierarchy 
 between black and white 
people. [France: There is no 
natural  hierarchy between 
black and white people.]
30.5 34.6 38.5* 32.4 18.7 45.1 41.6 41.8
14 Preferably blacks and whites 
should not get married.
[France: It is no problem 
if blacks and whites get 
married.]
13.5 10.6 13.6* 4.7 7.5 17.9 23.5 30.3
Additional items in random half of each sample
15 Some cultures are clearly su-
perior to others.
41.6 20.1 29.4 37.9 28.6 61.3 49.4 38.5
16 We need to protect our own 
culture from the influence 
of other cultures.
51.9 59.2 54.8 54.1 49.4 70.1 69.0 78.5
17 Some races are more gifted 
than others.
45.0 27.5 25.0 43.6 31.2 57.1 50.4 53.8
* In France the statements were formulated positively and subsequently reverse coded (for reasons see chapter 
3.2). In these cases the value for France is the percentage of respondents who “somewhat” or “strongly” disa-
greed with the statement.
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The feeling of having to protect one’s own culture from the influences of other 
cultures predominates in all the countries and is especially widespread in Po-
land, Portugal and above all Hungary, where a majority of respondents also 
said that some races are more gifted than others. In Poland nearly half and 
in Portugal 61 percent of respondents share the belief that some cultures are 
superior to others. In France, Great Britain and Italy between one quarter and 
one third hold this opinion.
We combined the first two racist statements into a scale from which we cal-
culated means for the countries (Figure 4). Racism is significantly most wide-
spread in Portugal and Hungary, followed by Poland. In Germany and France 
racist attitudes are more widespread than in Great Britain and the Netherlands, 
while the extent of racism is significantly smallest in Italy.
Figure 4: Racism in European comparison (mean scale)
Answer scale: 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”.
Difference between countries: F (7, 7417) = 116.56, p < .001.
Post-hoc comparisons: I < NL < GB < D, F < PL < PT, HU. 
4.4 Anti-Muslim Attitudes
After statistical testing, three statements were used to produce the anti-Muslim 
attitudes mean scale (Table 7, items 18 to 20). These cover the general impres-
sion that there are too many Muslims in the country, the charge that Muslims 
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make too many demands, and broad-brush criticism of Islam as a religion of 
intolerance. Four further statements were surveyed in a random half of the 
sample. These cover a positive attitude that sees Muslims as an enrichment and 
the idea that there are great cultural differences between the majority society 
and Muslims, especially concerning attitudes towards women. We also sur-
veyed the idea that Muslims generally support and condone terrorism. 
In most of the countries a majority believe Islam to be a religion of intolerance, 
with agreement just below 50 percent only in Great Britain and the Netherlands. 
In almost all the countries more than half of respondents said that Muslims make 
too many demands; Portugal was the only exception with about one third. The 
statement that there are too many Muslims in the country is affirmed by just 
over one quarter in Portugal and by about one third in France. In Germany, Great 
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Table 7: Anti-Muslim statements (agreement in percent)
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
18 There are too many Muslims 
in [country].
46.1 44.7 36.2 41.5 49.7 27.1 47.1 60.7
19 Muslims are too demanding. 54.1 50.0 52.8 51.8 64.7 34.4 62.3 60.0
20 Islam is a religion of 
intolerance.
[France: Islam is a religion of 
tolerance.]
52.5 47.2 52.3* 46.7 60.4 62.2 61.5 53.4
Additional items
22 The Muslim culture fits well 
into [country/Europe].
16.6 39.0 49.8 38.7 27.4 50.1 19.0 30.2
23 Muslims’ attitudes towards 
women contradict our values.
76.1 81.5 78.8 78.2 82.2 72.1 72.1 76.8
24 Many Muslims perceive ter-
rorists as heroes.
[France: question not asked].
27.9 37.6 - 29.2 28.5 30.3 30.2 39.3
25 The majority of Muslims find 
terrorism justifiable.
[France: not justifiable]
17.1 26.3 23.3* 19.9 21.5 22.4 26.0 29.6
* In France the statements were formulated positively and subsequently reverse coded (for reasons see chapter 
3.2). In these cases the value for France is the percentage of respondents who “somewhat” or “strongly” disa-
greed with the statement.
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Figure 5: Anti-Muslim attitudes in European comparison (mean scale)
Answer scale: 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”.
Difference between countries: F (7, 6932) = 14.97, p < .001.
Post-hoc comparisons: PT, NL < NL, F, GB < D, I, HU, PL.
Britain, Italy and the Netherlands more than 40 percent of respondents complain 
that there are too many Muslims in their country, in Hungary about 60 percent.
Interviewees were also asked to respond to four further statements covering 
perceived cultural differences and supposed affinity of Muslims toward terror-
ism (Table 7, items 22 to 25). Despite correlating closely with anti-Muslim at-
titudes these items represent separate constructs and were therefore excluded 
from the scale measure.
The figures for those who say that Muslim culture is compatible with their own 
range from 17 percent in Poland and 19 percent in Germany to about half the 
population in Portugal and France. A majority of more than 70 percent of Euro-
pean respondents find that Muslim attitudes towards women are incompatible 
with their own values. Overall in the surveyed countries about one third think 
that Muslims treat Islamist terrorists as heroes, although somewhat fewer believe 
that terrorism finds moral support in the Muslim community (ranging from under 
20 percent in Germany and the Netherlands to nearly 30 percent in Hungary).
The scale created from the first three statements clearly illustrates the extent of 
anti-Muslim attitudes in the studied countries (Figure 5). It is conspicuous that 
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Europeans are largely united in their rejection of Muslims and Islam. The signifi-
cantly most widespread anti-Muslim attitudes are found in Germany, Hungary, 
Italy and Poland, closely followed by France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. 
The extent of anti-Muslim attitudes is least in Portugal. In absolute terms, how-
ever, the eight countries differ little in their levels of prejudice towards Muslims.
4.5 Sexism
Sexism was surveyed in terms of agreement with the traditional division of 
gender roles, which gives men more power, influence, income and wealth 
than women, as well as better career opportunities and access to education 
(Table 8, items 26 and 27).
Table 8: Sexist statements (agreement in percent) 
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
26 Women should take 
their role as wives 
and mothers more 
seriously.
52.7 53.2 57.0 36.4 63.2 67.9 87.2 88.4
27 When jobs are scarce, 
men should have 
more rights to a job 
than women.
12.0 15.0 13.0 14.9 21.0 25.2 28.7 36.1
The extent of sexist attitudes varies greatly between the surveyed countries. 
In Poland and Hungary more than 80 percent think that women should take 
their role as wives and mothers more seriously. In Italy and Portugal the figure 
is more than 60 percent, and in all the other countries apart from the Nether-
lands more than half the respondents propagate this traditional role division. 
In Poland 36 percent and in Hungary 29 percent want jobs for men when 
work is in short supply, along with 25 percent in Portugal, 21 percent in Italy, 
and between 15 and 12 percent in Great Britain, the Netherlands, France and 
Germany.
The means calculated from these two statements reveal the following country-
specific distribution of sexist attitudes (Figure 6).
4. The Extent of Group-focused Enmity in Europe
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Figure 6: Sexism in European comparison (mean scale)
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Answer scale: 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”.
Difference between countries: F (7, 7504) = 178.56, p < .001.
Post-hoc comparisons: NL < GB < D, F < I < PT < PL < HU. 
The broadest acceptance of sexism is found in Hungary, followed in statisti-
cally significant steps by Poland, Portugal, and Italy, all above the European 
average. Germany and France come next, statistically speaking at the same 
level, followed, again in statistically significant steps, by Great Britain and the 
Netherlands.
4.6 Homophobia
We recorded homophobia by measuring rejection of two positively formulated 
statements: one about same-sex marriage and the other about the morality of 
homosexuality (Table 9, items 28 and 29). The percentage figures indicate how 
many respondents reject equality for homosexuals.
Whereas almost 90 percent of Polish and about two thirds of Hungarian, Italian 
and Portuguese respondents reject same-sex marriage, the figure is between 
52 and 40 percent in France, Great Britain and Germany, and lowest in the 
Netherlands with 17 percent. Similar differences between countries are found 
for the statement that there is nothing immoral about homosexuality. More 
than three quarters of Polish respondents find homosexuality immoral, as do 
about two thirds of Hungarians. In the other countries this sentiment is shared 
by between 44 and 36 percent, apart from the Netherlands, which again has 
the lowest figure by a large margin: one in six.
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The mean scale formed from the two statements confirms statistically what we 
have just outlined (Figure 7): Homophobia is most widespread in Poland fol-
lowed by Hungary, Italy and Portugal, France and Great Britain, and Germany 
(in that order). It is by far the least prevalent in the Netherlands. 
Figure 7: Homophobia in European comparison (mean scale)
Answer scale: 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”.
Difference between countries: F (7, 7504) = 178.56, p < .001.
Post-hoc comparisons: NL < D < GB, F < PT, I < HU < PL.
4. The Extent of Group-focused Enmity in Europe
Table 9: Homophobia statements (rejection in percent)
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
28 It is a good thing 
to allow marriages 
between two men 
or two women.
39.7 42.1 52.3 17.0 64.1 62.4 88.2 69.3
29 There is nothing 
immoral about 
homosexuality.
38.0 37.2 36.2 16.5 42.5 44.0 75.8 67.7
1
2
3
4
HUPLPTINLFGBD
Negative attitudes towards the target groups of group-focused 
enmity addressed here are widespread in Europe. Rejection of 
immigrants and Muslims is conspicuously similar across the sur-
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veyed countries, whereas the extent of racism, anti-Semitism, 
sexism and homophobia differs, sometimes considerably. The 
responses were least negative in the Netherlands where only 
anti-Muslim attitudes exists at a level comparable with the other 
countries. In France there is less anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim 
prejudice than in other countries, but their extent is still note-
worthy. In Italy, by contrast, the figures for anti-immigrant at-
titudes, anti-Muslim attitudes and homophobia are higher than 
in the other western European countries, whereas support for 
racism is conspicuously weak. Anti-immigrant attitudes are com-
paratively widespread in Great Britain, while anti-Semitism there 
and in the Netherlands is less prevalent than in the other coun-
tries, even if that still means worrying numbers of respondents 
espouse anti-Semitic attitudes. In Germany we find relatively 
strong anti-Muslim attitudes, while otherwise the responses cor-
respond largely with the European mean. In Portugal, Poland 
and Hungary we find relatively high levels of anti-immigrant at-
titudes, racism, anti-Semitism and sexism. In Poland and Hun-
gary these are joined by strong homophobia and anti-Muslim 
attitudes. The eastern European countries of Hungary and Po-
land stand out for their high levels of prejudice against all the 
surveyed groups.
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5. Ideological Configurations
As explained in chapter 2, we understand prejudices against immigrants, Jews, 
black people, Muslims, women and homosexuals as elements of a syndrome 
of group-focused enmity (Figure 8). 
Figure 8: The six elements of group-focused enmity examined in this study
This theoretical concept implies that there is a close empirical relationship be-
tween the individual prejudices. So we would assume that respondents who 
target one of the groups (for example immigrants), will probably also tend to 
target the other groups (Jews, black people, Muslims, women and homosexu-
als). Of course this will not apply strictly in every individual case, but across all 
respondents it should be possible to demonstrate clear and significant relation-
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ships. That would mean that all these prejudices are represented by a single 
dimension, the one we term group-focused enmity.
Earlier empirical research into group-focused enmity has already confirmed this 
relationship for Germany (Zick et al. 2008). Here we move on to test whether 
the surveyed dimensions of prejudice correlate empirically in the European 
context and whether they can justifiably be combined in a single construct of 
group-focused enmity (GFE).
After that we turn to the question of whether other theoretically related con-
structs correspond with group-focused enmity. Bringing together broader re-
search into right-wing populist and extremist attitudes with the concept of a 
syndrome of group-focused enmity, we test the relationship between prejudice 
against weaker groups and the constructs of authoritarianism, Social Dominance 
Orientation and rejection of diversity (which we also explain in a little more detail).
5.1 Relationships between the Investigated Prejudices
As expected, the six prejudices correlate statistically significantly at moderate to 
strong levels (r = .25 to .59; Figure 9). We find especially strong relationships 
in the western European countries of Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, 
What are correlations?
A correlation indicates the relationship between two constructs (here prejudice 
towards two different groups). It expresses the probability that a person who 
agrees (or disagrees) with one type of prejudice will also agree (or disagree) 
with another. Such a relationship is quantified using a correlation coefficient. 
A correlation coefficient r has a value between -1 (perfect negative relation-
ship) and +1 (perfect positive relationship). A value of 0 means that there is 
no relationship. Correlations up to r = .3 are classed as weak, because a con-
siderable number of respondents agree with one of the constructs but not 
with the other. A correlation of r = .3 to r = .5 means a moderate relationship, 
while a correlation of r > .5 represents a strong relationship, where many re-
spondents agree (or disagree) with both constructs. The level of significance 
(see glossary) indicates the probability that the identified relationship is real 
rather than coincidental.
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Italy and France (but less in Portugal; see Table 10, below). So it is indeed the 
case that people who hold a prejudice against one group also reject other 
groups that are at first glance completely different. A person with generalized 
negative attitudes towards immigrants is likely also to target Jews, black peo-
ple, Muslims, homosexuals and women.
There is evidence of an especially strong relationship between anti-immigrant 
attitudes and anti-Muslim attitudes in Europe (r = .59). Many of the European 
respondents who show prejudice against immigrants also exhibit generalized 
negative attitudes towards Muslims or Islam. This is especially the case in the 
western European countries of Great Britain (r = .71), France (r = .69) and the 
Netherlands (r = .66), as well as in Italy and Germany (r > .55). With the excep-
tion of Italy, these countries all have in common comparatively large immigrant 
populations from Muslim countries and sometimes heated debates over inte-
gration where immigrants and Muslims are often spoken about in the same 
breath or equated (even though a considerable proportion of the immigrant 
population also comes from non-Muslim countries).
Between anti-immigrant attitudes and anti-Semitism we also find a significant 
moderate relationship for Europe as a whole (r = .41). For many respondents 
prejudice against immigrants goes hand in hand with prejudice against Jews. 
In the individual countries the relationships range from .25 in Portugal to .49 
in Germany. 
The relationship between sexism and homophobia is also conspicuous (r = 
.42). These two dimensions are especially closely related in Great Britain and 
the Netherlands (.45), whereas the weak relationships in Hungary and Poland 
(.22 and .19) show that in those countries homophobia is not necessarily con-
nected with sexism. In Great Britain and the Netherlands, as in several other 
countries, respondents are generally either equally open to equality for women 
and homosexuals or opposed to equality for both groups, with few respond-
ents favouring equality for one group but not the other. When considering the 
relationship between sexism and the other prejudices it is pertinent to note that 
the group in question here is not a minority. The low social status that women 
share with other groups that are identified as inferior is plainly attributable to 
widespread ideas about the inequality and inferiority of women. 
There is also a noteworthy correlation between anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim 
attitudes, with a figure of .37 for Europe as a whole. In the individual countries 
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the strength of the relationship ranges from .23 in Hungary to .46 in France 
and is once again stronger in the western European countries (apart from Por-
tugal). What that means is that in these countries a considerable proportion of 
respondents are prejudiced either against both minorities or neither, whereas 
respondents in Hungary and Portugal tend to exhibit more specific patterns of 
prejudice against either Jews or Muslims.
In Europe as a whole we find only a weak relationship between racism and 
anti-Muslim attitudes (r = .28), with country-specific figures ranging from .12 
in France to .39 in the Netherlands. In other words a meaningful proportion of 
respondents were specifically negative about either black people or Muslims. 
Nor is the relationship between racism and anti-Semitism particularly strong 
Figure 9: Relationships between the six prejudice dimensions in Europe
All coefficients are highly significant at the 0.1 percent level.
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in Europe as a whole (r = .32), with the weakest country-specific figure .21 in 
France and the strongest .37 in Great Britain. So here, too, the prejudices of 
many European respondents tend to be group-specific, targeting either black 
people or Jews. The relationships between homophobia and racism and be-
tween homophobia and anti-Muslim attitudes are even looser at the European 
level, with figures of .25 and .27.
In France we find comparatively weak relationships between racism based on 
skin colour and the other types of prejudice. This is perhaps because compara-
tively many black people possess French citizenship and therefore in relative 
terms more black people took part in the survey. 
Table 10: Relationships between individual GFE elements by country
Anti-
Semitism
Racism Anti-
Muslim 
attitudes
Sexism Homo-
phobia
Anti-immigrant 
attitudes
D .49 .41 .55 .35 .26
GB .41 .39 .71 .34 .36
F .47 .23 .69 .31 .25
NL .35 .42 .66 .39 .20
I .35 .35 .60 .30 .34
PT .24 .40 .30 .36 .16
PL .44 .40 .29 .41 .29
HU .34 .31 .40 .25 .20
Anti-Semitism D .30 .40 .33 .23
GB .35 .38 .27 .32
F .22 .46 .35 .21
NL .30 .33 .28 .19
I .27 .34 .27 .14
PT .26 .25 .17 .09
PL .29 .29 .34 .24
HU .27 .22 .11 .14
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Anti-
Semitism
Racism Anti-
Muslim 
attitudes
Sexism Homo-
phobia
Racism D .33 .38 .22
GB .38 .38 .42
F .12 .13 .12
NL .39 .40 .27
I .35 .31 .19
PT .20 .41 .21
PL .22 .35 .14
HU .24 .26 .09
Anti-Muslim 
attitudes
D .23 .24
GB .35 .37
F .25 .20
NL .40 .26
I .31 .36
PT .15 .09 (ns)
PL .23 .13
HU .15 .03 (ns)
Sexism D .35
GB .49
F .29
NL .45
I .37
PT .38
PL .19
HU .21
All coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level or better, except those identified as “ns” (non-significant). 
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5.2 The GFE Index
These altogether close relationships between the six different prejudices sug-
gest that it might be possible to represent them as a single dimension of 
group-focused enmity. We therefore combined the six surveyed dimensions of 
prejudice to create a GFE Index. Calculated as the mean value of the six indi-
vidual GFE elements, it expresses the overall intensity of group-focused enmity. 
The internal consistency (reliability) of this index composed of anti-immigrant at-
titudes, anti-Semitism, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism and homophobia 
is confirmed empirically for Europe as a whole (Cronbach’s  = .76), and at the 
country level (internal consistency ranges from  = .62 in Hungary to  = .79 in 
Great Britain).18 That means that in all the countries all six prejudices are so closely 
related that they can be treated as a single dimension (group-focused enmity).19 
As the mean of the six surveyed prejudices, the GFE Index must be a value 
in the range from 1 to 4. Values above 2.5 indicate that agreement with the 
prejudice statements is greater than rejection. Taking all eight countries to-
gether this applies to 38 percent of respondents. Figure 10 shows the extent 
of group-focused enmity in the individual countries. It is smallest in the Neth-
erlands with 15 percent. In France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy between 
one quarter and one third tend towards group-focused enmity, and in Portugal 
41 percent. Group-focused enmity is most prevalent in Hungary and Poland, 
where it is identifiable among nearly two thirds of respondents.
18 For explanations of “reliability” and “Cronbach’s alpha” see the glossary. 
19 A principal component factor analysis of the six elements extracted a factor with an ei-
genvalue of 2.8 and explained variance of 46 percent. Using confirmatory factor analy-
sis and multiple group comparison we were also able to confirm the fit and comparabil-
ity of the GFE syndrome in all countries (Küpper, Zick and Wolf 2010). The model with 
metric invariance has an acceptable fit, meaning that the GFE syndrome can be con-
firmed for all eight countries individually and that there is a similar understanding of the 
prejudices in all the countries; CFI = .911; AIC = 4444; RMSA = .023; P-Close = 1; Chi2/
df = 5.21. In the individual countries the internal consistency of the GFE Index created 
from the six GFE elements is: GB:  = .79, D:  = .75, F:  = .79, NL:  = .76, I:  = .74, 
PT:  = .66, PL: a = .71, HU:  = .62.
GFE Index = anti-immigrant attitudes + anti-Semitism + racism + 
anti-Muslim attitudes + sexism + homophobia / 6
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5.3 GFE and other Constructs Indicating Right-wing 
Extremism
As discussed in chapter 1.3, several other constructs are widely regarded as 
central components of right-wing populist or extremist attitudes. In prejudice 
research social psychologists have discussed and empirically confirmed certain 
of these constructs as influencing or explanatory factors rather than constitu-
tive elements. In the following we examine whether certain selected ideological 
convictions are indeed related to prejudice against weaker groups. Our selec-
tion of constructs is grounded in the theories and restricted by the configura-
tion of the raw data. We were forced to omit certain ideological elements that 
extremism researchers consider relevant and theoretically closely connected 
with prejudice simply because the relevant data was not recorded in our survey.
We begin by briefly outlining the constructs involved. Numerous studies have 
already confirmed that the first two, authoritarianism and Social Dominance 
Orientation, are especially relevant for the tendency to target prejudice against 
weak groups (Duckitt and Sibley 2006; Zick et al. 2008). We added a third: 
to examine whether group-focused enmity is related to a general rejection of 
diversity. 
Figure 10: GFE in the individual countries (percentages)
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We surveyed each of these constructs using two statements and aggregated 
the figures for those who “somewhat” or “strongly” agreed with a statement. 
Table 11 shows the results by country.
A strong and fairly uniform tendency towards authoritarianism is found in all 
the surveyed countries. The proportion who believe that stronger action should 
be taken against troublemakers for the sake of law and order ranges from more 
than 90 percent in Hungary, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal to two 
thirds in Italy. At least 80 percent in all countries (and 94 percent in Portugal) 
also think that school should primarily provide a sense of discipline.
Authoritatianism describes a tendency towards subordination and obedience 
to authority, including an aggressive law-and-order mentality that seeks pun-
ishment for norm deviations (Adorno et al. 1950, Altemeyer 1988). The rela-
tionship between authoritarianism and prejudice was first proposed in 1950 
by Theodor Adorno and his co-authors and has since been confirmed by nu-
merous empirical studies (for example Stellmacher 2004; also Decker et al. 
2010). The more strongly a person tends towards authoritarianism, the more 
likely they are to target weak groups that deviate from prevailing or perceived 
norms. Deviation from the norm may be defined in terms of many different 
characteristics, such as skin colour, cultural or religious background, gender, 
sexual orientation or lifestyle.
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) centres on attitudes to group-based hi-
erarchies (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Individuals with high SDO find it right 
that certain groups are at the top of society, while others are at the bottom, 
and they want this social hierarchy to be preserved. Individuals with low SDO 
prefer equality between social groups. Here again, numerous empirical studies 
confirm that persons who fundamentally support a hierarchical social order 
also tend to express prejudices. Andreas Zick and colleagues (2008) were able 
to confirm empirically that group-focused enmity is essentially determined by 
SDO, and thus by an ideology of inequality.
Rejection of diversity describes the extent to which individuals favour cultural, 
religious and ethnic diversity in society. Individuals who reject diversity and 
wish for a homogeneous society based on uniform values and traditions tend 
towards prejudice (Zick and Küpper 2010).
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The tendency towards Social Dominance Orientation is only moderate. In most 
of the western European countries less than 20 percent of respondents be-
lieve that inferior groups should stay in their place, with figures ranging from 
7 percent in France to 24 to 29 percent in the eastern European countries, 
Italy and Portugal. In the eastern European countries of Hungary and Poland 
around 40 percent of respondents also believe it is probably a good thing that 
certain groups are at the top, while others are at the bottom. In Great Britain, 
Italy and France less than one in five share this view.
In all countries apart from Portugal and Poland at least half of respondents 
support religious diversity in their country, with the highest figure – three 
Table 11: Statements on theoretically related constructs (agreement in 
percent) 
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
Authoritatianism
1 To maintain law and order, 
stronger action should be taken 
against troublemakers.
79.2 92.0 76.8 91.7 65.3 91.6 84.1 95.7
2 School should primarily provide 
pupils with a sense of discipline.
81.3 88.3 87.6 78.8 85.0 94.0 82.0 84.7
Social Dominance Orientation
5 Inferior groups should stay in 
their place.
19.4 13.2 6.7 15.6 26.9 23.9 24.9 28.5
6 It is probably a good thing that 
certain groups are at the top, 
while others are at the bottom.
26.5 18.5 14.3 22.8 14.5 20.4 40.2 40.8
Diversity
7 It is better for a country if there 
are many different religions.*
65.8 62.5 65.7 58.9 53.5 43.6 43.0 75.6
8 It is better for a country if 
 almost everyone shares the 
same customs and traditions.
36.6 42.5 36.7 40.5 48.9 61.7 74.6 57.1
* When creating the mean scale we reverse coded this item so that a high value represents rejection of 
diversity.
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quarters – in Hungary. A counterweight here is formed by the respondents 
who think it would be better if almost everyone shared the same customs and 
traditions, whose proportion ranges from one third in Germany and France to 
three quarters in Poland.
We combined the statements to create a mean scale for each construct and 
investigated how they correlate with the GFE Index. Taking the European coun-
tries together we find significant relationships between group-focused enmity 
and authoritarianism (r = .40), Social Dominance Orientation (r = .42) and a 
negative attitude towards diversity (r = .45) (Table 12). What this means is that 
respondents who exhibit prejudice against weak groups are also fairly likely 
to espouse ideological convictions that oppose equality for different groups.
Table 12: Relationships between ideological constructs and GFE for 
 Europe and by country
 Authoritarianism Social Dominance 
Orientation
Rejection of 
diversity
GFE EU .40 .42 .45
D .53 .46 .43
GB .44 .42 .52
F .50 .36 .49
NL .44 .50 .51
I .56 .47 .50
PT .11 .46 .40
PL .42 .30 .36
HU .24 .18 .32
All correlation coefficients are highly significant at the 0.1 percent level. 
Significant positive relationships are found in all the individual countries with-
out exception (Table 12).20 In the western European countries the correlations 
20 The range of bivariate correlations between GFE and the ideological convictions is: 
Authoritarianism: r = .24 in Hungary up to r = .56 in Italy (Portugal r = .11); Social 
Dominance Orientation: r = .18 in Hungary up to r = .50 in the Netherlands; rejection 
of diversity: r = .32 in Hungary up to r = .52 in the United Kingdom.
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between ideological conviction and group-focused enmity are especially strong 
in Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands with individual outliers in 
France and Portugal. In France Social Dominance Orientation correlates less 
strongly than the other two constructs with the GFE syndrome, while in Portu-
gal there is a conspicuously weak relationship between group-focused enmity 
and authoritarianism (r = .11). In the eastern European countries, Poland and 
Hungary, the relationships are generally weaker but nonetheless significant. 
In all the countries we can confirm a significant positive relationship between 
the three constructs and group-focused enmity.
We were able to measure the six prejudices – anti-immigrant 
attitudes, anti-Semitism, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism 
and homophobia – reliably and ensuring cross-cultural com-
parability, and found significant and substantial relationships 
between them. After statistical testing we combined them to 
create an index of group-focused enmity. The GFE Index con-
firms that the extent of group-focused enmity is comparatively 
small in the Netherlands and conspicuously large in Poland and 
Hungary. The ideological convictions of authoritarianism, Social 
Dominance Orientation and rejection of diversity are closely re-
lated to group-focused enmity, especially in Great Britain, Ger-
many, the Netherlands and Italy; in Portugal and Hungary the 
relationship tends to be somewhat weaker.
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6. The Demography of Group-focused Enmity
In this chapter we consider the extent of prejudice in relation to the demo-
graphic variables of age, education, gender and income, analysing the extent 
to which the six elements of the group-focused enmity syndrome are present 
among different demographic groups in the eight European countries.
We first calculated the GFE means for each demographic variable (the average 
agreement for all six prejudice types together). For each demographic variable 
the first graph shows the results for all eight countries together, the second 
differentiated by country. Then we analysed how the extent of each of the six 
elements relates to each of the demographic variables. Statistically significant 
differences between the mean scale values are indicated beneath the figures.
6.1 Age Differences in GFE
To what extent does the age of the European respondents affect the extent 
of their prejudices? Figure 11 shows an almost linear relationship. In all age 
groups from 22 years upwards, the older the respondents the stronger their
Figure 11: GFE in Europe by age (means)
Difference by age: F (4, 7488) = 143.11, p < .001.
Post-hoc comparisons: 22–34, 16–21 < 35–49 < 50–65 < above 65.
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prejudice. The youngest respondents, the 16- to 21-year-olds, however, exhibit 
noticeably stronger prejudices than the next-oldest age group; the difference 
between their GFE mean and that of the 22- to 34-year-olds is not statistically 
significant. The 35–49, 50–65 and over-65 cohorts each express significantly 
more prejudice than the next-youngest age cohort. 
Figure 12: Social prejudices in Europe by age (means)
Differences by age: 
Anti-immigrant attitudes: F (4, 7478) = 27.72, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons: 22–34, 35–49, 16–21 
< 16–21, 50–65 < over 65. 
Anti-Semitism: F (4, 7207) = 31.51, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons: 16–21, 22–34 < 35–49 < over 
65 < 50–65. 
Racism: F (4, 7387) = 52.51, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons: 22–34 < 35–49, 16–21 < 50–65 < over 65.
Anti-Muslim attitudes: F (4, 6906) = 32.46, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons: 22–34, 16–21 < 16–21, 
35–49 < 50–65 < over 65. 
Sexism: F (4, 7474) = 148.12, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons: 22–34, 16–21 < 35–49 < 50–65 < 
over 65.
Homophobia: F (4, 7370) = 108.70, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons: 16–21, 22–34 < 35–49 < 50–65 
< over 65. 
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6.1.1 Results Differentiated by Prejudice Type
The finding for group-focused enmity as a whole is confirmed for the individual 
elements (Figure 12). Here too, broadly speaking, the older the respondents 
the stronger their prejudices against all groups under consideration here. The 
over-50 cohorts exhibit an especially conspicuous tendency towards prejudice. 
The oldest respondents, the over-65s, show significantly more anti-immigrant 
attitudes, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, and above all sexism and homophobia, 
followed by the 50- to 65-year-olds. One exception is anti-Semitism, which is 
significantly more prevalent among the 50- to 65-year-olds than the over-65s. 
The age distribution of racist attitudes also deviates slightly from the overall 
trend, with the youngest respondents, the 16- to 21-year-olds, exhibiting sig-
nificantly stronger prejudices than the next-oldest group, the 22- to 34-year-
olds. The latter age group also has conspicuously low values for the other 
dimensions of prejudice, with the lowest values for anti-immigrant attitudes, 
racism, anti-Muslim attitudes and sexism.
6.1.2 Results Differentiated by Country 
Within the individual countries, too, we observe that the extent of group-fo-
cused enmity increases with age. In Great Britain the over-65s, and in Germany 
the over-50s exhibit conspicuously more prejudice than younger respondents, 
especially where anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and racist statements are con-
cerned. In Germany, however, the high level of sexism and homophobia among 
16- to 21-year-olds is also striking.
Although we find the linear trend repeated for the older age groups in France 
and Italy, here again this does not apply to the youngest respondents. In Italy 
the youngest respondents, the 16- to 21-year-olds, express just as much preju-
dice as the 35- to 65-year-olds and thus considerably more than the next-oldest 
group, the 22- to 34-year-olds. Anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism and 
racism are especially prevalent among the youngest Italians. In France, too, the 
responses of the youngest age group were more negative than those of their 
22- to 34-year-old compatriots, with racism conspicuously widespread among 
the youngest French respondents. Otherwise in France, the responses of those 
over 50 were clearly more negative than those of the under-50s.
In the Netherlands agreement with statements expressing prejudice is com-
paratively small, but the linear relationship between age and group-focused 
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enmity is still present. Here too the over-65s most frequently affirm all the sur-
veyed social prejudices, although again the 16- to 21-year-olds express more 
prejudices towards immigrants than the 22- to 34-year-olds.
Figure 13: Country comparison of GFE means by age I
In Portugal and Hungary the age groups differ less in their extent of group-
focused enmity, but a linearity is observable here too. Whereas the same also 
applies to the individual dimensions of prejudice in Portugal, the picture for 
the individual prejudice types in Hungary is more complex. Here anti-Semitism, 
sexism and homophobia clearly increase with age, but with one caveat: the 
oldest respondents, the over-65s, are less negative towards Jews. The conspicu-
ously broad dissemination of anti-immigrant attitudes and racism among the 
youngest respondents in Hungary is also noteworthy. In Poland group-focused 
enmity is conspicuously strong among all respondents aged over 35. Only the 
two youngest age groups stand out with significantly smaller values. In Poland 
this linearity is also found in the individual elements of group-focused enmity. 
In Italy, the younger adults (aged 22–34) scored the lowest on GFE, the oldest 
respondents (over 65) the highest .
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Figure 14: Country comparison of GFE means by age II
6.2 GFE and Education
To what extent is prejudice a question of education? Because European edu-
cation systems are very diverse and tricky to compare, we classified the par-
ticipants in this survey into three groups, distinguishing only between a low, 
medium and high level of education. We made this division within each coun-
try sample rather than in relation to the absolute level of education, so that 
each of the education categories represents about one third of the country’s 
population.
The GFE means for the three education categories show that the lower the 
respondents’ level of education the stronger their overall level of prejudice 
(Figure 15).
Group-focused enmity increases with age in all countries.
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Figure 15: GFE in Europe by level of education (means)
Education: F (2, 7144) = 541.88, p < .001.Post-hoc comparisons: high < middle < low.
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Figure 16: Prejudices in Europe by level of education (means)
Differences by education: 
Anti-immigrant attitudes: F (2, 7134) = 256.02, p < .001; anti-Semitism: F (2, 6871) = 221.34, p < 
.001; racism: F (2, 7053) = 329.18, p < .001; anti-Muslim attitudes: F (2, 6583) = 162.01, p < .001; 
sexism: F (2, 7136) = 313.60, p < .001; homophobia: F (2, 7028) = 120.19, p < .001.
All post-hoc comparisons: high < middle < low.
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6.2.1 Results Differentiated by Prejudice Type
The same relationship can also be demonstrated for each of the six individual 
dimensions of prejudice (Figure 16). Respondents with a lower level of educa-
tion exhibited more anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, racist, anti-Muslim, sexist and 
homophobic attitudes than the better-educated.
6.2.2 Results Differentiated by Country 
The same trend is found when the results are differentiated by country (Figure 
17). In all surveyed countries we found less education to be associated with 
higher values both for group-focused enmity as a whole and for the individual 
dimensions of prejudice. It is also worth noting that in all countries the dif-
ference in means between the top and middle group is greater than the dif-
ference between the middle and bottom group. Especially in Hungary, Great 
Britain and Portugal the difference between respondents with a medium and 
low level of education is very small. Thus it is above all the better-educated 
who are less likely to express prejudices.
Figure 17: Country comparison of GFE means by level of education
Differences by education: 
Germany: F (2, 866) = 79.80, p < .001; Great Britain: F (2, 902) = 56.40, p < .001; France: F (2, 810) 
= 42.60, p < .001; Netherlands: F (2, 943) = 80.72, p < .001; Italy: F (2, 933) = 92.61, p < .001; 
Portugal: F (2, 943) = 156.34, p < .001; Poland: F (2, 827) = 92.61, p < .001; Hungary: F (2, 899) = 
39.99, p < .001.
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6.3 Gender Differences in GFE
Are women or men more likely to agree with negative statements about weak 
groups? To find out, we analysed the responses of all European respondents by 
gender. The resulting GFE means show that women are more likely to express 
prejudice than men (Figure 18).
Figure 18: GFE in Europe by gender (means)
Gender: F (1, 7523) = 17.88, p < .001. 
6.3.1 Results Differentiated by Prejudice Type
A differentiated examination of the individual dimensions of group-focused 
enmity reveals a largely similar pattern (Figure 19). Women express significantly 
more anti-immigrant attitudes, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes and sexism than 
men. No difference was found for anti-Semitism. Only in relation to homopho-
bia did men give significantly more negative responses than women.
Group-focused enmity declines with better education.
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One possible reason for the wider dissemination of prejudices among women 
might be that in the representative sample they are on average slightly older 
and less educated. To test this we controlled for the effect of age and educa-
tion. Although this does indeed reduce the observed influence of gender, the 
trend remains significant. Thus the different extent of group-focused enmity 
among men and women is not caused solely by differences in age and educa-
tion in the sample.
Figure 19: Social prejudices in Europe by gender (means)
Gender differences in Europe: 
Anti-immigrant attitudes: F (1, 7513) = 58.02, p < .001; anti-Semitism: F (1, 7239) = 1.45, ns; racism: 
F (1, 7422) = 27.05, p < .001; anti-Muslim attitudes: F (1, 6937) = 46.39, p < .001; sexism: F (1, 7509) 
= 47.10, p < .001; homophobia: F (1, 7405) = 45.66, p <.001.
6.3.2 Results Differentiated by Country 
In the individual countries, too, women generally give more negative responses 
than their male compatriots, but there are differences between the countries 
(Figure 20). In France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy the extent of overall 
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prejudice (GFE) does not differ significantly between men and women, but if 
we examine the individual dimensions, certain differences become visible. In 
all four countries male respondents gave more homophobic responses than fe-
male. In Great Britain and Germany prejudices towards Muslims were stronger 
among female respondents, and in Italy anti-immigrant attitudes, racism and 
sexism. French women gave more anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, racist and anti-
Muslim responses than their male compatriots.
In Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal the GFE Index itself clearly 
shows female respondents expressing more prejudices. This picture is generally 
confirmed for the individual dimensions: In all four countries women gave more 
anti-immigrant, sexist and anti-Muslim responses than men, and in Hungary, 
Poland and Portugal also more racist ones. Only in Hungary and Poland is anti-
Semitism stronger among male respondents. Unlike in Germany, Great Britain, 
France and Italy, women in the Netherlands, Poland. Portugal and Hungary are 
also more homophobic than their male compatriots.
Figure 20: Country comparison of GFE means by gender
Gender differences by country: 
Germany: F (1, 914) = .921, ns; Great Britain: F (1, 987) = .877, ns; France: F (1, 913) = 1.51, ns; 
 Netherlands: F (1, 967) = 6.84, p < .01; Italy: F (1, 965) = .23, ns; Portugal: F (1, 944) = 17.97, p < 
.001; Poland: F (1, 913) = 4.64, p < .05; Hungary: F (1, 906) = 19.06, p < .001.
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6.4 Income Differences in GFE
To what extent does prejudice against weak groups depend on the income of 
the respondents? Like the education systems, incomes vary considerably be-
tween European countries. In order to ensure comparability we created artifi-
cial categories, dividing respondents into groups with low, medium and high 
income. Here again, the division is not in terms of absolute income, but relative 
within each country sample. Thus each of the income groups represents about 
one third of each country’s population.
The calculated means in Figure 21 reveal a linear relationship: respondents with 
low income tend to express more prejudice than those with middle or high income.
Figure 21: GFE in Europe by income (means)
Difference by income: F (2, 5718) = 110.44, p < .001.
Post-hoc comparison: high < middle < low.
Because income and education are closely related, we conducted a second 
analysis (not shown here) controlling for the effect of education, to isolate the 
influence of income alone. Although this does indeed reduce the observed 
Men and women differ only slightly in their extent of group-
focused enmity.
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influence of income, the trend remains significant. Regardless of their educa-
tion, people with lower income tend to express more group-focused enmity 
than those with higher income. 
6.4.1 Results Differentiated by Prejudice Type
This trend is also confirmed in all six individual dimensions (Figure 22). The 
lower their income, the more anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, racist, anti-Muslim, 
sexist and homophobic the respondents’ attitudes. This effect is statistically sig-
nificant for all social prejudices in almost all income groups. Only in the case of 
racism are the responses of low-income respondents not significantly different 
from those of middle-income respondents.
Figure 22: Social prejudices in Europe by income (means)
Differences by income: 
Anti-immigrant attitudes: F (2, 5712) = 105.70, p < .001; anti-Semitism: F (2, 5552) = 51.52, p < .001; 
racism: F (2, 5648) = 44.73, p < .001; anti-Muslim attitudes: F (2, 5328) = 28.90, p < .001; sexism: F 
(2, 5712) = 93.76, p < .001; homophobia: F (2, 5657) = 21.73, p < .001. 
All post-hoc comparisons: high < middle < low, except racism: high < middle, low.
6.4.2 Results Differentiated by Country
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The linear trend of increasing prejudice with falling income is found in almost 
all the countries: the lower the relative income the stronger the prejudice. In-
dividual deviations were found in France, Hungary, Italy and Portugal. In France 
and Italy respondents with high income did not differ significantly from those 
with middle income, while in Hungary and Portugal there were no differences 
between respondents with low and middle income.
The causes of these irregularities emerge when we consider the individual ele-
ments separately. In Hungary and France there is no linearity for racism: whereas 
in Hungary respondents with middle incomes most frequently expressed racism, 
French low-income respondents were the least racist in their country. In Italy the 
linear relationship is completely inverted for homophobia: the higher the income, 
the more homophobic the attitudes. There are no significant differences between 
the income groups for homophobia and anti-Muslim attitudes in France, anti-
Semitism and sexism in Italy, or anti-Muslim attitudes in Portugal.
Figure 23: Country comparison of GFE means by income
Differences by income: 
Germany: F (2, 785) = 21.05, p < .001; Great Britain: F (2, 782) = 16.51, p < .001; France: F (2, 809) 
= 7.00, p < .001; Netherlands: F (2, 828) = 29.30, p < .001; Italy: F (2, 367) = 2.76, ns; Portugal: F (2, 
610) = 41.26, p < .001; Poland: F (2, 728) = 49.28, p < .001; Hungary: F (2, 788) = 12.93, p < .001.
1
2
3
4
HUPLPTINLFGBD
highmiddlelow
Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report92
6.5. Summary
The extent of group-focused enmity (GFE) is strongly dependent on certain de-
mographic characteristics. Animosity towards weak groups generally increases 
with age for all the investigated elements in all the surveyed countries. GFE is 
especially strong among the over-65s, and weakest among the 22- to 34-year-
olds. An exception to this trend is observed in Hungary, where the extent of 
anti-Semitism is smallest among the oldest respondents. In many countries the 
trend in the youngest age group of 16- to 22-year-olds is worrying. In France, 
Hungary and Italy, and to a lesser extent also in Poland and Portugal this age 
group exhibits considerably more racism than the next-oldest groups. In Hun-
gary and Italy the tendency towards anti-Semitism, anti-immigrant attitudes 
and anti-Muslim attitudes is also conspicuously strong in this youngest age 
group. In Germany we find a slight tendency towards more sexism, homopho-
bia and anti-Muslim attitudes among the youngest respondents than in the 
middle age groups. The same trend is observed in the Netherlands with respect 
to anti-immigrant attitudes. Portugal stands out for the very small differences 
between age groups for most prejudices, with only prejudices against women 
and homosexuals increasing clearly with age.
The extent of GFE falls as education increases. The trend is clear and ap-
plies to all six surveyed prejudices. The highly educated express noticeably 
less prejudice, while in many countries those with middle-level education 
are not significantly different from those with low education in terms of the 
extent of GFE.
Income affects the extent of GFE even after the effect of education has been 
taken into account and neutralized. For almost all the elements of GFE we 
found that prejudice increased as income fell. The only exception at the Euro-
pean level is racism, where respondents with medium and low income do not 
differ from each other (but here again those with higher income agree less 
with racist statements). At the level of countries we found further deviations 
from the overall trend. In France those with the lowest incomes show the least 
Group-focused enmity increases as income falls.
936. The Demography of Group-focused Enmity
tendency towards racism. In Italy homophobia increases clearly with income. 
In Italy income plays no significant role for the extent of anti-Semitism and 
sexism. In Portugal the level of income is irrelevant for the strength of anti-
Muslim attitudes and in France income has no significant effect on the extent 
of anti-Muslim attitudes and homophobia.
Gender is largely irrelevant for the extent of prejudice against weak groups. 
Women tend to exhibit slightly stronger GFE, even after we account for 
women in the sample being on average slightly older and having less educa-
tion. Women exhibit somewhat more anti-immigrant, racist and anti-Muslim 
attitudes than men and – perhaps surprisingly – more sexism, while men are 
more likely than women to affirm homophobia. It must be stressed that the 
absolute differences between men and women are very small at the European 
level (although slighter greater than elsewhere in Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Poland and Portugal). In all the countries apart from Germany anti-Muslim and 
anti-immigrant attitudes tend to be stronger among women than among men.
Demography affects group-focused enmity. Hostility towards 
weak groups increases with age; this applies to all investigated 
elements of group-focused enmity and to all the surveyed coun-
tries. The trend among the 16- to 22-year-olds in certain countries 
is worrying. Group-focused enmity falls with increasing educa-
tion in all the countries. Group-focused enmity also falls with in-
creasing income, with noteworthy exceptions in individual coun-
tries. Although income is often related to education, the income 
effect is independent. Gender plays only a very marginal role. In 
almost all countries women tend to express more anti-immigrant 
and anti-Muslim attitudes, and in some cases also more racism 
and sexism than their male compatriots; in most countries men 
express somewhat more homophobia.
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7. Political Attitudes and Prejudice
In this chapter we consider the relationship between general political attitudes 
and group-focused enmity. First we examine political self-characterization and 
attitudes towards the European Union (7.1). Then we move on to the ques-
tion of respondents’ fundamental political interest, in terms of how important 
political participation is to them and how frequently they vote in elections 
(7.2). We also wish to learn to what extent respondents feel a sense of politi-
cal powerlessness (7.3) and finally whether they countenance extreme political 
attitudes such as support for the death penalty or calling for a strong leader 
(7.4). We report the strengths of the various indicators of political orientation 
and discuss the relationship with group-focused enmity in each case.
7.1 Political Orientation
To determine general political orientation we employed the classical method of 
self-characterization in the left/right spectrum. We asked interviewees to say 
where they would place themselves on a scale ranging from 0 (far left) to 10 (far 
right) (without specifically recording what respondents actually understood by 
“left” and “right” in their particular country at that specific time). The self-charac-
terization overlaps to some extent with actual voting for parties regarded as “left” 
or “right” but is not identical with it.21 Traditionally supporters of socialist and 
social democratic parties place themselves at the left-hand end of the spectrum, 
with adherents of conservative parties towards the right-hand end. Which specific 
parties these are varies over time and from country to country. This simple political 
self-characterization permits no differentiated conclusions about political stances 
nor can opinions about concrete political issues necessarily be derived from it.
Table 13 lists the percentage of respondents who classify themselves as far 
right (self-categorized between 8 and 10 on the scale) or far left (scale value 
0 to 2) for each of the investigated countries. 
21 Voter behaviour in the European parliamentary elections of 2004 corresponded closely 
to political self-characterization figures for each country, although it made a difference 
whether the parties themselves could be clearly located on the left-right spectrum (Freire, 
Lobo and Magalhães 2009). 
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In Great Britain, Poland and Germany the proportion who say they are politi-
cally extreme right-wing is well under 10 percent, with the range extending 
up to nearly 20 percent in Italy. Overall fewer respondents place themselves 
at the extreme left-wing end of the political spectrum. In the Netherlands, in 
Germany, Poland, Great Britain and Hungary the figure is under 10 percent. 
More respondents in France, Portugal and Italy place themselves at the left-
wing end of the political spectrum, but even here the figure never exceeds 14 
percent. The great majority of respondents in all countries place themselves in 
the political centre (scale values 4 to 6), even more so if moderate left (3) and 
moderate right (7) are added.
We find an almost linear relationship between political self-characterization 
and the extent of group-focused enmity (r = .24): the more right-wing re-
spondents feel themselves to be, the stronger their prejudice against weak 
groups. The linearity is interrupted, however by the extreme left-wing re-
spondents. As Figure 24 shows, prejudices are also relatively widespread 
among respondents at the very left-hand end of the political spectrum, who 
generally express stronger prejudice than those who classify themselves as 
moderate left-of-centre. The extent of their prejudice is thus not distinguish-
able from those who place themselves in the political centre and moderate 
right. But the greatest extent of group-focused enmity is found in the right-
hand third of the spectrum.
Table 13: Statements on political orientation (percent) 
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
1a Political self-characterization 
(right-wing)
8.8 7.4 13.5 12.0 19.3 12.8 7.7 11.9
1b Political self-characterization 
(left-wing)
6.6 8.3 11.3 5.0 13.6 12.5 6.9 8.7
1c Political self-characterization 
(moderate)
68.8 66.2 56.2 57.6 47.4 60.5 61.4 68.4
2 In general, what image does 
the European Union conjure up 
for you? 
25.0 36.0 21.8 16.1 11.8 18.2 15.3 20.4
1 = very positive to 5 = very negative? 
(proportion with negative image)
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Figure 24: GFE in relation to political self-characterization
The described trend is found in all investigated countries apart from Poland, 
as Table 14 shows. Note that the relationship between group-focused enmity 
and political self-characterization as extreme right-wing is especially strong in 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.
We measured attitude to the European Union using a five-point scale where 
1 stood for very negative and 5 for very positive. Most European respondents 
were positive about the EU (Table 13, item 2). In Italy, Poland, the Netherlands 
and Portugal less than 20 percent of respondents were negative about the 
EU. The German and British respondents were considerably more sceptical; 
in Germany one in four and in Great Britain more than one in three saw the 
EU negatively.
We find a slight tendency for respondents who have a negative attitude to-
wards the EU to tend towards group-focused enmity, but this relationship is 
fairly loose (r = .19; Table 14). Especially in France and Portugal a negative at-
titude towards the EU is comparatively weakly linked with prejudice against 
identified groups. The relationship is clearest in Great Britain.
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Table 14: Relationship between political orientation and GFE
Political self-
characterization 
Negative attitude to EU
GFE EU  .24**  .19**
D  .40**  .20**
GB  .23**  .37**
F  .28**  .11**
NL  .40**  .20**
I  .38**  .28**
PT  .17**  .16**
PL  .06 ns  .24**
HU  .13**  .24**
Correlation coefficients: * Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level; *** 
significant at the 0.1 percent level; ns = non-significant. 
7.2 Political Interest
To measure how strongly interviewees felt interested and involved in politics 
we used three statements probing general political interest, motivation to in-
fluence others and participation in elections (Table 15).
Table 15: Statements on political interest (percent) 
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
3 How interested are you in  
politics? (proportion 
disinterested)
25.1 34.6 43.5 34.8 40.9 52.8 43.8 58.2
4 For you, is it (1 = very impor-
tant to 4 = not important at 
all) to influence the way prob-
lems are solved in our soci-
ety? (proportion who find it 
unimportant)
8.4 6.0 6.2 9.5 14.9 13.4 10.9 40.8
5 Do you vote regularly?  
(proportion who “never” vote)
7.0 10.3 2.5 3.1 1.8 6.3 9.2 6.1
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First we asked interviewees to indicate their general interest in politics on a four-
point scale where 1 stood for “very interested” in politics and 4 for “not interested 
at all”. In Hungary and Portugal more than half of respondents said that they were 
not interested in politics, along with more than 40 percent in Poland, France and 
Italy. In the Netherlands and Great Britain about one third, and in Germany about 
one quarter of respondents said they had little or no interest in politics. We also 
asked interviewees how important it is for them to be able to influence the way 
problems are solved on a four-point scale from 1 (very important) to 4 (not im-
portant at all) (Table 15). The proportion who felt having influence was unimpor-
tant was smallest in Great Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland 
(between 6 and 11 percent). The figure is somewhat higher in Portugal and Italy 
with 13 and 15 percent, but that still means that political influence is important 
for a large majority in these countries. Not so in Hungary, where strikingly many 
respondents feel it is unimportant to be able to influence the political resolution 
of social problems (nearly 41 percent). The wish for political participation is mark-
edly weaker here than in any other investigated country.
Table 16: Relationship between political interest and GFE
General political  
interest
Relevance of 
political influence
Election  
participation 
GFE EU -.22** -.03 ns -.06*
D -.18** -.02 ns -.14**
GB -.18** -.01 ns .03 ns
F -.25**   .13** .03 ns
NL -.17** -.03 ns -.05 ns
I -.31** -.07 ns -.09**
PT -.26** -.05 ns -.04 ns
PL -.07*   .13**  .01 ns
HU -.04 ns  .05 ns  .00 ns
Correlation coefficients: * Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level; 
*** significant at the 0.1 percent level; ns = non-significant.
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Finally we also asked our interviewees whether they vote regularly. Here our indica-
tor of political interest is not an official figure for non-participation but exclusively 
the information given by the respondents. Table 15 shows the proportion in each 
country who say that they never vote. In Italy, France and the Netherlands 2 to 3 
percent of respondents say they are non-voters, in Hungary Portugal and Germany 
between 6 and 7 percent, in Poland 9 percent. Only in Great Britain do just over 
10 percent report never taking part in elections. The proportion of self-reported 
non-voters is relatively small in all the investigated countries.22
Unlike political interest, the wish for political influence and self-reported elec-
tion participation are only weakly connected with group-focused enmity or not 
at all (see Table 16). In other words, non-voters and those who place no impor-
tance on political influence are not more susceptible to prejudice than others. 
Individual exceptions are found at the country level. The more important French 
and Polish respondents find political influence, the stronger their prejudice. In 
Germany and Italy we find a weak relationship between election participation 
and group-focused enmity: the more rarely the German and Italian respondents 
vote, the more likely they are to express prejudices. General political interest, 
on the other hand, correlates significantly with prejudice against weak groups 
across Europe (r = -.22). The less the European respondents are interested in 
politics the more strongly they tend towards prejudices. This relationship is con-
firmed relatively uniformly for all the surveyed countries with the exception of 
Hungary, where it is not significant. It is especially strong in Italy.
7.3 Political Powerlessness
In prior research in Germany the feeling of political powerlessness has already 
been identified as an important predictor of group-focused enmity (Klein and 
Hüpping 2008). To investigate whether this also applies to other European 
countries we confronted interviewees with two statements expressing that 
feeling (Table 17). Note that this survey recorded only the subjective personal 
impression of political powerlessness.
In all the countries a majority of respondents feel ignored by politicians. In 
Great Britain and Germany about two thirds of respondents share this feeling; 
22 When interpreting deviations from official election turn-out figures it must be noted that 
these usually indicate participation in a specific election. Here we asked about voting in 
elections in general.
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in France and Italy about three quarters, and in Portugal, Poland and Hungary 
more than 80 percent. Only in the Netherlands do “only” about one third of 
respondents feel that politicians do not care. The second statement, suggest-
ing that interviewees have no influence on the government’s plans, also found 
great agreement across Europe. In Portugal one third of respondents agreed 
with it, in the Netherlands nearly 40 percent. In France, Great Britain and Ger-
many about two thirds of respondents feel they have no influence on govern-
ment, and in Poland and Italy more than 80 percent.
We combined the two statements into a mean scale and examined its rela-
tionship to group-focused enmity. We can confirm a moderate, significantly 
positive relationship for Europe as a whole (r = .31). Those who feel politically 
powerless are more likely to target weak groups than those who feel they are 
able to influence political decisions. This relationship is confirmed for all inves-
tigated countries, but is weaker in Poland, Hungary and France (just under .20) 
and stronger in the Netherlands and Great Britain (.35 and .38).
7.4 Extreme Political Attitudes
Finally we also surveyed two extreme political attitudes that are closely linked 
to the concept of authoritarianism (Table 18).  The first relates to the death 
penalty, which is forbidden by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights. We con-
fronted respondents with a statement demanding that it be reintroduced in 
their country. In Germany, the Netherlands and Italy just under 20 percent 
of respondents would welcome the return of the death penalty; in Portugal 
and France one third and in Great Britain 44 percent. Agreement is particu-
Table 17: Statements on political powerlessness (agreement in percent) 
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
6 Politicians do not care what 
people like me think.
66.6 64.2 71.0 34.6 76.5 80.5 87.3 82.4
7 People like me do not have 
any say about what the gov-
ernment does.
64.6 64.4 59.7 39.3 81.1 33.5 80.4 50.2
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larly strong in Poland and Hungary, where about two thirds would have no 
objections.
The second statement examines the desire for a strong leader, which is ex-
pressed by almost one quarter of respondents in the Netherlands, almost one 
third in Germany, and between 38 and 43 percent in Italy, Great Britain and 
France. Agreement is strongest in Hungary, Poland and Portugal, where more 
than half of respondents want a strong leader.
We found clear positive correlations between these two statements and the 
extent of group-focused enmity (Table 19).
Table 19: Relationships between extreme political attitudes and GFE
Support for death penalty Desire for strong leader
GFE EU .45 .43
D .36 .40
GB .47 .34
F .49 .40
NL .36 .43
I .31 .45
PT .30 .37
PL .21 .35
HU .28 .23
All correlation coefficients are highly significant at the 0.1 percent level. 
Table 18: Statements on extreme political attitudes (agreement in percent) 
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
8 The death penalty should be 
restored in [country].
19.0 44.4 33.8 19.4 19.6 33.0 61.9 69.8
9 What the country needs most 
is a strong leader who does 
not bother about parliament 
or elections.
32.3 41.8 43.2 23.1 38.2 62.4 60.8 56.6
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The more respondents supported the death penalty (r = .45) or wished for a 
strong leader (r = .43), the stronger their prejudices towards weak groups. 
These positive relationships are significant in all surveyed countries. The rela-
tionship between support for the death penalty and the extent of prejudice is 
conspicuously strong in France and Great Britain.
7.5 Summary
Some political attitudes (but not all) influence willingness to target prejudice 
against weak groups (Figure 25). For political orientation the relationship is 
quite clear: The further right respondents place themselves in the political 
spectrum, the more likely they are to hold prejudices against the target groups 
under consideration here. However, we found prejudices to be stronger among 
respondents at the extreme left-wing end of the spectrum than among the 
moderate left. In fact, respondents who classified themselves as extreme left 
were just as susceptible to group-focused enmity as those who regarded them-
selves as political moderates. The relationship between political orientation and 
extent of prejudices is found in all the countries, but is particularly close in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Italy and France. The same applies to the relationship 
between a negative image of the EU and group-focused enmity, although the 
effect is considerably weaker overall and especially in Portugal, Poland and 
Hungary.
We also found a clear relationship between the feeling of political power-
lessness and the tendency to target weak groups: the stronger the feeling of 
political powerlessness the greater the extent of group-focused enmity. This 
tendency is particularly clear in the Netherlands and Portugal. Support for the 
death penalty is also associated with stronger prejudice; this relationship is 
found in all the countries, but is especially strong in Great Britain and France. 
Furthermore, we found that a desire for a strong leader clearly correlates with 
the extent of group-focused enmity in all the countries.
The influence of political interest on group-focused enmity is quite weak. Re-
spondents who are generally disinterested in politics tend more to target weak 
groups (especially in Italy). On the other hand, individual election participation 
and the importance of having political influence play almost no role.
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Figure 25: Relationships between political attitudes and GFE in Europe
The figure shows the correlation coefficients (r). The closer the point is to the centre the stronger the 
relationship between that political attitude and group-focused enmity. All coefficients are highly sig-
nificant at the 0.1 percent level, except for the non-significant correlations between group-focused 
enmity and voting (non-voters) and between group-focused enmity and political influence.
Desire for 
strong leader
Support
for death 
penalty
Low relevance 
of political 
influence
Negative 
attitude to EU
Low election 
participation
Political 
powerlessness
Political self-characterization 
to the right pole
GFE
0.43
0.24
Low political
interest
.000
0.03
0.19
0.06
0.31
0.45
1.000
0.22
Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report104
8. Grave Consequences: From Prejudice to 
Discrimination
In this chapter we move on to examine the possible consequences of group-
focused enmity. The focus here is on immigrants, who form the largest minority 
group and are the subject of heated political debate about issues of integration 
and equal status. We investigate the extent to which group-focused enmity 
(in the form of negative attitudes) is connected with intentions to act. We re-
port on the willingness of majority populations to support integration (8.1), 
the extent to which respondents concede immigrants the right to participation 
(8.2), how they imagine future coexistence with immigrants (8.3) and finally 
their willingness to discriminate (8.4) or use violence against immigrants (8.5). 
In each case we examine how the surveyed attitudes and intentions relate to 
group-focused enmity.
Intentions: In the scope of an opinion survey it is not possible to 
measure the actual behaviour of interviewees. But we can deter-
mine the extent to which respondents condone or tolerate behaviour 
and whether they intend to act on their prejudices. We know from 
research that attitudes do not automatically lead to behaviour. But 
behaviour in practice is certainly encouraged by corresponding atti-
tudes and above all by intentions. Attitudes are most likely to lead to 
behaviour when important peers share the same attitudes and when 
behaviour is tolerated or even desired under prevailing social norms 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1975). Discrimination against immigrants in eve-
ryday situations (school, employment, housing) becomes more likely 
where the social climate – shaped by individual attitudes, political ac-
tors, media and social norms – permits or even encourages this. Com-
paratively few people actually engage in hate crime (violence against 
immigrants or other minorities). Those who do are almost exclusively 
young men – often from the lower social classes – motivated by anti-
immigrant attitudes and racism. In defending their actions they often 
cite the support of their social milieu, saying they were only doing 
what most people wanted anyway (Wahl 2003).
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8.1 Integration, Assimilation and Separation
About two million people migrate to the European Union every year, many le-
gally, some illegally, others as asylum-seekers. Even more people migrate within 
the European Union.23 In 2008 there were altogether 31 million EU and non-EU 
foreigners living in the twenty-seven member states of the European Union (6.2 
percent of the population).24 The motives for immigration are diverse: people 
migrate for private reasons (for example to join their spouse or family), for 
economic reasons (career development or hoping to escape poverty and find 
a better life in one of the most prosperous parts of the world) and for political 
reasons (for example fleeing from political persecution or war). 
In many places immigrants – especially when they come from poor regions 
outside the EU – encounter rejection, exclusion and discrimination by the re-
ceiving population (Gauci 2009). Yet at the same time numerous EU member 
states find themselves facing population decline and demographic ageing. 
Immigration, especially of young, well-educated individuals, is one potential 
means for addressing skill shortages, underfunded pension systems and the 
need to care for a growing elderly population. Regardless of whether Europe 
wants or needs to accept immigrants, immigration will continue. In the coun-
tries where many immigrants already live today, immigration and integration 
are controversial issues. The special relevance and topicality of the integration 
question provides good grounds to take a closer look at the attitudes involved 
and their relationship with group-focused enmity.
Integration can only succeed if all those involved play their part, so fundamen-
tal attitudes to integration on both sides – minority and majority – are crucial 
(Zick 2010a). Immigrants must be willing and able to participate, while the 
receiving population must be willing to accept “newcomers” as full members 
of society; that means not only allowing them to participate but also conced-
ing them a certain degree of cultural autonomy.
Acculturation research identifies two central dimensions that crucially deter-
mine the quality of integration: participation in the culture of the receiving 
23 Eurostat, “Recent Migration Trends: Citizens of EU-27 Member States Become Ever More
 Mobile while EU Remains Attractive to non EU-citizens”, Statistics in focus 98/2008. 
24 Eurostat, “Large Differences in GDP and Consumption per Inhabitant across Europe”,
 Statistics in focus 95/2009. 
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country and retention of an independent cultural identity (Berry 2003; see also 
Zick 2010a). Depending on the acculturation orientation of the immigrants – 
their wish to preserve or abandon their own culture, to take part in the cul-
ture of the receiving country or to distance themselves from it, acculturation 
proceeds in the form of integration, assimilation, separation or marginaliza-
tion (Figure 26).
Figure 26: Participation and retention of culture as central dimensions of 
integration (after Berry 2003)
Looking at the matter from the other side, the acculturation orientation of the 
receiving society is expressed in its acceptance of immigrants’ retention of their 
original culture and its willingness to allow them to participate. These two as-
pects together characterize integration on the part of the receiving society. If 
its members make participation conditional on immigrants’ abandoning their 
original culture, what they are striving for is assimilation, whereas the opposite 
case, conceding cultural autonomy but refusing participation is the enforce-
ment of separation. If a society allows immigrants neither to maintain their 
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original culture nor to participate in the cultural life of the receiving country 
the outcome is marginalization. In this case the receiving society probably re-
jects immigration altogether. There is, however, also a fifth possibility, that of 
individualization. This happens when individuals remove themselves from their 
cultural group and define themselves primarily as individuals without any group 
ties or identity. Acculturation then becomes an individual matter, or is regarded 
as such. Many studies have investigated acculturation orientations (for an over-
view see Zick 2010a). Where immigrants and receiving society pursue the same 
strategy there is less conflict. Under certain circumstances this strategy may 
even be one of separation where immigrants and receiving society live parallel 
lives; but separation often creates its own problems such as lack of participa-
tion in the labour market, which can ultimately cause conflicts. If integration 
is to be successful, it must be the goal pursued by both sides.
In the survey we investigated the acculturation orientation of non-immigrants, 
as the number of interviewed immigrants was too small for analysis. In order 
to measure the interviewees’ views we asked them about three statements 
standing for integration, assimilation and separation, following Berry’ concept 
(2003, outlined above) (Table 20).
Table 20: Statements on willingness to integrate immigrants (agreement in 
percent) 
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
1 Integration:
Immigrants should maintain 
their own culture and also 
adapt to the [country’s] culture.
80.6 92.2 95.7 94.3 93.0 93.3 87.0 75.7
2 Assimilation:
Immigrants should give up their 
culture of origin and adopt the 
[country’s] culture. 
29.0 29.9 24.1 31.9 18.0 20.3 15.4 27.6
3 Separation: 
Immigrants should maintain 
their culture of origin and 
not mix it with the [country’s] 
culture.
34.8 22.8 43.2 23.9 35.3 30.5 72.3 70.6
Note: Multiple responses were permitted; i.e. repondents indicated agreement/disagreement with all three types 
of acculturation.
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A very large majority of European respondents chose integration. They believe 
that immigrants should both keep their own culture and adopt the culture of 
their new country. This attitude is held by more than 90 percent of respond-
ents in France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy and Great Britain. In Poland 
and Germany 87 and 81 percent share such strong support for integration, in 
Hungary the figure is three quarters.
Considerably fewer European respondents called for immigrants to assimilate 
by abandoning their original culture in favour of the culture of the receiving 
country. In the Netherlands, Great Britain, Germany, Hungary and France be-
tween one third and one quarter of the population subscribe to this demand, 
along with 20 percent in Portugal, 18 percent in Italy and 15 percent in Po-
land. The figures for these first two statements demonstrate that respondents 
sometimes vacillate between integration and assimilation.
Surprisingly many respondents call for separation. In Portugal, Germany and 
Italy about one third of respondents accept immigrants’ keeping their original 
culture but reject the idea that they might mix it with the culture of the host 
society. This view is shared by 43 percent in France and more than two thirds 
in Hungary and Portugal. Later we will return to examine the determinants of 
the support for separatism measured in these countries: is it readiness to al-
low immigrants to keep their own culture or worry about mixing their culture 
with one’s own? The figures are lower for Great Britain and the Netherlands, 
where such an attitude towards is immigrants shared by 23 and 24 percent of 
respondents, respectively.
All in all, 41 percent of respondents espouse a “pure” integration concept 
without at the same time calling for assimilation or separation. This purely 
integrative attitude is found among, respectively, 55 and 54 percent of re-
spondents in Portugal and Great Britain, about half in Italy and the Nether-
lands, 42 percent in France, 38 percent in Germany, 21 percent in Poland and 
14 percent in Hungary.
The three acculturation orientations considered here correlate significantly with 
group-focused enmity both for Europe as a whole and in the individual coun-
tries (Table 21).
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Table 21: Relationships between acculturation orientation and GFE
Integration Assimilation Separation
GFE EU  - .21**  .29**  .23**
D  - .15**  .34**  .05 ns
GB  - .21**  .50**  .04 ns
F  - .12**  .39**  .09*
NL  - .16**  .49**  .04 ns
I  - .18**  .35**  .08*
PT  - .21*  .36**  .31**
PL  - .09*  .27**  .19**
HU  - .07*  .13**  .06 ns
Correlation coefficients: * Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level; 
ns = non-significant. 
European respondents who support separation tend towards prejudices against 
weaker groups (r = .23). The relationship is especially strong in Poland and Por-
tugal, suggesting that the separatism orientation measured there is attribut-
able to a wish to safeguard the national culture. A similar relationship is found 
between group-focused enmity and the call for assimilation. Respondents who 
demand that immigrants assimilate are more likely to express prejudice towards 
weaker groups than those who do not share this attitude (r = .29). This re-
lationship is especially strong in Great Britain and the Netherlands. For those 
who prefer the strategy of integration we find a negative relationship with 
group-focused enmity. Respondents who concede immigrants their cultural 
autonomy while at the same time encouraging them to adopt the new culture 
also show a more positive attitude towards weak groups as a whole (r = .21).
Overall, in the western European countries of France, Great Britain, Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands the call for assimilation is especially strongly positively 
correlated with the extent of prejudice while the integration concept is rela-
tively strongly negatively correlated. In Poland and Portugal an especially strong 
relationship between support for separation and expression of prejudice can 
be demonstrated. In Hungary none of the three concepts correlates especially 
strongly with prejudice against weak groups, so the acculturation orientation 
there is largely independent of the extent of prejudice.
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Analysis of the extent to which an acculturation orientation is linked to the 
individual elements of group-focused enmity reveals relationships with the 
other surveyed prejudices, as well as with anti-immigrant attitudes (Table 22). 
A separation orientation correlates especially with anti-Semitism, sexism and 
homophobia, while an assimilation orientation correlates with anti-immigrant 
attitudes and sexism. An integration orientation, on the other hand, correlates 
negatively to a lesser extent not only with anti-immigrant attitudes, but also 
with racism and anti-Semitism.
Table 22: Relationship between acculturation orientation and the  
individual GFE elements in Europe 
Anti-
immigrant 
attitudes
Racism Anti-
Semitism
Anti- 
Muslim 
attitudes
Sexism Homo- 
phobia
Assimila-
tion
 .31  .17  .15  .24  .31  .12
Separation  .09  .16  .23  .06  .22  .16
Integration -16 -19 -16  - .06  -.13  -.12
All correlation coefficients are at least significant at the 5 percent level. 
8.2 Participation in Society
Participation in society requires rights. One important measure of the willing-
ness of the receiving society to encourage integration is its willingness to grant 
such rights to immigrants. Should immigrants be allowed to vote? What condi-
tions should be attached to the acquisition of citizenship? What about the right 
to freely practice a religion, especially where its principles or customs conflict 
with other fundamental rights, for example gender equality, individual self-
determination or freedom of speech? In the following we consider whether 
and how a lack of willingness to grant immigrants the rights required for par-
ticipation in society goes hand in hand with prejudice against them. In our 
survey we used statements concerning the right to vote and arrangements for 
naturalization for long-term immigrants to measure the willingness to grant 
immigrants such rights. Table 23 shows what proportion of respondents would 
refuse these rights to immigrants.
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Table 23: Statements on granting rights to immigrants (rejection in 
percent) 
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
3 Immigrants should 
be allowed to vote 
in all elections.
49.2 43.2 42.5 32.0 54.6 27.2 45.9 67.9
4 Immigrants who 
have been living 
in [country] for 
some years should 
gain [country’s] 
citizenship easily.
22.3 32.1 19.0 37.2 37.9 19.6 32.9 50.9
Overall 55 percent of European respondents would grant immigrants a general 
right to vote, while 45 percent would not. At the country level the situation 
is similar in France, Great Britain and Poland, where about 45 percent of re-
spondents oppose general voting rights for immigrants. Rejection is somewhat 
greater in Germany and Italy (50 and 55 percent of respondents, respectively) 
and a good deal greater in Hungary (two thirds). Only in Portugal and the 
Netherlands is the proportion who reject general voting rights for immigrants 
less than one third.
The idea of making naturalization easier for immigrants who have been living 
in the country for some time is rejected most widely in Hungary (by about half 
the population). In Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Great Britain about one 
third of respondents opposed easier naturalization, and in Germany, Portugal 
and France about 20 percent. Across all the countries 69 percent of respond-
ents supported making it easier for immigrants to apply for citizenship after 
they have lived in a country for some years.
Refusal of the rights required for political participation is positively related to 
group-focused enmity (Table 24). Respondents who concede immigrants only 
limited voting rights and reject easier naturalization tend to express more preju-
dice against weak groups. This relationship is statistically significant in almost 
all the individual countries, but is especially strong in Great Britain, Italy, Ger-
many and France. Only in Poland and Portugal is the relationship statistically 
marginal or insignificant (Table 24).
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Table 24: Relationships between rejection of rights for immigrants and GFE
Rejection of right to vote Rejection of easier 
naturalization
GFE EU  .31**  .30**
D  .35**  .36**
GB  .44**  .39**
F  .33**  .32**
NL  .28**  .30**
I  .41**  .39**
PT  .05 ns  .08*
PL  .11**  .19**
HU  .17**  .25**
Correlation coefficients: * Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level; ns 
= non-significant. 
Analysis of the relationships between rejection of political rights for immigrants 
and the individual elements of group-focused enmity shows, as one might ex-
pect, the strongest correlation with anti-immigrant attitudes. But rejection of 
political rights also has a bearing on the other prejudices considered here (Ta-
ble 25). Respondents who refuse immigrants a general right to vote and reject 
easier naturalization are also more likely to express anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim 
attitudes and homophobia.
Table 25: Relationship between rejection of rights for immigrants and the 
individual GFE elements in Europe 
Anti-
immigrant 
attitudes
Racism Anti-
Semitism
Anti- 
Muslim 
attitudes
Sexism Homo-
phobia
Rejection of 
general right 
to vote
.37 .11 .22 .28 .14 .20
Rejection 
of easier 
naturalization
.42 .12 .19 .30 .11 .16
All correlation coefficients are at least significant at the 1 percent level. 
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8.3 Integration Prospects
We also asked interviewees about their preferences for immigration policy and 
how harmoniously they think immigrants and the majority population will live 
together in future. For the former, we asked whether interviewees would like to 
allow “many” immigrants, “some”, “few” or “none” to come to their coun-
try and aggregated the last two response categories. For the latter, we asked 
interviewees whether they thought relations with immigrants would improve 
or deteriorate. Table 26 shows the results.
Table 26: Statements on desired immigration policy and future coexist-
ence with immigrants
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
6 How many immigrants 
do you think [country] 
should allow to come 
and live here? (propor-
tion responding with 
“few” or “none”)
21.8 33.9 33.6 18.5 25.0 18.6 32.1 60.5
7 In the course of the 
next few years, do you 
expect the relationships 
between immigrants of 
different ethnic origins 
and [natives in country] 
to improve, stay about 
the same, or get worse? 
(proportion responding 
“get worse”)
31.1 45.2 28.6 30.0 30.1 40.8 13.2 36.9
Overall nearly 6 percent of respondents in the eight selected countries said they 
wanted no more immigrants at all to be allowed into their country, and nearly one 
quarter would allow only a few. On the other hand, 56 percent would allow at 
least some immigration and nearly 14 percent would allow many in. In the Neth-
erlands, Portugal and Germany about 20 percent would restrict immigration to 
few or none at all, in Italy one quarter, in Poland, France and Great Britain about 
one third. This opinion is strikingly prevalent in Hungary, where more than 60 
percent of respondents would allow only “few” immigrants to enter or “none”.
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On the question of future relations with immigrants Europe is divided into 
three, with about one third of European respondents pessimistic, one third 
optimistic and one third neutral. The British and Portuguese respondents were 
especially pessimistic in this respect, with more than 40 percent expecting re-
lations to deteriorate. In Hungary, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and France 
about one third expect relations with immigrants to worsen. The figure is small-
est in Poland, at 13 percent.
For both statements we find positive relationships with group-focused enmity, 
especially for the wish to restrict immigration (r = .45). Those who would prefer 
to allow immigration only for a few or stop it altogether tend more strongly 
towards prejudices than those who support immigration. This correlation is 
significant in all the countries and especially strong in Germany, Italy, Great 
Britain, France, Poland and Hungary. 
The relationship between a pessimistic outlook on future coexistence and 
group-focused enmity is weaker (r = .19). Those who predict a deterioration 
of relations tend more strongly towards prejudice against weak groups than 
those who are optimistic. This correlation is statistically significant in all the 
individual countries, but especially strong in Great Britain and the Netherlands 
and rather weak in Hungary, Italy, Poland and Portugal.
Table 27: GFE, desired immigration policy and expectations concerning 
future relations (correlations)
Desire to restrict  
immigration
Expectation of worsening  
relations with immigrants
GFE EU .45 .19
D .51 .27
GB .51 .30
F .43 .24
NL .36 .29
I .51 .18
PT .33 .20
PL .43 .19
HU .41 .13
All correlation coefficients are at least significant at the 1 percent level. 
1158. Grave Consequences: From Prejudice to Discrimination
Analysis of the relationships between these two statements and the individual 
GFE elements shows that the wish for immigration restrictions is linked espe-
cially strongly to anti-immigrant attitudes, but also meaningfully with all the 
other GFE elements (Table 28). The same can also be observed for pessimism 
about future coexistence of immigrants and the receiving society. Here too, 
the relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes is especially strong. Correlations 
with the other GFE elements are significant but weaker.
8.4 Discrimination and Distance 
Hostile mentalities come to light directly in everyday situations. In the next 
stage of our examination of the consequences of prejudiced mentalities we 
turn to the extent to which the European respondents condone discrimina-
tory behaviour in concrete everyday situations. As already mentioned above, 
through the telephone interviews we were able to measure only intentions and 
reports concerning activity rather than actual activity, but we know from atti-
tude research that the intention to carry out an act may lead to actual activity 
(although not automatically).
We used four statements to measure the extent to which respondents ex-
pressed readiness to discriminate against and distance themselves from immi-
grants in different everyday contexts (Table 29). Specifically, we asked whether 
interviewees would send their child to a school attended by a majority of immi-
Table 28: Individual GFE elements, desired immigration policy and expectations 
concerning future relations, for Europe (correlations)
Anti-
immigrant 
attitudes
Racism Anti-
Semitism
Anti- 
Muslim 
attitudes
Sexism Homo- 
phobia
Desire to restrict 
immigration
.50 .26 .29 .33 .26 .23
Expectation 
of worsening 
 relations with 
immigrants
.29 .10 .11 .19 .08 .05
All correlation coefficients are at least significant at the 1 percent level. 
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grants or move to an area where many immigrants live. We also asked whether 
they would vote for a party that took a hard line on immigration and whether 
they tolerated discrimination by employers.
Altogether 41 percent of all European respondents agree somewhat or strongly 
that they would not send their child to a school where a majority of the pupils 
are immigrants. In the Netherlands, Germany and Great Britain more than half 
of respondents share this opinion, in France, Poland and Italy about one third. 
In Portugal the figure is one in four.
Overall 49 percent of all European respondents would prefer not to move to 
an area where many immigrants live. The figures for Germany, Great Britain, 
Hungary and Italy are close to the European average, with about half of re-
spondents saying they would avoid such areas. In France 42 percent and in 
Poland and Portugal about one third find such residential areas problematic. 
The figure for the Netherlands is strikingly high, at 69 percent.
There is also strong agreement with the statement about voting for a party that 
intends to restrict immigration. Exactly one third of all European respondents 
somewhat or strongly agree with this statement. In Great Britain and Hungary im-
migration policy is an important issue for many respondents, with about half say-
Table 29: Statements on discrimination against immigrants (agreement in percent) 
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
8 I would be reluctant to send 
my children to a school 
where the majority of pupils 
are immigrants.
53.8 52.7 35.6 55.6 32.3 25.2 34.7 40.7
9 I would be reluctant to 
move into a district where 
many immigrants were 
living.
56.3 54.4 42.4 68.5 48.6 32.9 36.6 54.1
10 In the next elections, I will 
vote for parties that want to 
reduce the further influx of 
immigrants.
25.8 52.7 21.6 37.8 35.2 16.4 31.3 46.2
11 An employer should have 
the right to employ only 
native [country].
16.6 21.8 9.8 11.1 18.4 17.8 26.4 42.8
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ing they intend to vote for parties that promise to restrict immigration. The figure 
is about one third in the Netherlands, Italy and Poland, 26 percent in Germany and 
22 percent in France. With 16 percent such parties have least support in Portugal.
Finally we asked whether employers should have the right to exclude immi-
grants. About one fifth or 20 percent of all European respondents agreed. 
Below the European average were France and the Netherlands with about 10 
percent, Germany with 17 percent, and Italy and Portugal with 18 percent. 
Great Britain and Poland, where about one quarter would accept employment 
discrimination, are slightly above the average, while the figure for Hungary is 
strikingly high at 43 percent.
For all four statements we find strong positive relationships with group-focused 
enmity: respondents who hold prejudices are more likely to condone discrimi-
nation against immigrants or themselves behave in discriminatory fashion. The 
targeting of weak groups is especially clearly related to the call for employers 
to have the right to employ only national citizens (r = .51). A similarly strong 
relationship is found between prejudice and the intention to elect a party that 
calls for restrictions on immigration (r = .50). 
Table 30: Relationships between discrimination against immigrants and GFE in 
Europe
Discrimination in 
choice of school
Discrimination 
in choice of 
housing
Voting for 
anti-immigrant 
parties
Discrimination in 
employment
GFE EU .26 .31 .50 .51
D .25 .44 .55 .45
GB .47 .53 .62 .52
F .36 .43 .54 .50
NL .29 .42 .56 .40
I .38 .46 .60 .44
PT .28 .25 .35 .44
PL .35 .21 .49 .56
HU .31 .38 .54 .43
All correlation coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.
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The relationship with voting intention is especially strong in Great Britain, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Germany. In Poland, Great Britain and France there are 
especially strong relationships between group-focused enmity and the call for 
jobs to be given to non-immigrants first. In Great Britain and Italy the extent of 
prejudice correlates especially with the intention to avoid sending one’s child to 
a school where there are many immigrants and not to move to an area where 
many immigrants live.
Alongside the expected clear relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes, analy-
sis of the extent to which discriminatory behavioural intentions towards im-
migrants and spatial avoidance of them relates to the individual elements of 
the group-focused enmity syndrome also reveals correlations with other GFE 
elements, especially with anti-Muslim attitudes, but also significantly with anti-
Semitism, racism and sexism.
8.5 Willingness to Use Violence
As the last aspect of the consequences of group-focused enmity, we examine 
willingness to use violence against immigrants. We note at the outset that the 
study on group-focused enmity in Germany has already shown that willing-
ness to use violence against immigrants is closely connected with general will-
ingness to use violence (authors’ own analysis of data from the German GFE 
survey 2008). Thus we can assume that those who demonstrate willingness 
Table 31: Relationship between discriminatory behavioural intentions towards 
immigrants and the individual GFE elements in Europe 
Discrimination Anti-
immigrant 
attitudes
Racism Anti-
Semitism
Anti- 
Muslim 
attitudes
Sexism Homo- 
phobia
… in choice of school .36 .16 .14 .28 .10 .07
… in choice of housing .41 .15 .19 .37 .13 .09
… by voting for anti- 
 immigrant parties
.59 .29 .30 .42 .30 .21
… in employment .50 .33 .35 .33 .34 .25
All correlation coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.
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to use violence against immigrants will more generally tend to use violence 
against others.
We measured willingness to use violence against immigrants through agree-
ment with two statements (Table 32). We first asked interviewees if they could 
imagine reacting violently if they were insulted by an immigrant. Overall 12 
percent of European respondents considered that response to be plausible. In 
the individual countries the figures were 4 percent in the Netherlands, 8 per-
cent in Germany and Great Britain, about 12 percent in Portugal and Italy, more 
than 17 percent in Hungary and more than 20 percent in Poland and France.
We also asked whether interviewees could imagine using violence against an 
immigrant over an issue of importance to them. Overall 15 percent of all Eu-
ropean respondents held that response to be possible: 5 percent in Great Brit-
ain, nearly 10 percent in Italy, France and Germany, and about 20 percent in 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Hungary and Poland.
Willingness to use violence against immigrants correlates positively with 
group-focused enmity. Respondents who tend more towards prejudice can 
more often imagine punching an immigrant following a slur (r = .24) or using 
violence against an immigrant for an important cause (r = .21). The correlation 
between GFE and readiness to use violence against immigrants after an insult 
is statistically significant for all the countries (except France), but particularly 
strong in the Netherlands. The correlation between GFE and readiness to use 
violence against immigrants for an important cause is statistically significant 
in all countries, but somewhat weaker in France, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
and Poland.
Table 32: Statements on willingness to use violence against immigrants  
(agreement in percent) 
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
12 If an immigrant insults me, I 
am likely to hit him.
8.0 7.9 22.0 3.5 11.3 12.2 21.3 17.4
13 On an issue important to 
me, I might use violence 
against an immigrant.
13.1 4.8 12.1 19.6 10.3 18.3 22.0 19.6
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Table 33: Relationships between GFE and willingness to use violence 
against immigrants 
Violence against immigrants 
after insult
Violence against immigrants 
for important cause
GFE EU  .24**  .21**
D  .25**  .26**
GB  .29**  .27**
F  .03 ns  .11**
NL  .33**  .10**
I  .24**  .21**
PT  .22**  .28**
PL .09*  .13**
HU  .18** .09*
Correlation coefficients:* Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level; 
ns = non-significant. 
The willingness to apply violence against immigrants in particular situations 
correlates not only with anti-immigrant attitudes, but at similar levels with 
the other GFE elements too. The comparatively weak relationships, however, 
suggest that willingness to use violence against immigrants is only partly mo-
tivated by prejudice, and is rather a product of a general willingness to use 
violence.
Table 34: Relationship between willingness to use violence against  
immigrants and the individual GFE elements in Europe 
Violence  
against 
immigrants
Anti- 
immigrant 
attitudes
Racism Anti-
Semitism
Anti-
Muslim 
attitudes
Sexism Homo- 
phobia
… after insult .17 .22 .22 .13 .17 .13
… for impor-
 tant cause
.17 .19 .21 .13 .15 .05
All correlation coefficients are at least significant at the 5 percent level.
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Figure 27: Relationships between behavioural intentions and GFE in 
 Europe in comparison
Showing correlation coefficients r. All coefficients are highly significant at the 0.1 percent level. The 
closer the point is to the centre the stronger the relationship between that intention and group-fo-
cused enmity.
8.6 Summary
We analysed acculturation orientation, willingness to grant rights to immi-
grants, expectations of future immigration policy, willingness to discriminate 
in everyday situations, and willingness to use violence against immigrants as 
expressions of intentions to act and looked at how these correlate with group-
focused enmity. It appears that the consequences of prejudice may indeed be 
grave for immigrants, since all the investigated intentions are related to the set 
of prejudices that we term group-focused enmity, with the clearest correlation 
of all being with anti-immigrant attitudes.
Table 34: Relationship between willingness to use violence against  
immigrants and the individual GFE elements in Europe 
Violence  
against 
immigrants
Anti- 
immigrant 
attitudes
Racism Anti-
Semitism
Anti-
Muslim 
attitudes
Sexism Homo- 
phobia
… after insult .17 .22 .22 .13 .17 .13
… for impor-
 tant cause
.17 .19 .21 .13 .15 .05
All correlation coefficients are at least significant at the 5 percent level.
Discrimination in 
choice of housing
 
GFE
Discrimination in 
choice of school
Voting for 
anti-immigrant 
parties
Discrimination in 
employment
Violence against
immigrants after
insult
Violence against 
immigrants for 
important causes
Rejection of 
right to vote
Rejection of easier
naturalization
Separation
Assimilation
Integration
Desire to restrict 
immigration
Expectation of worsening
relations with immigrants
0.19
0.45
-0.21
0.29
0.23
0.30
0.310.21
0.24
0.51
0.50
0.31
0.26
1
0
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When we analysed our findings in more detail we found that widespread ac-
ceptance of integration in Europe as a whole correlates with weaker group-fo-
cused enmity, especially with respect to anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism 
and racism. Respondents who hold prejudices against weak groups are more 
likely to call for assimilation or separation. The same applies to the question 
whether respondents concede rights of participation for immigrants: here re-
spondents who demonstrate strong anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism 
and homophobia tend to reject a general right to vote and easier naturaliza-
tion. Respondents who tend strongly towards group-focused enmity would 
generally like immigration policies to be more restrictive and tend to be pes-
simistic about future relations with immigrants. Respondents who hold preju-
dices against weak groups are also more likely to be willing to condone discrim-
ination against immigrants or to behave in a discriminatory fashion themselves. 
This applies especially to the call for employers to have the right only to employ 
non-immigrants and the intention to vote only for parties that support restric-
tions on immigration at the next election. Finally, respondents who express 
more prejudice also tend to be more willing to use violence against immigrants 
in particular situations: They can more easily imagine using violence against an 
immigrant for an important cause or in response to an insult.
Group-focused enmity in not restricted solely to prejudicial at-
titudes; it can also have very tangible consequences. Those who 
support integration (conceding both participation and autono-
mous cultural identity) tend to express less anti-immigrant sen-
timent, and generally less group-focused enmity towards other 
identified groups too. By contrast, the call for assimilation or 
separation is associated with greater prejudice. The same ap-
plies to those who would place obstacles in the way of political 
participation for immigrants by opposing easier naturalization 
and a general right to vote. Group-focused enmity at the level 
of attitudes correlates with greater willingness to discriminate 
against immigrants and to use violence against them. Here, too, 
the relationship applies not only to anti-immigrant attitudes, but 
also to negative attitudes towards other outgroups. 
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9. Determining and Preventive Factors
The various strands of research into prejudice, discrimination and right-wing 
extremism have produced a comprehensive repertoire of factors explaining 
prejudiced attitudes against weak groups (for example Wagner, van Dick and 
Zick 2001; Zick 1997). Sociology, social psychology, education, criminology 
and political science each have their own paradigms and explanatory con-
cepts, some of which overlap and others of which differ. Not every theory that 
is discussed has been well tested, and not every model that has been tested 
has actually been verified empirically. We can broadly differentiate the deter-
mining factors (determinants) by whether they locate the source of prejudice 
in the individual, in the group context or in the macro-social context (Zick 
and Küpper 2007; Zick and Küpper 2009). A second possibility is to classify 
these factors into spheres of influence, such as the political, economic or so-
cial environment.
Here we pursue a new alternative approach rooted in the social motives and 
functions of prejudice described in chapter 2.4. We begin by outlining this ap-
proach, which understands prejudice in terms of five basic social motives, to 
which different explanatory factors can be assigned. We present possible de-
terminants that are discussed in the literature as important explanatory factors 
and test their influence on group-focused enmity empirically. We distinguish 
between determinants that can be subsumed under the keyword of social 
capital or social integration, determinants that reflect ideological orientation, 
values and insecurity, and determinants associated with economic disadvan-
tage. The findings also offer starting points for identifying factors that protect 
against prejudice and as such are relevant for developing intervention and 
prevention strategies.
9.1 Fundamental Motives for Human Thought, Feeling 
and Action
Why does a person think and act as they do? That is a question that has long 
concerned psychological research into social motives. Social motives lead our 
thoughts and actions in communication and interaction with others. They sup-
port our goals and are implemented creatively and flexibly in different situa-
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tions. Social motives control thought, feeling and action vis-à-vis others. Susan 
Fiske (2004) identifies five core social motives for human interaction, which 
we also regard as decisive for intergroup relationships shaped by prejudice: 
 belonging
 trusting
 understanding
 controlling
 enhancing self
The motive of belonging serves the need for strong and stable relationships. 
Trust is rooted in the need to perceive others – especially those on whom we 
depend – as fundamentally sympathetic and well-meaning. The motive of 
understanding stems from the need to share meaning and importance with 
others. Control designates the need to perceive behaviour and its outcome as 
congruent (both in controlling our own behaviour and influencing the way oth-
ers behave). Enhancing self relates to the need for a sense of self-worth and 
possible improvement – in other words, a positive image of the self. To Fiske’s 
definition of the latter motive, we would like to add that self-enhancement is 
closely associated with the need to dominate others.
We propose understanding group-focused enmity in the context of these five 
core motives. We assume that people express prejudices, whether consciously 
or unconsciously, for precisely these motives. This means that we examine 
group-focused enmity from a functional/motivational perspective that also of-
fers points of departure for prevention and intervention and helps us to identify 
the obstacles to prejudice reduction. The crux of the matter is to serve these 
core needs not through prejudices, but through positive alternatives.
To take the example of anti-Muslim attitudes: The rampant and overt anti-
Muslim attitudes currently observed in Europe can be understood in terms of 
some of the aforementioned motives. Prejudices against Muslims are based 
on a shared perception and common understanding that prejudiced individu-
als have of the “foreign” and “unknown” Muslim, which they continuously 
reciprocally confirm and thus consolidate. Here prejudices serve the social mo-
tives of understanding and belonging. Labelling Muslims as archaic, patriarchal 
and aggressive is also associated with a self-enhancement of the ingroup and 
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thus also of the individuals concerned, who take the opportunity to demon-
strate their own “enlightened” and “liberal” attitudes. This causes infighting 
within the ingroup, for example over equality for women and homosexuals, to 
fade into the background, which enhances belonging. Finally, in anti-Muslim 
attitudes we also see the effect of the social motive of control. Muslim immi-
grants increasingly demand recognition, opportunities and rights, but are kept 
in check by prejudices that force them onto the defensive.
We now move on to discuss some of the central explanatory factors associated 
with these five core motives: social capital and social integration (9.2); ideologi-
cal orientation, values and insecurity (9.3); and economic disadvantage (9.4).
The explanatory factors social capital and social integration touch on the mo-
tives of belonging and trust. Friendships, having a spouse or partner, mem-
bership in clubs, ability to trust, identification with the ingroup and contact 
with people from groups identified as “other” play a role here. We also take 
account of general satisfaction with life.
Under ideological orientation, values and insecurity we find the motives of un-
derstanding and control. We have already addressed some of the ideologies 
and values involved here in chapter 5 and shown how they are closely related 
to group-focused enmity: authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and 
attitude to diversity. Now we broaden the scope to include the influence of 
religiosity, universalism and security orientation. Indicators of insecurity that 
undermine the motive of control, such as a general sense of disorientation 
(anomie) or feeling threatened by immigrants, are also of interest here.
The explanatory factor of economic disadvantage touches on the motive of 
self-enhancement. Economic disadvantage may mean de facto absolute pov-
erty, or it may express itself in a subjective assessment of the individual’s own 
financial position, the feeling of being worse off than others. In our view the 
need for dominance and improvement of social status also play a role in this 
respect. Following the social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) we 
assume that the need to maintain and enhance social status promotes preju-
dice and discrimination. Unlike Sidanius and Pratto we would not restrict this 
motive to groups of equal status, but regard it as a fundamental human mo-
tive (Küpper, Wolf and Zick 2010). 
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Notes on statistical analysis
By means of linear regression analyses (see glossary) we test the influence of 
the considered determinants of group-focused enmity (GFE) for each case. The 
advantage of linear regression is that the degrees of influence exerted by each 
determinant are comparable; they reveal which determinants have stronger 
explanatory power for group-focused enmity, which have weaker explanatory 
power and which have none at all.
The strength of a predictor (a factor or determinant) is indicated by beta co-
efficients; the higher the value of the beta coefficient, the stronger the influ-
ence of the predictor. A beta coefficient close to 0 means that the factor has 
practically no influence on GFE. A beta coefficient close to -1 or +1 indicates a 
strong negative or positive relationship between the factor and GFE. Beneath 
each figure we also state the total explained variance of all the factors con-
sidered there. This indicates the total explanatory power of these factors and 
how much room is left for other possible explanatory factors.
For these calculations we again use the combined GFE Index. In determining what 
influence each individual factor has on GFE, we always feed all the factors of the 
associated category (i.e. social capital, ideological orientation or economic disad-
vantage) into the model simultaneously and always control to neutralize the influ-
ence of gender, age and education. The analyses seek meaningful patterns in the 
variation of opinions that do not automatically apply to individual respondents.
Notes on interpreting the findings
In our description of the results we speak of explanatory or influencing factors. 
It is, however, impossible to test true causality on the basis of the present cross-
sectional data. All we can do is report statistical relationships, without being 
able to draw conclusions about their causal direction. This restriction applies to 
many similar studies, meaning that very few factors have yet been subjected to 
real causality testing. So a certain degree of caution must be exercised when 
interpreting the results. To take the example of satisfaction with life, which is 
assumed to correlate with the extent of prejudice: One common interpretation 
is that low satisfaction with life leads to more prejudice. But it is also conceivable 
that negative attitudes towards particular groups lessen a person’s satisfaction 
with life. Because prejudices are often based on threatening, fear-inducing ste-
reotypes, a person who shares such stereotypes will feel threatened by “stran-
gers” in their vicinity and this could itself impair their satisfaction with life.
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9.2 Social Capital and Social Integration
Social capital, meaning a person’s integration in social systems, is a possible 
determinant of group-focused enmity. The concept was introduced by Robert 
Putnam, who understands social capital as the web of cooperative relation-
ships between citizens that holds together the members of a society. It is the 
foundation of civil society and helps society to solve collective problems that 
arise. In his famous book, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of Ameri-
can Community (2000), Putnam argues that Americans – the civic society par 
excellence – have gradually lost their ties to social networks, and in the pro-
cess have also lost the norms of reciprocity they reproduce and the trust that 
grows out of them. Instead they are increasingly “bowling alone”, eroding 
the civil society on which democracy is based and endangering democratic 
values such as tolerance and pluralism. For the individual, social capital may 
consist in having stable and lasting relationships and contacts with others, 
being part of a community, being involved in societies and organizations, or 
being able to trust others. All these play a major role in satisfaction with life 
(Brehm and Rahn 1997). Some theoretical approaches also emphasize inte-
gration in social networks through spouse/partner, friends and neighbours 
as an important preventive factor for GFE (for example Anhut and Heitmeyer 
2000). 
Whereas Putnam’s social capital approach focuses on friends and neighbours 
and membership of clubs, organizations and communities, the contact hypoth-
esis (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998) concentrates on contact with members of 
outgroups. From the perspective of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 
1986), identification with the ingroup is also important for negativity towards 
particular outgroups.
9.2.1 Indicators of Social Capital and Social Integration
In the following we first provide a brief overview of individual indicators of so-
cial capital and social integration. In the text box on “Measuring social capital 
and integration” (see p. 130–32) we describe precisely how these indicators 
were recorded in the GFE Europe survey and provide some statistical informa-
tion on the dissemination of the factors in the surveyed countries. At the end 
of the section we report the explanatory power of the indicators for group-
focused enmity.
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Membership in clubs and organizations, spouse/partner, friends and 
neighbours
Putnam (2000) especially stresses the positive role played by organizations and 
clubs in promoting democracy and civil society. In response to criticism that 
not all organizations pursue democratic goals or are egalitarian, anti-racist and 
anti-ethnocentric in their activities, Putnam introduced an important distinc-
tion between bridging and bonding social capital. Very exclusive organizations 
bond their members together but isolate them from others, and are generally 
structured by social categories such as gender, ethnicity or social class. Profes-
sional bodies come into this category. At the other end of the spectrum open 
and very integrative organizations unite widely differing members across these 
category divisions. One example of this would be a multi-ethnic football team. 
In fact, this example shows how an organization can both bridge and bond, be-
cause such a team brings together men from different ethnic or cultural back-
grounds, but separates them from women (unless there is a female team too).
Membership of organizations of the exclusive type is less likely to promote the 
idea of equality of different social groups and is more associated with separa-
tion processes. On the other hand it would seem obvious that membership of 
organizations of the inclusive type would promote values such as equality, tol-
erance and pluralism among its members (Mayer 2003). Independent of these 
hypotheses, clubs (especially sports clubs) and other organizations (for example 
church groups) are assigned an important role in intervention and prevention 
aiming to reduce prejudice.
Trust
Mutual trust between individuals plays an important role for social integration 
and social capital. But establishing mutual trust is also important for groups 
in conflict, as politicians emphasize when tackling persistent group conflicts 
(confidence-building). Very broadly, trust can also be defined as positive dis-
tortion in the processing of imperfect information (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 
1994). Studies show that trust in others can be developed to avoid insecurities 
(for example Kollock 1994). In successful and repeated social exchange, trust is 
linked with positive affect (Lawler and Yoon 1996). In social relationships such 
reliable and continuous exchange may occur between individuals or between 
groups. Trust and civil society commitment are closely linked, as commitment 
promotes trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Many studies point to the importance 
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of trust for reducing intergroup conflicts. Contact between the members of 
hostile groups increases trust, which in turn creates positive behavioural inten-
tions and reduces negative ones. In the case of the Northern Ireland conflict 
this was demonstrated using a student sample (Tam et al. 2009). 
Satisfaction with life
On the basis of the theoretical account of social capital we assume that greater 
satisfaction with life leads causally to less group-focused enmity. But the legiti-
mizing function of prejudices – which supply grounds for existing inequalities 
– also permits the opposite case to be made. It is easier to live with inequali-
ties if prejudices are available to justify them. That would mean that prejudices 
could actually lead to greater satisfaction with life.
There is indeed empirical evidence for both propositions. A comparative study 
of thirty-two countries in the World Value Survey found the following pattern 
in relation to sexism (Napier, Thorisdottir and Jost 2010): In countries where 
there is greater overall equality of the sexes, those who openly espouse sex-
ism are less satisfied with their lives than those who express apparently positive 
prejudices about women (benevolent sexism), whilst in countries where there is 
great inequality open sexism correlates positively with high satisfaction with life. 
So whereas in countries with greater equality between the sexes only the more 
respectable version of sexism provides emotional relief, in countries with great 
inequality this is also accomplished by the openly hostile version of sexism. Most 
of the countries covered by the GFE Europe survey have a comparatively high 
degree of equality between men and women. Applied to GFE, which in the pre-
sent study encompasses overt and hostile prejudices, we would tend to expect a 
negative relationship between satisfaction with life and group-focused enmity.
Identification with region, nation and Europe
Social identity is a key concept when it comes to prejudiced attitudes towards 
outgroups (Zick 2005). Although the idea of social capital would suggest that 
identification with a community tends to be associated with democratic and 
thus plural and tolerant attitudes, alternative theoretical approaches and a 
great deal of empirical research suggest the opposite. Social Identity Theory 
has a central place in social psychology research on intergroup conflicts and 
prejudices (see chapter 2.2). Negativity towards outgroups is a simple and easy 
strategy for gaining a positive social identity. Strong identification with an in-
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group – for example the nation or any other group understood as ingroup – 
leads as a rule to more prejudice and intolerant attitudes towards outgroups. 
This applies especially to exclusive overidentification in the form of national 
pride. The study on group-focused enmity in Germany found that pride in be-
ing German and in German history leads causally over time to more anti-immi-
grant attitudes (Wagner et al. 2011). Civic patriotism – in the sense of pride in 
German social security – is negatively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes. 
For the present GFE Europe survey we did not measure national pride, but only 
the extent to which respondents identify with their region, their nation and 
Europe. On the basis of prior research we suspected that regional and national 
identification would tend to correlate positively with group-focused enmity, 
whereas identification with Europe would lead to less group-focused enmity, 
because Europe is an inclusive category that overlays country categories.
Contact with immigrants
In theory and practice (intervention) there is agreement that group conflicts 
lessen when the members of the groups enter into contact (Allport 1954; Pet-
tigrew 1998). This applies especially where contact occurs as equals, where 
both groups share a common goal, and where contact is supported by au-
thorities (such as teachers). A major meta-analysis of empirical studies confirms 
that intergroup contact reduces prejudices across a range of different contact 
situations and in relation to different outgroups (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). 
It has also been shown that as well as direct personal contact with members 
of an otherwise prejudice-targeted group, the mere idea of contact reduces 
the extent of prejudice (Turner et al. 2007), as does indirect contact via friends 
(Wright et al. 1997). Even those who only imagine contact or who have a friend 
who is friends with a member of a prejudice-targeted outgroup express less 
prejudice. Contact with one group (e.g. immigrants) not only reduces prejudice 
towards that specific group, but also reduces prejudice towards other groups 
such as religious minorities and even homosexual people (Pettigrew 2009).
Measuring social capital and integration
Friendships: “Finding real friends is becoming more and more difficult now-
adays” and “Relationships are getting more and more unstable”. Respond-
ents chose from four response categories ranging from “strongly disagree” to 
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“strongly agree”. Both statements were reverse coded and combined to form 
the “friends” scale, where high scale values correspond with a positive sense 
of friendship (Cronbach’s  = .73). 62 percent of all European respondents find 
that it is becoming more and more difficult to find real friends and 76 percent 
believe that social relationships are becoming more unstable. In other words, 
about two thirds of Europeans express insecurity about friendships. Especially 
many share this impression in Hungary, Italy, Poland and Portugal with values 
around 80 percent.
Contact with neighbours: “How many people are you socially acquainted 
with in your neighbourhood?” Respondents chose from four response catego-
ries ranging from “none” to “many”. 52 percent of all European respondents 
said that they had contact with many people in their neighbourhood, another 
29 percent with some. Interestingly, in the four aforementioned countries 
(Hungary, Italy, Poland and Portugal) strikingly many respondents – 80 to over 
90 percent – said that they had many local contacts. That would suggest that 
having contact with neighbours and ease of making friends are empirically 
completely independent of one another (correlation r = -.01).
Contact with immigrants: “How many of your friends are immigrants?” and 
“How many of your [country native] friends have themselves friends that are 
immigrants?” Respondents chose from four response categories ranging from 
“none” to “many”. The two questions were combined to form the “contact 
with immigrants” scale (Cronbach’s  =.78). 28 percent of all European re-
spondents said they had some or many friends from an immigrant community, 
ranging from a good half in Portugal to just 15 percent in the Netherlands and 
Poland and 11 percent in Italy. 42 percent of all European respondents have 
friends who are friends with immigrants, ranging from 72 percent in Portugal 
to 19 percent in Italy and the Netherlands. In the other countries between 40 
and 50 percent of respondents count immigrants among their friends.
Trust: We used two statements to measure trust: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?” and “Generally speaking, would you say that most peo-
ple try to take advantage of you when they have the opportunity to do so or 
that they do their best to behave decently?” Respondents were asked in each 
case to agree with one of the two possibilities. The first question was reverse 
coded and combined with the second to form the “trust” scale where high 
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scale values correspond with stronger trust (Cronbach’s  =.51). 67 percent of 
all European respondents said that one cannot be too careful in dealing with 
people, 34 percent believe that most people try to take advantage of them 
when they have the opportunity to do so. Respondents in Portugal and France 
tended to be mistrustful of others, although they also stood out for assuming 
that others would do their best to behave well.
Satisfaction with life: To measure satisfaction with life we asked: “On the 
whole, are you (very satisfied – not at all satisfied) with the life you are liv-
ing?” 84 percent of European respondents said they were fairly or even very 
satisfied. In most countries 85 to 95 percent were fairly or very satisfied with 
their life, but only 64 percent in Portugal and Hungary.
Spouse/partner: Interviewees were asked about their marital status, and 
those who were not married were asked if they had a “long-term partner”. 
The country comparison shows about 70 percent of the population living in a 
long-term partnership, with about half the population married.
Membership: “How many organizations (like sports clubs, cultural or hobby 
activities, trade union or business organizations, church, environment or ani-
mal protection groups) do you belong to?” We recorded the total number of 
memberships but distinguished only between those who were a member of at 
least one group and those without any memberships. In Germany and Great 
Britain about 70 percent of respondents were members of an organization or 
club, in the Netherlands 88 percent. In Hungary with 28 percent comparatively 
few respondents were members of an organization.
Identification: We used three statements to measure the extent of regional, 
national and European identification: “I feel attached to my region”, “I feel 
attached to [country]” and “I feel attached to Europe”. Respondents chose 
from four response categories ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly 
agree”. 74 percent of all European respondents rather or strongly identify with 
Europe, 93 percent with their country and 82 percent with their region. In all 
the individual countries a majority of respondents identify with their region, 
with the exact figures ranging between 75 and 90 percent. In Great Britain 
only 43 percent of respondents identify with Europe, in the Netherlands and 
Italy about 70 percent and in the other countries between 80 and 87 percent. 
Identification with the nation is relatively uniform between the countries, with 
figures of about 90 percent.
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Table 35: Indicators of social capital and social integration (agreement in 
percent)
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
Friendship 
1 Finding real friends is becom-
ing more and more difficult 
nowadays.
56.7 36.2 58.2 30.4 72.6 86.6 78.1 80.4
2 Relationships are getting more 
and more unstable.
67.9 69.1 70.2 60.5 79.7 88.4 85.2 84.9
Trust
3 Generally speaking, would you 
say that you can’t be too care-
ful in dealing with people. 
64.5 53.7 80.2 39.3 56.4 83.7 77.4 78.5
4 Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people try to take 
advantage of you when they 
have the opportunity to do so?
33.7 25.0 40.2 13.4 39.4 51.8 30.2 38.2
Neighbours
5 How many people are you so-
cially acquainted with in your 
neighbourhood? (some, many)
79.6 70.6 74.8 78.4 82.7 89.1 94.4 80.8
Memberships
6 How many organizations (…) 
do you belong to? (mem-
bership at least in one 
organization)
70.7 68.2 51.9 87.9 39.0 46.0 49.4 27.8
Contact with immigrants
7 How many of your friends are 
immigrants? (some, many)
39.3 25.9 39.5 15.4 11.2 56.0 15.3 21.4
8 How many of your [coun-
try native] friends have them-
selves friends that are immi-
grants? (some, many)
46.9 36.5 51.7 18.3 19.7 72.4 56.9 34.5
Spouse or partner
11 Any long-term partnership 69.1 72.4 72.2 78.0 71.7 71.0 74.0 76.3
10 Married 48.6 52.3 52.4 61.2 56.4 60.5 61.5 60.1
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9.2.2 Results for Social Capital and Social Integration
To what extent do social capital and social integration affect group-focused 
enmity? Does its extent decline where respondents are integrated in social 
networks? The following analyses underscore the influence of social capital 
on the extent of group-focused enmity. For reasons of capacity some of the 
indicators used to survey these aspects were presented to only a randomly 
selected half of the sample, so in these cases the sample size was about 500 
respondents per country.
The indicators of social capital and social integration certainly have explanatory 
power for the extent of GFE. Together these factors explain 32 percent of the 
variance (see note under Figure 28), so their strength allows us to make quite 
a good estimate of the extent of a person’s GFE. These indicators have the 
greatest explanatory power in Great Britain, the smallest in Portugal and Hun-
gary. As that suggests, other factors aside from social capital are of relevance.
Within this model the impression that it is easy or difficult to find real friends 
turns out to be the strongest influencing factor (  = -.26**). The more nega-
tive respondents’ views about friendship today (whatever undertone of nostal-
gia may be involved), the stronger their group-focused enmity. This relatively 
strong effect is confirmed in all the countries apart from Portugal. Neighbour-
hood contacts also play a role for GFE, although not the one we might have 
expected. The more contact a respondent has with neighbours the more likely 
they are to express prejudices. This effect is found above all in France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands.
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
Identification
12 I feel attached to Europe. 82.7 43.2 68.4 68.0 82.6 76.3 86.9 86.2
13 I feel attached to [country]. 89.2 89.5 92.6 94.5 95.2 88.4 95.3 95.4
14 I feel attached to my region. 76.9 81.1 80.9 83.9 81.5 86.4 90.0 73.3
Satisfaction with life
15 On the whole, are you (very 
satisfied – not at all satisfied) 
with the life you are living? 
(fairly, very)
89.6 92.5 84.9 96.3 89.5 63.9 87.5 64.3
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Confirming the results of numerous empirical prejudice studies, we find that 
contact with immigrants clearly reduces GFE. The less contact respondents 
have with immigrants the more strongly they express prejudices. This applies 
equally to direct personal contact and to indirect contact via friends. In all the 
individual surveyed countries we likewise find that contact with immigrants 
reduces GFE, most clearly in France (  = .35) and least in Portugal (  = .08). So 
contact with persons in the social context of the neighbourhood is associated 
with greater prejudice whereas contact with immigrants is clearly associated 
with less, as is the feeling of being able to make friends easily.
Regression analysis. Total explanation of variance: R² = .32 (excluding control variables age, educa-
tion, gender); in the individual countries: D: R² = .31, GB: R² = .35, F: R²=.31, NL: R² = .32, I: R² = .29, 
PT: R² = .16, PL: R² = .19, HU: R² = .17. The higher the beta value, the stronger the variable’s impact. 
Strongest predictors are highlighted grey.
* Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level; ns = non-significant.
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Figure 28: Social capital and social integration as determinants of GFE in Europe
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Trust in others also affects GFE. The less respondents trust others, the more 
likely they are to express prejudices. This effect is found in all the surveyed 
countries apart from Hungary. We also find a weak but significant influence of 
satisfaction with life on GFE: the less satisfied respondents are with their lives, 
the more likely they are to express prejudice. Here, however, the results in the 
individual countries reveal how weak this trend is; in none of the individual 
countries did this relationship reach significance. An equally weak but signifi-
cant influence was found for membership. Respondents who are not members 
of any organizations or clubs tend on average rather more to express preju-
dice against weak groups. The existence of a spouse or partner plays no role.
Finally we also investigated how regional, national and European identity affect 
GFE. Where respondents identify especially with Europe there is no noticeable 
effect on the extent of GFE. For identification with the respondent’s own na-
tionality there is a weak effect, with those whose identity is strongly defined 
by nationality slightly more likely to express prejudices. Identification with the 
region also has a weak effect: the more strongly respondents feel they belong 
to their region, the more likely they are to express prejudices. Overall it is clear 
that regional and national identification tend to contribute to prejudices while 
identification with Europe does little to counteract them.
In the individual countries we find different patterns concerning the influence 
of identity on GFE. Respondents who define themselves as Europeans are less 
likely to express prejudices in the western European countries (France, Ger-
many, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal) but more likely in Hun-
gary. On the other hand, in France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the Neth-
erlands, strong identification with the nation is linked with greater prejudice, 
whereas in Portugal, Poland and Hungary it is associated with less prejudice. 
Only for regional identity did we find uniform effects across all countries. The 
stronger the identification with the region the stronger the prejudice.  
Social capital and social integration are theoretically significant preven-
tive factors against intolerance and prejudice. Our results confirm this for 
certain indicators: those who trust other people and feel that it is easy to 
establish stable friendships tend to express less group-focused enmity. We 
also found that contact with immigrants – either direct or mediated via 
mutual friends – is related to lower levels of prejudices while, conversely, 
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9.3 Ideological Orientation, Values and Insecurity 
In this section we investigate how ideological orientation, values and insecu-
rity affect group-focused enmity. Various theoretical traditions highlight the 
special relevance of ideological orientations for attitudes towards outgroups. 
In chapter 5.3 we already addressed how authoritarianism, Social Dominance 
Orientation and rejection of diversity relate to prejudice. In the following we 
go into these and other constructs in greater detail.
The constructs we discuss as ideological orientations would be described by au-
thors in other theoretical traditions as ideologies, generalized attitudes or person-
ality traits. However they are labelled, the constructs discussed here have come to 
be understood across the board as stable and firmly rooted beliefs often already 
learned through childhood and adolescent socialization. They define our view 
of the world and our understanding of social relations between individuals and 
groups. Social psychology emphasizes that ideological orientations are in principle 
open to change. We share that perspective and assume that the respective context 
exercises a certain moderating influence on general beliefs. So the extent to which 
a belief leads to specific attitudes or behaviour depends not only on the person 
and their socialization, but also on the circumstances. Social comparison pro-
cesses, which depend on which comparison group is available and focussed upon 
in the given context, play an important role for attitudes towards outgroups (Zick 
2005). People from two neighbouring villages may regard one another as mutual 
outgroups or jointly as Germans; as Germans they may compare themselves with 
the outgroup of the French or, broadening out the perspective, juxtapose them-
selves together with the French as Europeans against the outgroup of Americans.
prejudices are widespread among those who have little contact with im-
migrants. Other indicators exhibit weak effects. Those who are satisfied 
with their lives tend rather less to express prejudice against identified 
groups, as do those who are members of at least one organization. Hav-
ing intensive contact with neighbours, on the other hand, tends to have a 
negative effect and appears to actually foster prejudices. Having a spouse 
or partner plays no role. Finally, we found that those who identify with 
nation and region tend rather more towards group-focused enmity, while 
identification with Europe does not protect against prejudices.
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Beyond the realm of ideological orientation we take a closer look at general 
values and examine specifically how universalistic, security-orientated and reli-
gious values affect GFE. Finally we also consider general insecurity as a possible 
determinant of GFE and investigate the constructs of anomie (a feeling of diso-
rientation triggered by social change) and the perceived threat of immigrants.
9.3.1 Indicators of Ideological Orientation, Values and Insecurity
In the following we first provide a brief overview of individual indicators of 
ideological orientation, values and insecurity. In the text box on “Measuring 
ideological orientations, values and insecurity” (see p. 142-44) we describe 
precisely how these indicators were recorded in the GFE Europe survey and 
provide some statistical information on the dissemination of the factors in the 
surveyed countries. At the end of the section we report the explanatory power 
of the indicators for group-focused enmity.
Authoritarianism
When Theodor Adorno and his colleagues wrote The Authoritarian Personal-
ity in 1950, memory of the crimes of Nazi Germany was still very fresh. In the 
book they argue that an authoritarian style of education that demands obe-
dience and subordination to authority and places great weight on discipline 
and strictness was directly responsible for the holocaust. They propose an au-
thoritarian personality that is closely connected with anti-Semitism. Its nine 
facets are conventionalism (rigid adherence to the conventional values of the 
middle class), submission (uncritical obedience of idealized moral authorities 
of the ingroup), aggression (a law-and-order mentality that seeks to condemn 
and punish norm violations), lack of introspection, superstition, admiration of 
power and strength, cynicism, projectivity and excessive fixation on sexuality 
(see also Decker et al. 2010). 
On that basis Altemeyer developed his concept of right-wing authoritarianism 
(1988) and a scale to record it in the dimensions of submission, aggression 
and conventionalism. More recent theoretical works often tackle authoritari-
anism in connection with the concept of Social Dominance Orientation (see 
chapter 5.3 and below), understanding it as comprising two world views: one 
that perceives life as a competitive jungle and another that sees the world as 
a dangerous place. Authoritarian individuals quickly feel threatened by other 
groups and respond by denigrating and excluding them. Dominance-orientated 
1399. Determining and Preventive Factors
persons, on the other hand, perceive the world as a place of competition and 
rivalry. They denigrate and exclude groups in order to do well in competition 
themselves (Duckitt 2001). The great explanatory power of authoritarianism 
for prejudice against weak groups has, like the concept of Social Dominance 
Orientation described in more detail below, been confirmed in numerous stud-
ies (for example Ekehammar et al. 2004; Duriez and van Hiel 2002).
Social Dominance Orientation
The concept of Social Dominance Orientation is comparatively recent. It focuses 
on the extent to which people support social hierarchies between groups and 
correspondingly reject social equality. The social dominance theory (Sidanius 
and Pratto 1999) assumes that individuals differ in their extent of Social Domi-
nance Orientation, with persons from higher-status groups, for example white 
people or men, having higher Social Dominance Orientation than persons from 
lower-status groups, like for example black people or women. People who 
belong to higher-status groups justify the existing hierarchies with prejudices, 
which the theory calls legitimizing myths. Alongside prejudices such as racism 
and sexism, ideologies such as nationalism or the Protestant work ethic also 
serve as legitimizing myths. The sexist prejudice that women are biologically 
“different” and therefore tend to be more emotional and less rational serves as 
an argument for keeping women out of top jobs. On the basis of our own em-
pirical findings, however, we assume – in a departure from the original theory 
– that people from groups whose status in terms of power, influence or money 
is low can gain advantages by distinguishing themselves from groups even fur-
ther down the ladder, for example immigrants (Küpper, Wolf and Zick 2010).
Diversity
Diversity describes the extent of subjectively perceived or objectively discernible 
difference between the members of a social group (van Knippenberg and Schip-
pers 2007). This actual or perceived heterogeneity may relate to differences in 
gender, age, ethnicity, religion, cultural or social background, or disability. The 
concept of diversity has thus far been investigated above all in work contexts, 
particularly with respect to the effects of heterogeneity on cooperation, produc-
tivity and job satisfaction of work teams (for an overview see van Knippenberg 
and Schippers 2007). It is assumed that demographic diversity in work teams 
is associated with different experience, abilities, attitudes, values, personalities, 
emotions and cognitive approaches. These real or supposed differences may be 
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utilized creatively and experienced as an enrichment but they can also lead to 
misunderstandings and stress. Alongside the type of task to be accomplished, 
the outcome depends on the fundamental attitude of those involved (van Dick 
et al. 2008). If they regard its diversity as an advantage then they are more able 
to identify with their team, which has positive effects on their productivity and 
job satisfaction. Thus a positive attitude to diversity can offset the negative ef-
fects of social categorization. Using the same data on which this report is based 
we have already been able to demonstrate that those who support diversity and 
value the diversity of cultures and religions in their country tend less towards 
anti-immigrant attitudes (Küpper, Wolf and Zick 2010; Zick and Küpper, 2010).
Universalism and security orientation
The two values of universalism and security are drawn from the value theory 
of Shalom H. Schwartz (1992), who defines values as convictions that apply 
regardless of the situation and motivate individuals to act in accordance with 
desirable goals. Value orientations give individuals criteria by which they can 
judge themselves, their own and others’ behaviour and external events. Every 
individual has their own individual value system within which their personal 
values are ordered by importance. Schwartz identifies ten universal value types 
according to the different motives they are based on. From these we have se-
lected two: security and universalism. Security-orientated values emphasize 
safety and protection as central social objectives. Weak groups and minori-
ties differ from the majority society through features such as origin, ethnicity, 
religion, sexuality or gender. They may appear as a threat to a person’s own 
values and goals and consequently as a danger to the stability and security of 
the social order. And indeed, an empirical relationship can be found between 
values focused on security and negative attitudes towards immigrants (Leong 
2008). People with universalist values seek to appreciate, understand and pro-
tect other people and the environment. The value of universalism thus stands 
opposed to category-based negativity towards weak groups.
Religiosity
All the major religions and especially Christianity – which is naturally foremost in 
the European context of the study – propagate peaceableness and neighbourly 
love; many people cite their faith as a reason to work for charitable causes. But 
people are also repressed, persecuted and even murdered on religious grounds. 
Churches stress their differences and confessions quarrel. “Religion makes and 
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unmakes prejudice”, as Gordon Allport recognized back in the 1950s (Allport 
1954, 444). Since then numerous empirical studies have scrutinized the rela-
tionship between religiosity and prejudices. In the scope of this study of group-
focused enmity in Europe, we analysed the relationship between religiosity 
and prejudices in terms of the different elements of the GFE syndrome (Küpper 
and Zick 2010). What emerged was that the extent of sexism and homophobia 
clearly increased with religiosity. Religious people have a significant tendency 
towards stronger prejudices against women and homosexuals. For racism we 
found a similar tendency in a weaker form. The effect of religiosity on anti-
immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim attitudes was small and 
differed from country to country, making it difficult to generalize except to 
note that religiosity does not necessarily protect against these prejudices either.
Anomie
We understand the sociological concept of anomie as arising from the loss 
of norms in society as a consequence of rapid social change (Durkheim 1983 
[1897]). Within a short space of time people find that what was previously 
regarded as right and proper no longer applies, unsettling their sense of or-
der and producing a feeling of disorientation and insecurity. This individual 
response to a loss of binding social norms is what we term anomie. The dis-
semination of anomie, in turn, itself has repercussions for society as a whole. 
Numerous studies confirm that those who feel disorientated are more likely 
to express prejudice against other groups. As they see it, “foreign” groups 
threaten to further complicate the society they have to deal with and endan-
ger its already eroding values and norms (Hüpping 2006).
Perceived threat by immigrants
Certain prominent theories of conflict, such as the social psychological theory 
of realistic group conflict (Sherif 1966; LeVine and Campbell 1972), see preju-
dices as the outcome of conflicts over limited resources. Here both subjectively 
perceived and real competition over land, water or jobs, for example, can lead 
to negativity towards actual or supposed rival groups, which are experienced 
as a threat to prosperity, security but also as challenging their power to define 
what is “right” or “wrong”.
According to integrative threat theory (Stephan and Stephan 2000) a perceived 
threat leads directly to prejudices against the supposedly threatening group. 
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This theory distinguishes between realistic threat, where the outgroup is felt to 
threaten material property or security, and symbolic threat, which is rooted in the 
suspicion that outgroups threaten an ingroup’s values or way of life. This feeling 
can sometimes arise simply because the other group is perceived as being very 
different, which puts the concept of threat close to that of covert prejudices, 
which are partly couched in terms of large perceived or imputed cultural dif-
ferences (chapter 2.3). This theory also distinguishes between personal threat, 
where an individual feels personally threatened by the other group, and collective 
threat, where one group feels threatened by another (for example “natives” by 
“foreigners”). A meta-analysis of numerous empirical studies found perceived 
threat by an outgroup to be closely related to prejudice (Riek, Mania and Gaert-
ner 2006). Moreover, the results of a longitudinal study on group-focused enmity 
conducted in Germany suggest that the feeling of threat leads causally to more 
anti-immigrant attitudes and not the other way round (Schlüter, Schmitt and 
Wagner 2008). It is also noteworthy that as well as promoting negative attitudes 
towards the involved outgroup, rivalry perceived as threat can sometimes also 
lead to negativity against completely uninvolved groups (Sassenberg et al. 2007).
In this study we measured perceived threat by immigrants in terms of both 
personal and collective threat. We would like to stress that what we are talking 
about is perceived threat, which can be very subjective and requires no basis 
in reality. A feeling of threat by immigrants sometimes arises through a lack 
of real experience that would allow realistic images to replace the stereotypes 
of members of “foreign” groups, finding things in common and recognizing 
specific personal differences in place of the assumed group characteristics. In 
regions where hardly any immigrants live or in very closed neighbourhoods 
residents experience few opportunities to encounter people from migrant com-
munities and replace the feeling of threat with more varied and possibly posi-
tive experiences.
Measuring ideological orientations, values and insecurity
Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and rejection of diversity: 
See chapter 5.3, Table 11
Religiosity: “How religious are you?”. Respondents chose from four response 
categories ranging from “very religious” to “not religious at all”. The item was 
reverse coded so that a high value indicates strong religiosity. Almost 55 per-
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cent of European respondents said they were quite or very religious, ranging 
from about 34 percent in Great Britain and France to 88 percent in Poland. 
Anomie: “Nowadays things are so confusing that you sometimes do not know 
where you stand” and “Nowadays things are so complex that you sometimes 
do not know what is going on”. Respondents chose from four response cat-
egories ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. 77 percent of all 
European respondents said they felt that today everything was confusing, and 
76 percent that things were too complicated. The strongest agreement with 
both statements was found in Portugal and Poland with more than 85 percent. 
Both items were combined to form the “anomie” scale (Cronbach’s  = .81).
Universalism: “A man/woman who believes it to be important that every per-
son in the world is treated equally. He/She believes that everyone should have 
equal opportunities in life” and “A man/woman for whom it is important to 
listen to people who are different from him/her. And even if he disagrees with 
them, he/she would still want to understand them”. Respondents indicated in 
four response categories ranging from “not like me at all” to “very much like 
me” how similar they thought the described person was to themselves. Both 
items were reverse coded so that high values indicate strong universalism, and 
both were combined to form the “universalism” scale (Cronbach’s  = .52). 88 
percent of European respondents said that the described person was some-
what or very much like them (m > 2.5). Universalistic values are widespread in 
all the countries, with the lowest values in Portugal, followed by Poland and 
Hungary, and the highest in Italy. 
Security orientation: “A man/woman for whom it is important to live in se-
cure surroundings. He/she avoids anything that might endanger his/her safety” 
and “A man/woman for whom it is important that the government ensures 
his/her safety against all threats. He/She wants the state to be strong so it 
can defend its citizens”. For each pair of statements, respondents indicated 
in four response categories ranging from “not like me at all” to “very much 
like me” how similar they thought the described person was to themselves. 
Both items were combined to form the “security” scale (Cronbach’s  = .56). 
75 percent of all European respondents said that the described person was 
somewhat or very much like them (m > 2.5). Security was significantly most 
important to respondents in Hungary and Italy and significantly least impor-
tant to Dutch respondents.
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Threat: “Immigrants living here threaten the economy in [country]”, “Im-
migrants living here threaten my personal financial situation”, “Immigrants 
living here threaten our way of life and our values in [country]” and “Immi-
grants living here threaten my personal way of life and my values”. Respond-
ents chose from four response categories ranging from “strongly disagree” 
to “strongly agree”. All four statements were combined to form the “threat” 
scale (Cronbach’s  = .78). 16 percent of all European respondents recorded a 
value greater than 2.5, indicating that they (somewhat or strongly) feel their 
standard of living or way of life is threatened personally or as group by im-
migrants. Above all in Hungary, followed by Portugal, Great Britain and Ger-
many the feeling of threat by immigrants is significantly stronger than in the 
other countries.
Table 36: Indicators of ideological orientation, values and insecurity (agreement in 
percent)
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
Authoritarianism 
Social Dominance Orientation
Diversity 
See chapter 5.3, Table 11
Religiosity 
1 How religious are you?  
(proportion responding with 
at least “somewhat religious”)
48.2 34.3 34.6 52.0 65.9 54.7 88.3 59.3
Anomie (disorientation) 
(Cronbach’s  = .81)
2 Nowadays things are so con-
fusing that you sometimes do 
not know where you stand. 
61.5 70.3 86.1 65.7 73.4 92.4 88.7 76.6
3 Nowadays things are so com-
plex that you sometimes do 
not know what is going on. 
65.5 70.4 78.3 62.6 78.6 88.3 86.2 80.6
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No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
Universalisma
(Cronbach’s  = .52)
4 A man/woman who believes 
it to be important that every 
person in the world is treated 
equally. He/She believes that 
everyone should have equal 
opportunities in life.
[Proportion who say they 
are similar to the described 
person]
90.9 94.8 95.5 91.6 93.9 92.2 90.5 83.3
5 A man/woman for whom it 
is important to listen to peo-
ple who are different from 
him/her. And even if he disa-
grees with them, he/she would 
still want to understand them. 
[Proportion who say they 
are similar to the described 
person]
94.4 94.8 94.7 91.6 94.7 86.8 86.8 85.3
Securitya
(Cronbach’s  = .56)
6 A man/woman for whom it is 
important to live in secure sur-
roundings. He/she avoids any-
thing that might endanger his/
her safety. [Proportion who 
say they are similar to the de-
scribed person]
77.6 77.4 75.9 62.7 86.0 80.1 77.6 83.6
7 A man/woman for whom it is 
important that the govern-
ment ensures his/her safety 
against all threats. He/She 
wants the state to be strong 
so it can defend its citizens. 
[Proportion who say they 
are similar to the described 
person]
82.2 83.7 86.8 76.2 87.2 89.4 86.6 80.5
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9.3.2 Results for Ideological Orientation, Values and Insecurity 
What influence do ideological orientation, values and insecurity have on group-
focused enmity? Can the reported findings from previous research be repli-
cated in the present study’s pan-European dataset?
Overall, the indicators of ideological orientation, values and insecurity possess 
remarkably large explanatory power for the extent of group-focused enmity, 
explaining more than half of the variance in our model (R² = .53; Figure 29). 
So if we know a person’s ideological orientation, values and insecurity we can 
fairly reliably estimate the extent of their prejudices. The explanatory power is 
especially strong in Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, least in Hun-
gary. In the following we examine the individual determinants of GFE, in each 
case controlled for the influence of gender, age and education.
Perceived threat by immigrants has an especially clear effect on the extent 
of prejudices (  = .28). The more strongly respondents feel that immigrants 
threaten their prosperity and way of life, the more strongly they express preju-
dice. This effect is conspicuously strong in all the countries without exception, 
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
Threat
(Cronbach’s  = .78)
8 Immigrants living here 
threaten the economy in 
[country].
23.9 42.4 21.2 17.7 26.0 32.8 22.4 51.6
9 Immigrants living here 
threaten my personal financial 
situation.
14.6 22.7 11.9 8.3 11.3 16.9 10.0 37.8
10 Immigrants living here 
threaten our way of life and 
our values in [country].
28.2 40.9 27.3 35.7 36.2 26.2 16.3 41.2
11 Immigrants living here 
threaten my personal way of 
life and my values.
9.9 18.6 14.7 12.2 17.3 15.4 5.8 28.6
a The proportion of respondents who feel they are somewhat or very like the described person.
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Figure 29: Ideological orientation, values and insecurity as determinants of GFE 
in Europe
Total explanation of variance: R² = .53 (excluding control variables age, education, gender); in the individual 
countries: D: R² = .62, GB: R² = .61, F: R² = .52, NL: R² = .61, I: R² = .58, PT: R² = .47, PL: R² = .44, HU: R² = 
.28. The higher the beta value, the stronger the variable’s impact. Strongest predictors are highlighted grey. 
* Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level.
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with beta coefficients exceeding .30 in Germany, Great Britain, the Nether-
lands and Portugal.
Appreciation of diversity also has a clear effect on the extent of group-focused 
enmity. The more strongly respondents reject diversity, the more likely they are to 
express prejudices, and vice versa. This influence was found in all the countries, 
but is weakest in Portugal and Poland. Social Dominance Orientation and authori-
tarianism have similarly strong effects on GFE. As already described in chapter 
5.3, even after controlling for other indicators both Social Dominance Orientation 
and authoritarianism correlate strongly and positively with group-focused enmity. 
The more respondents support hierarchies in society and the more enthusiastic 
they are about discipline and punishment the more strongly they tend towards 
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prejudices. This effect is statistically significant in all the countries. The influence 
of Social Dominance Orientation is especially strong in Portugal with a beta value 
of .26, and weakest in Italy and Hungary with .12 and .04. The influence of au-
thoritarianism is seen especially clearly in Poland, France and Italy with beta values 
exceeding .20, and is weakest in Portugal, the Netherlands and Hungary with .10.
The two value orientations of universalism and security both also have statisti-
cally significant effects on group-focused enmity. The data shows that respond-
ents with universalist values tend to be less prejudiced. The more respondents 
are interested in the well-being of all and the environment, the less likely they 
are to express prejudices, although this effect is weak and is found largely in the 
western European states of Germany, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands. 
In Hungary, Poland, and Portugal it is even weaker and in some cases statistically 
insignificant. A security orientation has a similarly weak effect on group-focused 
enmity. Respondents who place more emphasis on security are more likely to ex-
press prejudices, but the effect is conspicuously weak in all the countries. In other 
words, there are many respondents who do not necessarily express more preju-
dices, even though they value security. This influence is clearest in Germany, and it 
is weakest in Great Britain and Poland (below the significance threshold in Poland). 
Anomie has a noticeably stronger effect on group-focused enmity. The more 
strongly respondents report a feeling of disorientation the more likely they 
are to express prejudice against weak groups. This effect is found above all in 
Germany, Hungary, Italy and Poland; it is not statistically significant in Portugal.
Finally, the extent of self-reported religiosity has a significant influence on 
group-focused enmity. Religious respondents are more likely to express preju-
dices than non-religious respondents, even after controlling for age, gender, 
education and the other surveyed value concepts. This striking effect is found 
in all the countries with the exception of Hungary. The influence of religiosity 
is particularly strong in Great Britain and the Netherlands.25 
25 The data suggests that the influence of religiosity is largely restricted to homophobia and 
sexism, in other words to prejudices that Christianity and other religions do not clearly 
diasapprove of (unlike prejudices anainst black or poor people). Religiosity does indeed 
correlate most strongly with these elements of group-focused enmity (r = .34/.30). But 
even if we measure GFE in the model without homophobia and sexism we still find a 
small positive effect of religiosity (  = .08**). In a departure from our earlier publication 
(Küpper und Zick 2010), here we report the aggregated survey values without adjusting 
for the relative size of the country.
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To summarize, we note that ideological orientation and insecurity play a con-
siderable role for the extent of group-focused enmity. In particular we can 
confirm perceived threat by immigrants, rejection of diversity, Social Domi-
nance Orientation, authoritarianism and religiosity as important determinants 
of group-focused enmity. The stronger these factors are, the more likely re-
spondents are to express prejudices against weak groups. For anomie we find 
a slightly smaller but still significant effect; people who feel disorientated tend 
more strongly to target weak groups. The values of universalism and security 
also play a role for the extent of group-focused enmity, but a small one. Re-
spondents with universalistic values tend somewhat less to prejudice; respond-
ents who particularly prioritize security somewhat more. It is also conspicuous 
that the influence of the factors grouped under ideological orientation, values 
and insecurity is fairly similar in all the countries.
In many theoretical approaches ideological orientation and gen-
eral values are important determinants of prejudice and other 
anti-democratic attitudes. The same applies to general social dis-
orientation and the specific feeling of threat by outgroups. Our 
results show that with the exception of values all these factors 
are relevant for group-focused enmity: Those who feel disorien-
tated or feel threatened by immigrants, reject diversity, gener-
ally support social status hierarchies and/or share authoritarian 
convictions are more likely to express prejudice against weak 
groups. Critically, it should be noted that some of the considered 
concepts – especially perceived threat – are conceptually very 
close to prejudice. We also found that religiosity tends to fos-
ter prejudices rather than protect against them. Whereas values 
that emphasize universalism tend to be associated with less prej-
udice, the opposite applies to values prioritizing security. That 
said, these general values play only a subordinate role for the 
individual strength of group-focused enmity.
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9.4 Economic Disadvantage 
Many influential theories of conflict treat scarcity as a central cause of intergroup 
conflict and prejudice (for example Blalock 1957, LeVine and Campbell 1972, 
Sherif 1966, Olzak 1992). Some of these theories restrict themselves solely to 
limited, lacking or threatened resources such as water, land or income. Others 
emphasize the role of social comparison where hostile attitudes and behaviour 
arise when a person feels worse off in comparison with other individuals (Crosby 
1976) or a group in comparison with other groups (Gurr 1970). The same is pro-
posed for comparisons over time: negative attitudes may arise if a person feels 
they or their group is worse off than in the past, or if they fear becoming worse 
off in future (Redersdorff and Guimond 2006), or believe that their own situa-
tion will worsen in comparison to that of others (Runciman 1966). This feeling 
of disadvantage in comparison to others, to one’s own expectations or to what a 
person believes they are entitled to is described by the term relative deprivation.
These conflict theories also distinguish whether or not a group is explicitly 
named as a real or supposed rival for scarce resources (“foreigners are stealing 
our jobs” versus “there are not enough jobs to go round”). In the case of ma-
terial and economic disadvantage we also distinguish between objective and 
subjective deprivation. Objective deprivation relates to limited, threatened or 
lacking resources that are objectively definable, for example an income that is 
extremely low in absolute terms or below the country’s poverty line. Subjective 
deprivation relates to a person’s own subjective assessment of their financial 
situation and the feeling of being disadvantaged compared to others or to 
their own expectations (Pettigrew et al. 2008). The objective situation and the 
subjective assessment are not always identical. Individuals with a small income 
may not actually feel deprived (for example students) whereas others whose 
income is objectively considerable may see themselves as financially hard done 
by in comparison with richer people (Pettigrew et al. 2008).
Numerous studies have investigated the effect of economic deprivation on pro-
tests, violence and also prejudices. The findings to date underscore above all 
the importance of fraternal relative deprivation for the extent of prejudices: the 
feeling that the ingroup is worse off than an outgroup (Pettigrew et al. 2008). 
In the scope of the Group-focused Enmity in Germany project we were also 
able to demonstrate that where Germans feel relative deprivation in compari-
son with foreigners this not only leads to more prejudice against immigrants, 
but also to more prejudice against other groups too (Zick et al. 2008).
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9.4.1 Indicators of Economic Disadvantage
In the following we first provide a brief overview of individual indicators of eco-
nomic disadvantage. In the text box on “Measuring economic disadvantage” 
(see p. 151/152) we describe precisely how these indicators were recorded in 
the GFE Europe survey. At the end of the section we report the explanatory 
power of the indicators for group-focused enmity.
On the basis of the conflict theories outlined above we test the influence of 
objective and subjective indicators of economic deprivation. As an objective 
criterion we take personal income, here as net equivalent household income 
taking into account household size. For our indicators of subjective economic 
deprivation we asked interviewees to assess their own personal financial situ-
ation and the economic situation of their country. To assess their outlook, we 
asked interviewees how they expected their personal financial situation to 
develop in coming years. We also measured relative deprivation as individual 
relative deprivation (comparing the interviewee’s own financial situation with 
that of most compatriots) and fraternal relative deprivation (comparing the 
financial situation of the receiving population with that of immigrants as a 
group).
Measuring economic disadvantage
Income: First of all interviewees were asked about their income: “If you add 
up the income from all sources, what is your household total net income per 
month? Please stop me when I reach your level of income.” Responses were 
given on a 10-point scale adjusted to the general level of incomes in the 
country. The stated household income was divided by the (weighted) number 
of persons in the household, recorded by the question: “What is the total 
number of people living in your household, including all adults, children and 
yourself?” The net equivalent household income was standardized relative to 
the country average rather than the European average, so that in each country 
we have similar numbers of respondents with high and low incomes regard-
less of the general level of wages.
Subjective assessment of national economy and own financial situation:  
“According to you, is the economy doing very well, quite well, quite badly, very 
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badly”; “And how would you rate your personal financial situation?” Respond-
ents chose again from four response categories ranging from “very good” 
to “very bad”. Shortly before the outbreak of the financial crisis in autumn/
winter 2008 almost 76 percent of all European respondents believed that the 
economic situation in their country was “quite bad” or “very bad”. In France, 
Great Britain, Hungary, Italy and Portugal very many respondents shared this 
opinion, with figures of over 80 percent and in some cases over 90 percent. 
The figure was lower in Poland with 56 percent and least in the Netherlands 
with 40 percent. 42 percent of all European respondents said that their own 
financial situation was “quite bad” or “very bad”, ranging from 65 percent in 
Hungary and 59 percent in Portugal to just under 9 percent in the Netherlands. 
The two assessments correlate only moderately with one another (r = .39).
Financial outlook: “In the course of the next few years, do you expect your 
personal financial situation to improve/stay about the same/get worse?” Al-
most 30 percent of all European respondents said that they feared their own 
financial situation was set to worsen. Worries about the future were most 
widespread in Hungary, Portugal, France and Germany with more than 30 
percent of respondents, followed by Italy with 26 percent, and in Poland, 
Great Britain and the Netherlands with about 20 percent. 
Relative deprivation:  To measure individual relative deprivation we asked: 
“If you compare your personal financial situation with that of most other 
[country natives], would you say that your financial situation is much better, 
better, roughly the same, worse or much worse?” Fraternal relative depriva-
tion was measured using the statement: “If you compare the economic situ-
ation of most [country natives] with that of immigrants living in [country], 
would you say that the situation of [country natives] is much better, better, 
roughly the same, worse or much worse?” About 15 percent of all European 
respondents feel personally disadvantaged, while about 17 percent feel that 
the majority population is worse off than immigrants. In Poland and Hungary 
almost one in four feels worse off in comparison with others in the country, 
in the Netherlands considerably less than one in ten. In Hungary, Portugal 
and Great Britain about one quarter of the established feel disadvantaged in 
comparison with immigrants, but in France and Italy only about 8 percent.
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Table 37: Indicators of subjective economic deprivation and relative deprivation
No. Item D GB F NL I PT PL HU
Subjective economic deprivationa
1 According to you, is the 
economy doing…? (quite/
very badly)
60.5 89.8 84.0 40.0 91.6 92.4 55.6 90.5
2 And how would you rate 
your personal financial  
situation? (quite/very bad)
36.4 30.3 40.3 8.7 48.4 58.9 43.0 64.7
3 In the course of the next 
few years, do you expect 
your personal financial sit-
uation to (improve/stay 
about the same/get worse)? 
(get worse)
30.0 19.5 38.6 18.5 25.6 39.8 20.5 44.1
Relative deprivationb
4 Individual: If you compare 
your personal financial sit-
uation with that of most 
other [country natives], 
would you say that your fi-
nancial situation is better/
roughly the same/worse? 
(worse, much worse) 
12.8 10.7 9.4 6.8 10.8 18.7 26.6 23.8
5 Fraternal: If you compare 
the economic situation 
of most [country natives] 
with that of immigrants liv-
ing in [country], would you 
say that the situation of 
[country natives] is better/
roughly the same/worse? 
(worse, much worse)
16.9 23.3 8.2 12.0 8.4 24.5 14.7 27.8
a The proportion of respondents who answered “quite bad” or “very bad” or who expect their future financial 
situation to get “worse”.
b The proportion of respondents who see their own financial situation or that of their non-immigrant compatriots 
as comparably “worse” or “much worse”.
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9.4.2 Results for Economic Disadvantage 
What influence does economic deprivation have on group-focused enmity? 
Here again, we controlled for the influence of age, gender and education.
Overall the indicators of economic disadvantage do not have any great ex-
planatory power for the extent of group-focused enmity. So whether a person 
feels economically disadvantaged is relatively unimportant for the extent of 
their prejudices. In the individual countries the considered indicators relatively 
uniformly explain only 15 percent of the variance in the GFE scale; only in Italy 
is the explained share somewhat higher with 22 percent. What that means is 
that alongside economic disadvantage numerous other determinants must be 
responsible for group-focused enmity.
However, if we examine the indicators of economic disadvantage individually 
we find a more complex pattern. For the objective indicator of net equiva-
lent household income we do find a negative influence on GFE: the lower 
respondents’ income is, the more likely they are to express prejudices. This 
effect is especially strong in Hungary, Poland and Portugal; in France, Great 
Britain and Italy it is statistically insignificant after the effect of education has 
been removed.
Overall, economic deprivation has only a minor effect on group-focused en-
mity. This applies equally to a negative assessment of the national economic 
situation and to a negative assessment of the respondent’s own economic 
situation. Nevertheless, respondents who have a negative assessment of one 
or the other are somewhat more likely to express prejudices. Examining the 
results for individual countries, the assessment of the country’s economic 
situation is relevant for the extent of prejudices only in Germany, Great Brit-
ain and the Netherlands, and not in the other countries. Conversely, subjec-
tive personal financial situation has a clear effect on group-focused enmity 
in Hungary and Poland, but is irrelevant in Great Britain, the Netherlands and 
Portugal. In Germany and France there is even an opposing trend; the better 
the Germans and French assess their own economic situation the more likely 
they are to express prejudices. However this effect is weak, so it applies to 
relatively few respondents.
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Figure 30: Aspects of economic disadvantage as determinants of GFE  
in Europe
Regression analysis. Total explanation of variance: R² = .15 (excluding control variables age, education, 
gender); in the individual countries: D: R² = .14, GB: R² = .15, F: R² = .14, NL: R² = .15, I: R² = .14, 
PT: R² = .18, PL: R² = .22, HU: R² = .12. The higher the beta value, the stronger the variable’s impact. 
Strongest predictors are highlighted grey.
* Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level; ns = non-significant.
In overall terms how respondents assess their future financial situation is ab-
solutely irrelevant for the extent of group-focused enmity. The influence of 
future personal finances is statistically insignificant for Europe as a whole, but 
there are differences between the countries. In Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Portugal there is no effect, whereas in France, Hungary and Poland we 
find a slight effect in the expected direction: the more pessimistic respondents 
are about their own financial prospects, the more likely they are to express 
prejudices. In Great Britain there is a significant unexpected effect in the op-
posite direction: the more optimistically the British see their financial future, 
the stronger their prejudices. In Hungary and Poland a negative assessment of 
either current or future personal financial situation is associated with greater 
prejudice.
Fraternal relative deprivation on the other hand is of considerable relevance for 
GFE. The more strongly respondents in Europe feel disadvantaged compared 
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with immigrants, the more likely they are to express prejudices. Here striking ef-
fects are observed especially in France, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands, 
while in Hungary and Poland fraternal relative deprivation has no significant 
effect on the extent of prejudices. The effect of individual relative deprivation 
on group-focused enmity is considerably smaller. Overall the effect is weak; 
only in Germany is it somewhat stronger.
To sum up we can say that economic disadvantage overall plays a comparatively 
small role for the extent of group-focused enmity. Where negative effects on 
group-focused enmity are found they are for income and for the feeling of 
being worse off than immigrants as a group. Interestingly, in Germany, Great 
Britain and the Netherlands we find a slight tendency in the opposite direction, 
where the better respondents assess the economic situation of their country 
the stronger their prejudices against weak groups.
With respect to income we feel it is also relevant to add the following: In an 
alternative calculation (Küpper, Zick and Wolf 2010) we also included the feel-
ing of threat by immigrants (discussed here in chapter 9.3) along with the in-
dicators of economic disadvantage used here in the analysis. This completely 
removed any effect of income on group-focused enmity. That would suggest 
that low income contributes to prejudice against weak groups above all when 
they are perceived as a threat.
Many conflict theories treat economic deprivation as a central 
cause of group conflicts from hostile attitudes to violent clashes. 
Our empirical analyses indicate that the explanatory power of 
economic factors is relatively limited and suggest that the form 
of deprivation matters. Two factors are relevant for the extent of 
group-focused enmity: income and the feeling that the ingroup 
is disadvantaged. Those who have an objectively low income are 
more likely to express prejudiced attitudes against weak groups, 
but this effect is found only in the poorer countries of Portugal, 
Poland and Hungary. Similarly those who feel that the majority 
population is disadvantaged in comparison with immigrants are 
also more likely to express prejudices. This factor is most relevant 
in countries with larger immigrant populations, and not at all in 
Poland and Hungary (where the feeling of individual disadvan-
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tage in comparison with others contributes most to prejudice). 
Financial worries about the future are completely irrelevant for 
the extent of group-focused enmity, and subjective assessments 
of the personal financial situation and the national economy play 
only a small role. However it is striking that in the more prosper-
ous countries of Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands an 
opposite tendency is found: those who are more positive about 
the country’s economic situation tend to be more hostile towards 
immigrants.
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10.  Summary and Outlook
The state of a society or community is revealed above all by the quality of re-
lations between its members. The question of integration is decisive for the 
countries of Europe, affecting not only immigrants, but also other groups in-
cluding Muslims, Jews, dark-skinned people, women and homosexuals. For 
the European Union and its member states, protecting the identity of groups 
and enabling them to participate in the life of society are central precondi-
tions for cohesion.
Social relations and their expression in democratic communities depend deci-
sively on the level of equality between the various groups to which the mem-
bers of society belong. This criterion of equality is anchored in Article 2 of the 
Treaty on European Union:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail.
Equality of groups is the ultimate barometer for the state of democracy. Recog-
nizing equality means appreciating cultural diversity and difference and apply-
ing the same standards to all groups without distinction. The member states of 
the EU unanimously commit themselves to this in the EU treaties, but realizing 
this promise in everyday life is not easy and by no means automatic. Societies 
– at least the kind represented by the countries of Europe – are not just legal 
entities or top-down formations. They are composed of living groups pursuing 
and negotiating particular interests, values, norms and ideologies. Even where 
equality is enacted in law and protected as a democratic norm, it means noth-
ing unless it is negotiated, accepted, internalized and lived by the different 
social groups. Democracy and equality do not emerge automatically simply by 
defining rules; they are the outcome of negotiating processes. Precisely for that 
reason they are always endangered and threatened, vulnerable to the whims 
of power and influence. In social and political relations, social groups distin-
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guish themselves from one another to secure identities, create relationships 
and cohesion, preserve power and control and express trust between members.
Article 2 of the EU Treaty implies that intolerance, social prejudices and dis-
crimination are serious threats to social cohesion and community. Prejudices 
that feed on a shared ideology of inequality inscribe especially deep signa-
tures, for their destructive power is paired with an ability to create bonds and 
order. Group-focused enmity is a central instrument of identity-creation and 
separation. It legitimizes inequality by discrediting certain groups through 
generalized negative opinions and prepares the ground for the discrimination 
that creates and maintains group differences. Group-focused enmity is based 
on similar social motives to the concert of right-wing extremist and populist 
ideologies in which it plays a part. As components of group-focused enmity, 
prejudices are capable of creating self-esteem, trust and identity, establishing 
bonds, serving motives of power and control and “explaining” apparently 
complex social processes. In this respect the effect of prejudices is simple and 
effective, especially where they are not restrained or suppressed by norms. 
Anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism, homo-
phobia and even racism are supported or at least tolerated in many sectors 
of the population.
Prejudices are the lifeblood of right-wing populism and extremism, both of 
which threaten social cohesion and peaceful coexistence in the European Un-
ion. Populists channel prejudice into calls for exclusion, while right-wing ex-
tremists take their prejudices further and often propagate ideologies of vio-
lence against those seen as “foreign” or “different”. Populism barks, but 
extremism bites. Both currents draw on and create prejudices.
These developments can be observed in all the countries of the European Un-
ion. Where it succeeds in concealing its violent leanings, right-wing populism 
makes relatively successful use of prejudices by playing on people’s existing 
concerns and fears. Populism seeks to draw in people whose need for belong-
ing, self-esteem, trust, control and understanding can no longer be satisfied by 
politics, parties and mainstream institutions, using prejudices that apparently 
satisfy these needs. We currently see this happening most of all in extremist 
(and mainstream) discourses that inflame and stoke anti-Muslim attitudes and 
thus allow the Union to slide to the right. As our data shows, this mechanism 
also possesses traction in relation to other facets of group-focused enmity, such 
as anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, racism, sexism and homophobia.
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Prejudices against the different target groups of group-focused enmity are 
linked to one another and share a common core that we identify as an ideology 
of inequality. This group-related generalized hostility endangers democracy and 
inscribes its signatures into conflicts and violence. If prejudices – often traded 
as fact – are accepted rather than combated in the European Union intolerance 
is likely to increase. The extent of prejudice in a society is therefore an indicator 
not only of extremism, but also of the failure of established democratic forces.
The present study uncovers one excerpt of this extreme reality. Although only 
a small section of a much broader picture, it is an important one in the his-
tory of European mentality and democratic consciousness. The study docu-
ments some of the groups targeted by prejudice, the form these prejudices 
take, who espouses them, and where in Europe they are most widespread. In 
other words, it supplies us with a picture of the extent of prejudice in selected 
European countries.
In conclusion we would like to reiterate the central aspects of inequality un-
covered by our data and highlight empirical observations of significance for 
the political debate. Our efforts to initiate a discussion about prejudiced and 
extreme right-wing ideologies that transcends the national borders of Europe 
are guided by two central questions: Where does inequality lurk in the major-
ity societies of Europe? And what strategies and measures are appropriate for 
tackling it?
10.1 Inequalities
If we review the most important findings of the study, we can identify groups 
and contexts that pose a particular danger to democracy. We review these be-
low, and consider what questions they provoke for future European discussion.
First of all, we must note that the developments we observe in the investigated 
countries are the same ones we have already been observing for some time in 
Germany. With respect to the norm of equality, the social centre is eroding in 
the surveyed countries. In all the countries concerned, group-focused enmity 
is not just a problem of the margins; it extends far into the centre. Even after 
many years of immigration, generalized negative opinions about immigrants 
and “people from migrant communities” are very widespread in Europe. De-
spite the long history of immigration and the objectively small immigrant popu-
lation the idea that “we” are being “swamped” still has a great deal of sup-
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port. Willingness to exclude immigrants is strong, as expressed especially in a 
tendency to support immigration restrictions. This applies least to the Dutch 
respondents, and also in Italy the atmosphere – at least as reflected in individual 
attitudes towards immigration – is better than in other countries. Nonetheless, 
in all the surveyed countries many people are open to mobilization in favour of 
discrimination and immigration restrictions, despite migration and coexistence 
with immigrants being a fact of European life.
Europe must ask why successful everyday coexistence has so far had so little 
impact on attitudes towards immigrants? Why has the possibility of intercul-
tural contact not been enough to erode persistent prejudice?
Populists and extremists see the answer to these questions in the migrants’ 
own unwillingness to integrate (implying to assimilate). But this one-sided 
opinion fails to recognize that intercultural relations depend on the will and 
possibilities of all involved. The distance inherent in such emotionally charged 
attitudes is large. But integration is a mutual process that depends not only 
on the attitudes and behaviour of immigrants but also on the acceptance and 
participation of the majority society (Zick 2010a). Where the majority society 
fails to recognize the minority’s achievements and willingness to integrate, the 
results are fatal. So it is worrying that the majority society in Europe, to judge by 
the attitudes we have uncovered, exhibits great distance and little recognition.
As far as anti-Muslim attitudes are concerned, the boundaries between coun-
tries and cultures blur: this prejudice is more or less evenly distributed across 
Europe. The findings presented here and in other studies reveal an astonish-
ing extent of distance, suspicion and mistrust towards Muslims and Islam in 
Europe. The generalized suspicion against Islam that fosters prejudice cannot 
be explained by the numbers of Muslims. Anti-Muslim attitudes exist without 
Muslims. In fact, also in the eastern European countries, where the number 
of Muslims is negligible, prejudice against Muslims is quite prevalent. That is 
the power of prejudice: it exists even in the absence of contact with the group 
against which it is directed. Especially where information about the group is 
rejected and contact avoided, there is no real experience that could refute the 
prejudice. 
That is not itself new, but for Europe another hefty problem looms over future 
relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Our data shows with incontest-
able clarity that religious difference – the accusation that Islam is a religion of 
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intolerance – is exceedingly prevalent. A large majority, especially in Germany 
and Poland, also believe that Islam is incompatible with their own culture.
The example of anti-Muslim attitudes demonstrates very well how prejudice 
can be politically charged and seeded. As our anti-Muslim attitudes scale 
shows, prejudice against Islam and Muslims is made up of individual opinions 
that mutually confirm and justify each other. On their own, each of the items 
we presented to interviewees might not even appear to represent proper prej-
udice (see chapter 4.4); for example the statement that “Muslims’ attitudes 
towards women contradict our values”, with which very many people in all 
the countries agree. But respondents frequently associate other negative and 
prejudiced opinions about Islam with the individual statements, and these to-
gether distil into prejudice. Tracing the dynamics of the process that entwines 
individual statements into prejudice will require further qualitative analyses and 
the application of other methods. All the same, the opinion scales by which 
we observe attitudes point to consistent and uniform anti-Islamic and anti-
Muslim constellations.
Anti-Semitism has a long and uniquely terrible history in Europe. The Ger-
man surveys that we have been conducting at regular intervals since 2002, 
as well as studies in other European countries that have a different history of 
anti-Semitism, demonstrate that anti-Semitism is an important component of 
group-focused enmity. It is particularly conspicuous in the eastern European 
countries. In all European countries a shift appears to have occurred from tra-
ditional anti-Semitism to secondary anti-Semitism. In Germany, Italy and the 
eastern European countries a reversal of perpetrator and victim is observed 
alarmingly frequently; many respondents agree with the accusation that “Jews 
try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era”. The data 
also shows anti-Semitism often appearing in the guise of criticism of Israel. 
Anti-Semitic criticism of Israel comes close to majority support in all European 
countries. If this observation is any measure of Europeans’ attitudes to Israel, 
then we must conclude that perceptions of Israel are coloured by anti-Semi-
tism. In that context we also need to discuss whether secondary anti-Semitism 
– refusal to acknowledge the crimes of the holocaust – has taken the place of 
traditional anti-Semitism.
Our findings also identify two elements that are less controversially discussed 
these days as empirical components of the group-focused enmity syndrome. 
Here we are talking about sexism and old-fashioned racism. The study shows 
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that a form of old-fashioned sexism involving support for traditional role divi-
sions continues to enjoy widespread support in Europe. The question of the 
dissemination of modern forms of sexism remains unanswered. This applies 
for example to the strong emphasis on individual freedom, which overlooks 
the impact of discriminatory norms and structures. 
Blatant biological racism, as manifested in the rejection of marriage between 
black and white people, is less widespread in Europe. But the cultural version of 
racism, for example claiming that particular cultures are less talented, is alarm-
ingly widespread. Surprisingly many people also believe in a natural hierarchy 
between black people and white, especially in eastern Europe. A majority in 
Portugal and almost a majority in Poland believe that their culture must be 
protected from the influence of other cultures. This attitude, which covertly 
claims cultural superiority for the nation, has the potential to cause grave dif-
ficulties and slow the development of a multicultural Europe. Our analysis of 
racism shows that citizens are exceptionally reticent about accepting other and 
supposedly “foreign” cultures.
Prejudice against homosexuals (homophobia) runs counter to equality too. 
Prejudices against homosexuals, characterized by a charge of immorality and 
an intention to discriminate, are widespread, especially in eastern Europe. This 
is less the case in western Europe, possibly because the fight against anti-ho-
mosexual opinions has a longer history. The data suggests that the attitudes 
found in eastern Europe today resemble those that existed in western Europe 
a few years ago.
Our findings show a strong East-West difference in the general prejudice syn-
drome measured by the GFE Index. Although in the countries of eastern Europe 
the individual elements are less strongly connected to one another than they 
are in western Europe, we can still demonstrate a linked syndrome of group-
focused enmity there. In the countries of eastern Europe the overall strength 
of group-focused enmity is greater than in western Europe. Despite differences 
in the degree of prejudice against specific minorities, the composition of the 
syndrome is similar across the board.
The prejudices studied here, which we understand as components of the group-
focused enmity syndrome, are but one facet of intolerant and anti-democratic 
mentalities. Prejudice is a tool that creates and cements inequality. Group-fo-
cused enmity is also closely bound up with other ideologies. Our cross-cultural 
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analyses show that people with a specific triangular ideology pattern are espe-
cially susceptible to prejudiced attitudes. Europeans who reject cultural, religious 
and ethnic diversity and have higher Social Dominance Orientation (meaning 
that they fundamentally support social hierarchies in society and thus espouse 
an ideology of inequality) are especially likely to agree with prejudiced state-
ments. The same applies to Europeans with an authoritarian orientation (who 
call for submissiveness and obedience to authority and lean towards punitive 
law-and-order). It is this triangular ideological formation of authoritarianism, 
Social Dominance Orientation and rejection of diversity that in all the coun-
tries predisposes respondents to prejudice. Punitive, authoritarian opinions find 
great agreement in all the surveyed countries, and Social Dominance Orienta-
tion is also relatively widespread, but where support for cultural homogeneity 
is concerned we find great differences between the countries. The study clearly 
shows that reducing such ideological convictions, or creating a climate that is 
inconducive to authoritarian and dominance-oriented views and accepting of 
cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, can protect against unthinking agreement 
with prejudices. That is an important pointer for intervention and prevention. 
Our demographic analyses indicate which groups prevention and intervention 
measures most need to reach: older people, people with less education, peo-
ple in eastern European countries, people with low economic status and peo-
ple with a politically conservative orientation. The analyses show that group-
focused enmity and the triangular ideology pattern that promotes it are thus 
not a marginal phenomenon but an issue at the centre of European society.
According to our findings the centre is interested in politics but not necessarily 
active and feels very powerless politically. If we refer to the surveyed attitudes 
to politics, and regard them cautiously as an indicator of democratic potential, 
we find a worrying relationship. The extent of subjective lack of influence on 
politics is very great across all the countries. The indicators of lack of politi-
cal participation, whether as perception or as intention to become involved, 
correlate with group-focused enmity in almost all the countries. This is also 
associated with negative attitudes to the European Union, a lack of political 
interest, a feeling of powerlessness and the desire for a strong national leader. 
These relationships are potentially important for political discourse and inte-
gration in the political sphere. They reflect the way group-focused enmity can 
express a political stance or disinterest (or positive ignorance) that it is associ-
ated with the subjective feeling of lack of participation and with detachment 
from the established political system. The latter especially hampers efforts to 
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enhance equality, because right-wing populist and extremist groups are able 
to appeal to political dissatisfaction as well as prejudice. In other words, if 
citizens’ political orientations can no longer be integrated within the political 
system (or citizens no longer find a place in the established political system for 
their orientations) then not only is prejudice close at hand, as the correlations 
show, but also openness to extremist political groups. That at least is our fear.
This cutting of political ties, which is only hinted at in the data and requires 
more thorough research, is reflected in attitudes towards integration and un-
willingness to grant concessions on naturalization. A survey of the kind con-
ducted here is unsuited to measuring actual political activity, and is restricted 
to empirically recording (behavioural) intentions towards groups and systems. 
Rejection of rights for immigrants and its relationship to anti-immigrant atti-
tudes and anti-Muslim attitudes suggest, however, that attitudes can also lead 
to political intentions.
This is supported by the strongly attitude-based discriminatory intentions that 
are particularly conspicuous in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands. 
Even if prejudiced attitudes are less prevalent in these countries than in eastern 
Europe, many people there would prefer not to send their child to a school 
attended by many immigrant children or move to an area where many immi-
grants live. It is difficult to avoid the impression that group-focused enmity in 
certain western European countries expresses itself less in open hostile preju-
dice and more in social distancing. That shows how strongly these sentiments 
are rooted in the centre of European society.
10.2 Analysis, Prevention and Intervention
Although this is not a prevention or intervention study, it does identify relevant 
aspects with implications for action against intolerance and extreme right-wing 
ideologies. In particular, it allows the political discourse about desirable pre-
vention and intervention measures to be conducted with greater clarity and 
based on scientific evidence. In the following we would like to raise a number 
of aspects that we consider relevant to the discussion. Ideally they would be 
taken up by political parties and institutions strong enough to establish norms 
against prejudice.
First of all we appeal emphatically for the European Union to commission 
continuous scientifically independent monitoring of right-wing extremist and 
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populist opinions and intentions across Europe. The existing institutions and in-
struments conducting monitoring are unable to supply precise and comparable 
data. If we are to gain a proper basis for discussion and action we will require 
considerably more facts about where, how and why ideologies, opinions and 
intentions develop and consolidate in the countries of Europe.
Our results paint a picture of the existence of prejudices, but also document the 
concerns and fears of European majority populations. Populists are always de-
manding that the fears of the populace be taken seriously (by which they mean 
exclusion, discrimination and harsh measures against minorities). To take these 
fears and concerns seriously means acknowledging the threat they pose to a de-
mocracy built on tolerance and pluralism. They must be tackled by reducing mu-
tual fears and suspicions rather than demanding stricter laws against minorities. 
Here we need European initiatives for intervention and prevention rather than a 
simple law-and-order populism that adheres to the power of blind obedience. A 
precise analysis of citizens’ fears reveals the potential and danger of intolerance in 
Europe and shows where coexistence of majorities and minorities can be improved. 
It would appear to us that neither the European Social Survey nor the Euro-
barometer is equipped for the task, because their ability to reveal prejudiced 
tendencies and their causes and consequences is limited. That is not their pri-
mary purpose anyway. Nor can our study provide anything more than the basis 
for a monitoring operation. Politics needs facts and evidence as the basis for 
action, and political responses should be based on singular evidence that is 
not methodologically comparable across countries. We already have broadly 
comparable data concerning crimes and acts of discrimination (for example 
from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights). What is needed 
is clarity about the prejudiced opinions, emotions, intentions and norms that 
encourage such acts. These opinions are also what moves people to give their 
vote to right-wing populist and extremist parties.
Secondly we appeal to those involved in intervention and prevention to take 
the facts seriously. Politicians in particular must urgently translate these into 
social practice. Since the surveyed European countries share many identical 
causes for prejudiced attitudes it would be obvious to take joint European ac-
tion to combat group-focused enmity. Fundamentally we can distinguish be-
tween two groups of causes: individual causes which bind people to groups 
and describe an individual collective disposition, and contextual causes located 
in circumstances outside the individual.
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The individual causes include the aforementioned triangular ideology of au-
thoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and rejection of cultural diversity. 
People whose socialization leads them to adopt these convictions are more 
likely to take on board right-wing extremist and populist opinions. We observe 
this in almost all the European countries. This can be the point of departure for 
joint efforts to establish attitudes that are positive about equality. In order to 
promote equality we need more acceptance of cultural difference (rather than 
rejection of multiculturalism), less authoritarian attitudes and behaviour and 
more support for horizontal rather than vertical structures in society. A country 
where a majority of citizens challenge cultural diversity may be able to learn 
from others where this works better. And they in turn could ask themselves 
how they could better communicate their belief in diversity.
Although we still lack adequate data on the influence of the macro-social 
context, the present study has been able to identify certain contextual factors 
that apparently favour prejudiced attitudes. According to our findings, the 
main contextual conditions that make people susceptible to prejudiced opin-
ions are a low level of education, low income in a low-income region and a 
culture where prejudices as a whole are more widespread (as is partly the case 
in eastern Europe).
Individual disposition, opinions and emotions are less decisive for prejudice as 
a whole. Prejudice is a social stance adopted by groups towards other groups. 
It is influenced by the environment of prejudice-bearers out of which these so-
cially shaped negative opinions about groups emerge. This is also supported by 
the potentials and dangers we identify in the political orientation of respond-
ents. So European political education is of great importance. According to our 
findings, citizens are not politically disinterested but feel subjectively detached 
from the political system. Many complain of a sense of political powerlessness, 
frequently associated with fears and worries about issues including immigra-
tion. The dissatisfied seek a hearing, but they are unlikely to find it in the es-
tablished political system that they blame for their powerlessness.
Gains made by right-wing populism show that citizens no longer direct their 
ire against the established political system, but blame immigrants, Muslims 
and other minorities. Political detachment melds with prejudice to create an 
ideological mixture that is poison for democracy. It comes as no surprise that 
European identity alone is not enough to prevent hostile discriminatory inten-
tions. Europeans’ great pessimism about the prospects for intercultural coex-
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istence will hamper efforts to integrate all citizens in individual countries and 
across the European Union.
Our results demonstrate the importance of intervention and prevention strate-
gies for combating group-focused enmity directed against “the others”. Ques-
tions of democratic process in groups should be taken seriously, calls for po-
litical participation need to be acknowledged and considered in the political 
discourse. However, in all cases, the process of social negotiation must be 
conditional on tolerance and the acceptance of diversity – if necessary with 
explicit reminders.
Our concluding appeal is to make equality a central topos in Europe. We will 
continue to do our part, monitoring and analysing the development of preju-
diced, intolerant and anti-democratic mentalities in Europe to identify where 
political education can have most impact. Studies such this one hold up a mir-
ror to us Europeans, showing us as we really are with respect to prejudice and 
exclusion of groups. We hope that what we see there will spur efforts to build 
a more democratic and tolerant Europe.
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Anti-immigrant attitudes
There are too many immigrants in [country].
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 20.7 16.3 29.8 30.8 26.6 14.8 8.3 4.9
3 = somewhat agree 29.3 24.0 32.4 27.9 35.8 31.2 18.8 54.7
2 = somewhat disagree 35.5 34.6 22.7 27.9 19.7 35.5 52.1 35.7
1 = strongly disagree 14.4 25.2 15.1 13.4 17.8 18.5 20.8 4.7
N (weighted dataset) 971 996 976 903 942 1003 912 968
Because of the number of immigrants, I sometimes feel like a stranger in [country].
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 15.2 16.1 18.9 18.4 9.8 12.4 5.4 1.8
3 = somewhat agree 22.4 14.8 26.9 26.2 17.2 25.3 14.1 17.3
2 = somewhat disagree 39.1 29.0 26.2 26.7 28.8 34.6 45.0 66.2
1 = strongly disagree 23.3 40.1 27.9 28.6 44.2 27.7 35.5 14.7
N (weighted dataset) 991 1003 993 950 995 1005 934 981
When jobs are scarce, [country natives] should have more rights to a job than 
immigrants.
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 20.5 13.2 23.4 50.4 31.0 7.0 44.5 11.4
3 = somewhat agree 21.9 16.3 26.9 20.7 25.0 17.7 29.5 46.8
2 = somewhat disagree 37.2 26.6 32.7 16.5 23.6 39.9 17.8 37.9
1 = strongly disagree 20.5 43.9 17.0 12.3 20.5 35.5 8.1 4.0
N (weighted dataset) 985 992 978 972 958 998 991 973
Immigrants enrich our culture. [reverse coded]
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
1 = strongly agree 26.7 26.9 21.7 21.0 15.3 20.2 14.8 7.4
2 = somewhat agree 48.3 44.0 49.5 36.0 45.7 54.6 49.4 66.3
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Anti-immigrant attitudes
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
3 = somewhat disagree 20.5 21.2 20.0 24.8 23.7 18.6 26.8 24.9
4 = strongly disagree 4.5 8.0 8.8 18.2 15.3 6.5 9.0 1.4
N (weighted dataset) 994 997 977 928 961 1005 936 971
Racism
There is a natural hierarchy between black and white people.  
[F: There is no natural hierarchy between black and white people.] [reverse coded]
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 9.5 40.0 8.3 19.9 5.6 4.4 9.0 3.9
3 = somewhat agree 21.0 21.5 26.3 21.9 13.1 28.0 32.6 41.1
2 = somewhat disagree 27.9 19.6 27.3 33.2 16.1 22.5 33.1 43.9
1 = strongly disagree 41.6 19.0 38.1 25.0 65.2 45.1 25.3 11.1
N (weighted dataset) 983 987 966 872 970 998 936 959
Preferably blacks and whites should not get married.  
[F: It’s no problem if blacks and whites get married.] [reverse coded]
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 6.5 68.1 4.5 16.6 3.4 .8 8.0 2.0
3 = somewhat agree 7.0 18.3 6.1 13.7 4.1 3.9 15.5 15.9
2 = somewhat disagree 26.9 7.6 19.3 24.4 16.8 19.4 35.1 57.6
1 = strongly disagree 59.6 6.0 70.1 45.3 75.7 75.9 41.3 24.4
N (weighted dataset) 977 1001 991 895 961 1008 941 982
Anti-Semitism
Jews have too much influence in [country].
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 9.9 11.6 3.6 43.2 3.4 1.4 20.3 1.0
3 = somewhat agree 9.7 16.1 10.3 26.0 17.8 4.2 29.6 18.9
2 = somewhat disagree 56.7 43.1 54.1 18.5 42.3 56.2 38.0 74.8
1 = strongly disagree 23.6 29.1 32.0 12.2 36.4 38.2 12.1 5.3
N (weighted dataset) 929 942 912 778 783 960 883 767
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Racism
Jews in general do not care about anything or anyone but their own kind.
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 11.0 10.7 5.8 27.3 8.9 5.1 22.0 4.8
3 = somewhat agree 18.4 15.1 16.7 23.7 18.1 15.4 34.9 49.4
2 = somewhat disagree 46.0 33.8 34.7 26.0 31.2 43.3 31.2 41.7
1 = strongly disagree 24.6 40.4 42.9 23.1 41.9 36.2 11.9 4.1
N (weighted dataset) 912 938 935 808 826 959 867 820
Jews enrich our culture. [reverse coded]
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
1 = strongly agree 23.9 19.6 19.5 25.5 14.3 15.7 14.7 3.8
2 = somewhat agree 45.0 41.0 52.0 31.7 35.4 56.1 36.5 48.1
3 = somewhat disagree 25.1 25.3 24.5 21.7 29.1 22.7 34.2 44.3
4 = strongly disagree 6.1 14.1 4.0 21.0 21.2 5.5 14.6 3.8
N (weighted dataset) 951 958 926 821 783 963 919 819
Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era.
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 22.9 13.4 5.4 39.1 9.4 3.9 30.2 4.9
3 = somewhat agree 26.0 19.0 16.4 28.9 30.8 13.4 42.0 47.2
2 = somewhat disagree 32.3 38.4 39.4 17.2 24.0 41.2 22.7 43.9
1 = strongly disagree 18.8 29.2 38.8 14.7 35.8 41.6 5.1 3.9
N (weighted dataset) 969 948 948 779 883 986 922 836
Anti-Muslim attitudes
The Muslim culture fits well into [country/Europe]. [PL and HU: Europe]
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 3.3 11.7 5.9 8.3 3.0 3.7 2.4 4.7
3 = somewhat agree 13.3 38.2 33.1 21.9 24.4 35.0 16.6 45.4
2 = somewhat disagree 60.0 38.7 39.3 28.3 47.5 41.5 56.9 43.6
1 = strongly disagree 23.3 11.5 21.7 41.5 25.0 19.8 24.1 6.3
N (weighted dataset) 964 949 929 767 877 979 882 819
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Anti-Muslim attitudes
There are too many Muslims in [country/Europe]. [PL and HU: Europe]
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 18.4 17.2 20.5 28.0 20.5 13.3 17.6 2.5
3 = somewhat agree 27.6 19.0 24.2 32.7 29.2 28.3 29.5 24.6
2 = somewhat disagree 43.5 37.2 36.1 24.2 30.5 39.1 46.5 66.8
1 = strongly disagree 10.4 26.6 19.2 15.1 19.8 19.3 6.4 6.1
N (weighted dataset) 923 917 910 516 792 966 736 706
Muslims are too demanding.
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 24.9 26.2 20.2 29.2 28.2 18.0 22.6 1.1
3 = somewhat agree 29.2 26.6 29.8 30.8 36.5 33.8 39.7 33.3
2 = somewhat disagree 38.6 33.2 34.8 21.3 19.7 37.5 31.3 59.2
1 = strongly disagree 7.3 13.9 15.2 18.7 15.6 10.7 6.4 6.3
N (weighted dataset) 912 920 925 599 879 974 762 748
Homophobia
There is nothing immoral about homosexuality. [reverse coded]
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
1 = strongly agree 39.3 41.1 36.4 15.6 28.1 53.2 11.2 7.3
2 = somewhat agree 22.6 22.8 26.4 16.7 29.4 30.3 13.0 48.6
3 = somewhat disagree 23.0 18.7 16.9 19.7 19.9 9.7 26.3 33.5
4 = strongly disagree 15.0 17.5 20.4 48.0 22.7 6.8 49.4 10.5
N (weighted dataset) 971 992 977 876 914 994 945 933
It is a good thing to allow marriages between two men or two women. [reverse coded]
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
1 = strongly agree 34.5 24.4 27.4 13.9 16.0 51.5 2.6 5.1
2 = somewhat agree 25.8 23.3 30.4 16.8 19.8 31.6 9.2 32.5
3 = somewhat disagree 19.1 20.8 13.9 14.0 15.5 7.5 26.0 36.4
4 = strongly disagree 20.7 31.5 28.2 55.3 48.7 9.4 62.2 26.0
N (weighted dataset) 986 1002 976 911 965 998 973 940
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Sexism
Women should take their role as wives and mothers more seriously.
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 22.0 31.3 18.7 69.2 31.8 12.8 57.6 15.6
3 = somewhat agree 30.7 25.7 34.5 19.2 31.4 23.6 29.6 52.3
2 = somewhat disagree 25.8 21.7 20.4 6.1 15.1 25.6 7.6 26.0
1 = strongly disagree 21.5 21.2 26.4 5.5 21.7 38.0 5.2 6.2
N (weighted dataset) 989 1002 977 943 980 998 981 979
When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women.
D F GB HU I NL PL PT
4 = strongly agree 5.7 7.3 7.0 22.1 8.2 5.8 14.7 4.7
3 = somewhat agree 6.3 5.7 8.0 13.9 12.8 9.1 14.0 20.5
2 = somewhat disagree 30.8 21.0 19.4 23.8 19.1 22.8 36.2 52.0
1 = strongly disagree 57.2 66.1 65.7 40.2 59.9 62.3 35.1 22.8
N (weighted dataset) 992 1001 992 969 983 1011 972 1001
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Glossary
Beta coefficient: Indicates the share of explained variance, i.e. the relative 
influence of one particular influencing factor on a variable (such as prejudice) 
in comparison to the other measured influencing factors (see variance analysis). 
For example, the beta coefficients tell us whether the prejudice varies between 
respondents more in connection with the strength of authoritarianism or more 
with Social Dominance Orientation.
CATI Survey:   For a Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (unlike a Com-
puter Assisted Personal Interview; CAPI), the interviewer does not meet the 
interviewee in person, which saves time and money. The results are available 
immediately in digital form.
Correlation:  A measure of the closeness of the linear relationship between 
two constructs or factors (variables). A correlation has a value between -1 and 
+1, where 0 means no relationship, -1 a perfect negative relationship and +1 
a perfect positive relationship. Concretely, a positive relationship between A 
and B means that as the value of variable A increases so the value of variable 
B. Conversely, a negative correlation means that as the value of variable A in-
creases the value of variable B decreases. If two factors do not correlate there 
is no relationship between them. A correlation must be statistically significant. 
Interpretation is restricted to the existence of a relationship and allows no con-
clusions to be made about causality.
Cronbach’s alpha:  See “Reliability”.
Explained variance R²:  This value indicates what percentage of the variance 
in an investigated phenomenon (e.g. prejudice) is explained by a particular fac-
tor (independent variable, e.g. authoritarianism).
Factor analysis:  Factor analysis reduces dimensions to discover structures; 
put simply it is an attempt to form factors by grouping several items together. 
For example, from the six elements of the GFE syndrome (anti-immigrant atti-
tudes, anti-Semitism, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism, homophobia) we 
attempted to find a shared factor that expresses the GFE syndrome (corre-
sponding with the “shared part” of the six elements. An eigenvalue and an 
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explained variance value indicate what proportion of total variance is explained 
by a factor. In our example the GFE syndrome is understood as the cause for 
the arising connections of the six elements.
GFE Project:  A long-term survey on group-focused enmity in Germany initi-
ated in 2002, which gave rise to the GFE Europe project (Group-Focused Enmity 
in Europe) documented here. For further details see 
http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/gmf/einfuehrung.html.
Gini index:  The Gini index or Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of distribu-
tion. It is used primarily as an indicator of income or wealth distribution within 
countries (economic inequality). The value of the index ranges from 0 (income/
wealth equally distributed among all citizens) to 1 (one citizen receives all in-
come or wealth). So the closer the Gini index is to 1 the greater the inequality.
Item:  An item is the smallest unit in a questionnaire, an individual statement, 
question or task. In our case these were statements to which responses were 
given on a scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”.
Post-hoc test:  General term for tests conducted after omnibus tests over 
several groups (e.g. variance analysis) have confirmed significance. Post-hoc 
tests are used above all to explore data and when no hypotheses were formu-
lated before a general test. Post-hoc tests may only be conducted when the 
preceding general test has confirmed significance, because the general test 
examines all the groups at the same time and therefore has greater overall 
validity. In this study we used Duncan’s post-hoc test because it focuses on 
individual error probability. 
Regression analysis:  Regression analysis predicts one factor (variable) in 
terms of another. Here one factor is chosen as the independent variable that 
influences another factor (the dependent variable). This method shows what 
kind of influence one factor has on another and how strong the relationship 
is. In contrast to correlations, regression analysis is often interpreted causally 
by assuming the independent variable (e.g. age) to be causal for the depend-
ent variable (e.g. prejudice). Strictly speaking, regression analysis performed 
on cross-sectional data cannot demonstrate causality.  
Reliability:  Reliability indicates the internal consistency of two or more items, 
i.e. whether all items measure the same construct. Cronbach’s  (alpha) is the 
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standard method for estimating the reliability of a scale. The standard conven-
tion is that values < .50 indicate inadequate reliability, values > .50 adequate 
reliability. The coefficient also depends on the number of items, because the 
use of more items leads to a higher value regardless of the fit of the scale.
Significance/statistically significant:  Even if there is a difference between 
the means of two groups, the difference is not necessarily statistically signifi-
cant. We must always test whether they could have arisen through coincidence 
by investigating the probability that the difference in values is indeed caused 
by real differences between the two groups. Here we calculate the probability 
that these differences are actually random (which would mean that the differ-
ence was falsely interpreted as significant). For a difference to be classified as 
statistically significant the error probability must be less than 5 percent. Error 
probability is also indicated in decimal figures. The usual thresholds are less 
than 5 percent (p < .05), less than 1 percent (p < .01) or less than 0.1 percent 
(p < .001). Different test methods are used to calculate statistical significance 
depending on the type of difference (for example a difference between means 
or between frequencies).
Variance:  Variance is calculated as the sum of the squared deviation of all 
individual measured values from the mean divided by the number of measured 
values. Generally a particular group of respondents is described in terms of 
their mean, for example the mean strength of prejudice in one country or age 
group. This mean will describe the group more or less well depending on how 
strongly the individual values differ from the mean. The average deviation of 
individual values from the mean is known as the standard deviation. The higher 
the standard deviation, the worse the mean describes the actual characteristics 
of the group. Because variance is calculated using the square of the deviation 
it is more sensitive to the effect of individual large deviations.
Variance analysis:  Variance analysis examines the influence of one (uni-
variate) or several (multivariate) factors on one or more dependent variables. 
For example, the influence of the factor of experience of deprivation on the 
dependent variable of prejudice could be investigated using variance analy-
sis. The result indicates how much of the deviation from the mean is caused 
by one or more other factors; in this case, whether the factor of experience 
of deprivation explains higher or lower values for prejudice. The value for ex-
plained variance indicates in percent how much of this deviation is explained 
by the examined factor.
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Abbreviations
D Germany
EU European Union
F France
GB Great Britain
GFE Group-focused enmity
HU Hungary
I Italy
NL Netherlands
ns non-significant
PL Poland
PT Portugal
SDO Social Dominance Orientation
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